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INTRODUCTION 
 
The federal immigration system controls the lives of every individual entering the 
United States—it dictates when they can enter, when they must leave, and the process by 
which officials operate if they encounter individuals without legal status. Though federal 
laws and regulations once dominated immigration policy in the U.S., many policies are 
now enacted on the local level. This increased state and local involvement in immigration 
policy—known as “immigration federalism”—has become an important facet of 
immigration law and policy. This dissertation contributes to the existing literature in this 
area by examining the effects of immigration federalism at three different levels: the 
state, the county, and finally, the immigration court.  
My first chapter focuses on the labor market impacts of the modern Official 
English movement on the limited English proficient (LEP) population in the United 
States. This movement, which originated in the early twentieth century, was revived in 
the 1980s. Thirty-two states currently have an Official English law. These laws require 
that all official government business be conducted in only English. I find that these laws 
are associated with a wage penalty for men residing in Official English law states. This 
wage penalty remains unexplained by individual characteristics and occupational 
representation in jobs that place a lesser importance on English skills. I find that these 
laws have a heterogeneous effect on LEP minorities: white LEP workers do not earn the 
same wage penalties that other LEP minorities do in Official English states, providing 
limited evidence for employment discrimination as one mechanism underlying the 
negative effects of Official English laws on LEP workers. 
My second chapter provides a nationwide empirical analysis of the labor market 
impacts of 287(g) agreements. 287(g) agreements are made between representatives from 
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local governments and U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and allow 
ICE to deputize local officers to investigate the immigration status of individuals so that 
local officers may report those individuals to ICE. I find that these agreements are 
associated with large wage penalties for both male and female immigrant workers. After 
segmenting my sample by a proxy for legal status, I find that the negative effects of 
287(g) agreements on wages are felt more acutely by potentially undocumented workers 
than their peers with legal status. Further, underlying heterogeneity in the breadth of 
these agreements can explain some of their negative effects on immigrant wages.  
My final chapter examines a different type of local body: the immigration court. 
While immigration courts are a part of the federal immigration system, each court must 
autonomously manage the backlog of cases in their docket. This case backlog has 
resulted in a crisis of volume facing immigration courts and has nearly crippled the 
immigration system: at the end of 2017, there were 629,051 cases pending nationwide, or 
more than 2,500 cases per immigration judge. My analysis examines the impact that this 
case backlog has on both the duration of immigration cases and the final decision in each 
immigration case. My results provide evidence that a congestion effect is occurring in 
immigration courts: when case backlog becomes sufficiently large, the amount of time 
that it takes judges to reach a final decision in a case slows and the probability of success 
in a given case increases. Ultimately, my dissertation provides evidence that local 
immigration policies and procedures created under the immigration federalism 
framework can have a significant impact on the U.S. immigrant population. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH MOVEMENT AND MECHANISMS 
UNDERLYING THE EFFECTS ON LEP WORKER WAGES 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The United States has a long history of promoting a singular national English 
language. Theodore Roosevelt wrote in support of one language: “We have room for but 
one language here, and that is the English language, for we intend to see that the crucible 
turns our people out as Americans, of American nationality . . .” (Morrison and Roosevelt 
1954). The influx of immigrants to the United States in recent decades prompted state 
legislatures to return to the ideal of a nation under a homogeneous language through 
state-level Official English policies. Yet, the effects of these modern laws on workers 
who do not speak English well or at all—and the mechanisms through which these 
workers can be affected—are unclear. In this paper, I examine the impact of Official 
English laws on limited English proficient (LEP) worker wages. After finding that these 
laws negatively impact LEP worker wages, I isolate the mechanisms behind the effects of 
these laws. 
Language is one of the most important factors in immigrant assimilation. 
Immigrants who learn the native language of their host country achieve better labor 
market outcomes (Koussodji 1998; Dustmann and Van Soest 2002; Dustmann and Fabri 
2003; Bleakley and Chin 2004; Chiswick and Miller 2007) and are quicker to integrate 
socially (Bleakley and Chin 2010; Tam and Page 2016). Yet there are more than 19.2 
million adults in the United States who report that they do not speak English well or at all 
(Wilson 2014).  
As immigration rates swelled throughout the 1980s, many state policymakers 
responded to this increase by proposing bills declaring English the official language of 
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the state, with the stated intent of helping immigrants assimilate to the culture of the 
United States by learning the native language. Those in opposition to this Official English 
movement saw these laws as thinly veiled attempts to discriminate against workers who 
do not speak English well or at all—or even against foreign-born individuals as a whole, 
regardless of English ability (Liu 2014).  
The Official English movement supports the declaration of English as the official 
government language of the United States and each individual state. Under Official 
English laws, all official government business—including public documents, records, and 
meetings—are conducted in English, and English only.1 West Virginia became the thirty-
second state to pass an Official English law on March 5, 2016 and debates over 
Pennsylvania’s Official English bill are currently taking place in its legislature. National 
attempts to make English the official language of the United States are quickly gaining 
support, as there are over 90 co-sponsors of a proposed national Official English bill in 
the House of Representatives. If enacted, this bill would require all official functions of 
the U.S. government to be conducted in English and would require all candidates for 
naturalization of citizenship to undergo uniform testing of their English language ability.  
Prior research shows that these laws hinder the labor market outcomes of limited 
English proficient workers. Zavodny (2000) finds that limited English proficient (LEP) 
male workers experience a wage penalty of 12 percent in states that have Official English 
laws, but does not find a significant effect of these laws on women’s earnings. Mora and 
Saenz (1997) find an 8 percent decline in earnings for all LEP Hispanic workers in states 
                                                 
1 Though providing ballots and other voting materials could be considered official government business, 
the Voting Rights Act of 1975 contains a provision that requires state governments to provide ballots and 
other information relating to the electoral process in minority languages if the language group is more than 
(1) 10,000 people or (2) is more than five percent of all voting age citizens. 
 
5 
with Official English laws. Federman et al. (2006) conclude that Official English policies 
harm LEP workers after finding that manicurist state licensing laws requiring a test in 
English only results in a significant wage penalty for Vietnamese immigrants. Official 
English laws decrease housing investments among Hispanic immigrants (Dávila et. al 
2003) but moderately increase the literacy of certain foreign-born children (Lleras-Muney 
and Shertzer 2015).  
Yet, past literature focusing on Official English laws stops short of determining 
the mechanism by which these laws affect the labor market outcomes of LEP individuals. 
Using four decades of Census and American Community Survey (ACS) data, I use a 
differences-in-differences-in-differences methodology that uses the differing state 
enactment dates of Official English laws. I find that Official English laws are associated 
with roughly a 3 percentage point decrease in wages for male workers. Using O*NET, a 
detailed dataset that provides detailed working conditions by occupation, I find these 
wage penalties remain unexplained by individual occupational characteristics and the 
importance of English in the individual’s job. These wage penalties also unexplained by 
proxies for differences in individual productivity. 
 I ultimately conclude that the unexplained differences of the effects of these laws 
may be associated with wage discrimination against LEP minorities. While these laws 
negatively impact foreign individuals, the effects of these laws are concentrated among 
minority ethnicities. Additionally, I find limited evidence that white LEP workers do not 
experience the same wage penalties as minority ethnicities. In United States v. Carolene 
Products, the Court characterized historic Official English laws as discrimination against 
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particular national minorities.2 My results show that the characterizations of the 1938 
Supreme Court have held over time, and provide a possible explanation for why these 
Official English laws are negatively impacting LEP worker wages. 
II. Official English Movements: Past and Present 
 
Though the United States is one of the most ethnically diverse nations in the 
world, it is historically one of the most homogeneous countries linguistically (Thernstrom 
1980; Citrin et al. 1990; Patsiurko et al. 2012). Despite the lack of linguistic diversity, 
there exists continued support for establishing English as the official language of the 
United States. This support has ebbed and flowed with migration trends. After a surge of 
immigration in the early 1900s, twenty-one states passed laws to make English the 
official language of the state and required the teaching of only English in schools 
(Trasvina 1990). Concerns over immigrant assimilation prompted these laws, as 
immigrants were coming from a diverse set of nations and most did not know English. 
Bilingual education programs raised concerns that teachers were not properly conveying 
“American values” and were therefore slowing the assimilation process (Lleras-Muney 
and Schertzer 2015). These concerns were directed primarily towards German 
immigrants, who used the German language in German social clubs, newspapers, 
churches, and parochial schools. During the outbreak of World War I, distrust of German 
immigrants grew (Moser 2012) and Americans believed that the use of the German 
language signaled disloyalty towards the United States. Many states with large numbers 
of immigrants began adopting Official English laws that required instruction in public 
and private schools to be in English. However, these Official English laws did not survive 
judicial scrutiny. In 1923, the Supreme Court ruled in Meyer v. Nebraska that these 
                                                 
2 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).  
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Official English laws were unconstitutional because they prohibited the teaching of 
foreign languages in schools.  
Soaring levels of immigration in the 1980s ushered in a new era of federal 
legislation promoting English as the official language of the United States. This 
culminated in the Bill Emerson Language Empowerment Act of 1996, which declared 
English the official language of the federal government and required all government 
business to be conducted in English. The bill was passed by the House of 
Representatives, but stalled in the Senate due to concerns of discrimination against 
immigrants and beliefs that the bill was unnecessary, as the United States had functioned 
without an official language for more than 200 years. Despite these concerns, a federal 
Official English bill is introduced into Congress almost every year, and the English Unity 
Act of 2017 has gained more supporters in the House of Representatives than any other 
proposed Official English bill since 1996. 
Rather than wait for federal action, some states took the Official English 
movement into their own hands by adopting a statute or passing a Constitutional 
amendment declaring English the official state language.  These laws differ from the 
Official English laws of the 1920s as they require the use of English only when the state 
government is acting in its official capacity. Modern Official English laws do not directly 
limit bilingual education, though some states have used their Official English law to 
restrict bilingual education for LEP students. Table 1 lists all thirty-two states that have 
passed Official English laws along with the date of adoption and form of law (whether 
the law was enacted by statute or constitutional amendment).  
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Figures 1 and 2 show the progression of these state laws over time. 3   Figure 3 
depicts all states with some form of Official English law as of April 2016. States that 
have enacted Official English laws are geographically and politically diverse. This is 
consistent with evidence from the American National Election Study (NES), which 
shows that support for Official English laws is broad and is not based on partisanship, 
social class, or racial and ethnic hostility (Frendreis and Tatalovich 1997).  The four 
states that receive the most immigrants—California, Texas, New York, and Florida—are 
also equally balanced: two (California and Florida) have official English laws while two 
(New York and Texas) do not. One study claims that these laws are adopted in part 
depending on the proportion of a state’s population that is foreign-born and whether the 
state allows for direct initiatives to influence the adoption of language laws (Schildkraut 
2001) but other scholars find that the size of a minority population has only an indirect 
effect on legislative policy decisions (Citrin et al. 1990; Preuhs 2005). Liu et al. (2014) 
finds that a state’s foreign-born population only increases the likelihood of English-
official legislation adoption when the issue of immigration is nationally salient.  
Figure 1 also depicts the handful of states that passed Official English laws before 
1980. There is evidence that the motives underlying these early laws were different than 
those passed during the Official English movement. For example, Louisiana’s Official 
English law was passed in 1807, denouncing French as its official language so the state 
could join the Union. Illinois’s law was passed in 1969 to replace its official language, 
                                                 
3 Virginia clarified its official English law in 1996, by adopting a new statute stating, “[e]xcept as provided 
by law, no state agency or local government shall be required to provide and no state agency or local 
government shall be prohibited from providing any documents, information, literature or other written 
materials in any language other than English.” The prior law had simply designated English as the official 
language of the state. For the bulk of my analysis, I treat Virginia’s date of adoption as 1981, but I also 
perform robustness checks changing the date of adoption to 1996 and my results are not qualitatively 
affected. 
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which was then “American.” My analysis focuses only on Official English laws passed 
from 1980–2010. I examine Official English laws passed before 1980 in the Appendix. 
III. Conceptual Framework 
 
Despite claims that these laws are purely symbolic, Official English laws may 
affect the wages of workers with limited English ability. The direct effect of these laws 
would exclude LEP individuals from working in state governments. As the share of LEP 
workers in state government is likely to be slim, this direct effect is unlikely to be 
substantial. Yet, the indirect effects of Official English laws on both worker and 
employer behavior have the potential to be large.  
Official English laws can impact a worker’s occupational choice. Without English 
ability, LEP workers may shift their occupational choices to occupations that do not 
emphasize knowledge of the language, as occupational choices are the “intervening 
activity” that links earnings to acquired country-specific human capital skills (Duncan 
1961; Chiswick and Miller 2010). However, at the individual level, even if LEP workers 
select out of occupations requiring high levels of English language ability because of a 
lack of country-specific language skills, the supply of workers in each occupation should 
not differ on the basis of whether there are Official English laws in the state, as worker 
preferences should not shift based on Official English laws.  
Similarly, while LEP workers may be less productive in occupations requiring the 
English language (Lazear 1999; Chiswick and Miller 2010), the productivity of LEP 
workers should not differ between states if there is no difference in the quality of LEP 
workers in states with or without Official English laws.4 However, to the extent that 
                                                 
4 Table 3 reports that LEP workers in states with and without Official English laws are similar on many 
observable characteristics, including age and years of education.  
 
10 
Official English laws limit the use of government services (such as driver’s licenses and 
job licensing), LEP workers may be hindered from obtaining the necessary prerequisites 
for employment.5 Controlling for differences in strength of enforcement of Official 
English laws can explain the effects of these laws on worker productivity.  
Any remaining unexplained difference between LEP worker wages in Official 
English states may be attributable to employment discrimination (Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 
1973). Official English laws have been linked to discrimination against foreign-born 
individuals by encouraging xenophobic rhetoric and prejudice (Califa 1989; Arington 
1991) and by allowing to employers to create their own English-only policies (Davis 
1997). However, according to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
English-only policies are categorically unlawful and presumed to violate Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discriminating based on national origin unless the employer 
can demonstrate that English is necessary for the individual’s job.6 Still, employment 
discrimination may persist without a formal English-only policy in Official English states 
if employers choose to favor non-LEP workers systematically over LEP workers, or if 
employers systematically favor groups of LEP workers. If Official English laws reflect 
employer discrimination against LEP workers, I expect a decline over time in the labor 
                                                 
5 For example, in states that enforce their Official English law such that they will not offer driver’s license 
exams in any language other than English, an LEP worker’s employment opportunities may be severely 
restricted in places without ample public transportation. 
6 See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2012); see also Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(“The EEOC Guidelines provide that an employee meets the prima facie case in a disparate impact cause of 
action merely by proving the existence of the English-only policy.”); Long v. First Union Corp., 894 F. 
Supp. 933, 940 (E.D. Va. 1995) (same). The Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether language-based 
discrimination should be considered a suspect class, but legal scholars have contended that this type of 
discrimination should be given strict scrutiny, or intermediate level scrutiny at the very least (Moran 1981; 
Califa 1989). 
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market outcomes of LEP workers in Official English states relative to LEP workers in 
non-Official English states that cannot be explained by observable differences.7 
Finally, these laws may cause immigrants to resist the English language. The anti-
immigrant rhetoric that often surrounds the Official English movement may encourage 
ethnic minorities to become more ethnocentric and resist acquiring English skills (Pérez 
2014; Fouka 2015). These laws may also allow for feedback such that LEP workers 
choose lower paying jobs with less emphasis on the English language in anticipation of 
employer discrimination, migrate out of states that adopt Official English laws, or leave 
the labor force altogether. I discuss the potential for these effects giving my analysis in 
the concluding remarks of this chapter. 
IV. Data and Methodology 
 
A. Data 
 
I use the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Census 1% samples along with a 1% sample of the 
2009-2013 5-year American Community Survey (ACS).8 This is the only large data set 
spanning the modern Official English movement that also asks participants questions 
regarding English proficiency.9 I use this time period because it coincides with the 
modern Official English movement and because the Census first asked questions 
regarding English proficiency in 1980.  
                                                 
7 This conceptual framework squares with political science work regarding support for Official English 
laws. The two main explanations for these laws are economic conflict and cultural resentment (Moran 
1987), where majority groups feel vulnerable and support Official English laws as a defensive reaction to 
this vulnerability (Citrin et al. 1990). As a result, the majority may discriminate against minority actors. 
8 I use data compiled by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). IPUMS contains the same 
underlying values as Census data, but harmonizes the data across years by assigning uniform codes to 
variables.  
9 Though the Current Population Survey (CPS) provides labor market information, it only twice asks 
individuals about English ability. The CPS included questions about English ability in the supplements 
administered in 1979 and 1989.  
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 In each Census year, all households in the United States receive a short form 
Census, which asks basic demographic questions regarding each household member. 
Additionally, through the 2000 Census, one out of six households receives the long form 
Census, which asks more detailed labor market and migration questions. I use data from 
the long form Census, as it contains data on immigration status and important 
employment measures such as employment status and income. 
The questions that were once asked in the long form Census are now asked in the 
ACS, which began in 2005. The ACS is a nationally representative sample that 
continually surveys randomly sampled addresses in every state, the District of Columbia, 
and Puerto Rico. Each year, the ACS samples nearly three million household unit 
addresses in the United States. No household will receive the survey more often than 
once every five years. I supplement my analysis of Census samples with the 5-year ACS 
spanning the years of 2009–2013. The 5-year ACS has the benefit of providing more 
reliable samples than 1-year ACS estimates of smaller populations, like those of limited 
English proficiency. I treat the 2009–2013 ACS as a proxy for the 2010 Census 
consistent with prior literature (Borjas 2015).  
 To obtain information on English proficiency, the both ACS and Census ask 
individuals how well they speak English. There are four responses to this question: very 
well, well, not well, and not at all. Census forms are in English but are also available in 
Spanish. Following Zavodny (2000), I classify those who report their ability to speak 
English as not well or not at all as having limited English proficiency.  These measures 
are self-reported and could introduce non-random measurement error if, for example, 
individuals were overly confident about their English speaking abilities when answering 
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the survey. But there is evidence that individual’s self-reported measures of English 
ability are accurate: Kominski (1989) and Wilson (1999) find that self-reported measures 
of English ability are highly correlated with interviewer reports of English ability. 
Further, Kominski (1989) noted that reporting errors in this question were unlikely to 
change the final distribution of a two-category measure of English ability. I use a two-
category measure of English ability. Therefore, it is unlikely that the estimated 
coefficients will be biased due to systematic measurement error. However, these 
coefficients could be attenuated due to random error, which would only bias my 
coefficients downward and result in my coefficients providing conservative estimates of 
the true effect of these laws on LEP workers. 
 To analyze the effects of Official English law enactments, I code each state law 
according to its date of adoption as shown in Table 1. I create indicator variables to show 
if a state has enacted an Official English Law in each year of data. For example, South 
Carolina, which enacted its law in 1987, would have an indicator variable for an Official 
English law equal to zero in 1980, but equal to one in 1990, 2000, and 2010.  
My analysis uses measures of wages, hours, and weeks worked. The Census and 
ACS report earnings annually. The Census and ACS measure hours worked each week by 
asking the surveyed household member: “during the past 12 months, in the weeks 
worked, how many hours did you usually work each week?” The Census and ACS 
measure weeks worked each year by asking respondents how many weeks that they 
worked last year, including paid vacation, paid sick leave, and military service. The 
Census reports actual weeks worked, while the ACS reports weeks in broad ranges. For 
individuals in the ACS, I use the midpoint of the reported range as the number of weeks 
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that individual worked. I construct hourly wage by dividing an individual’s earnings by 
the amount of weeks worked multiplied by usual hours worked each week. I adjust all 
wages to 2010 dollars.  
I create a variable for years of completed schooling.10 I create indicator variables 
for marital status, race, veteran status, and if children are present in the individual’s 
household. I also create independent indicator variables for racial and ethnic groups to 
allow for the mutual exclusivity of Hispanic individuals and white individuals. To 
examine the importance of an individual’s occupation, I create indicator variables using 
the 2010 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) major groups including 
transportation, construction, management, sales, and production. As my sample excludes 
those in the military, there are 22 different indicator variables for occupation in my 
analysis. 
There is a substantial literature showing that time spent in the United States is 
positively related to the wage growth of foreign-born individuals relative to natives 
(Chiswick 1978; Chiswick 1986; Smith 2006; Lubotsky 2007; Borjas and Friedberg 
2009), though this growth may be slowing in newer cohorts (Borjas 2015). To capture 
this heterogeneity of the foreign-born population, and to provide for direct comparison to 
prior literature (Zavodny 2000), I create categorical indicator variables for the years since 
entry to the United States for each foreign-born individual.11  
                                                 
10 The ACS provides a detailed report of the highest level of schooling completed. Each survey participant 
has an option to select the precise highest grade of schooling, but some are also reported in ranges. For 
example, individuals could report their highest level of schooling as grade 1 or grades 1, 2, 3, or 4. For 
those individuals that report their highest level of schooling as a range, I use the midpoint values of the 
ranges as their years of schooling. All individuals that spent more than four years in college and obtained a 
college degree were coded as obtaining 16 years of education.   
11 These categories are less than 5 years, less than 10 years, less than 15 years, less than 20 years, less than 
30 years, and more than 30 years. 
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I restrict the sample to full-time, full-year workers who are not self-employed or 
working without pay and are not in the armed forces. I remove individuals who were born 
in Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, or those born abroad with American 
parents. Therefore, my sample contains only citizens born in the United States, 
naturalized citizens, and non-citizens. I create a variable indicating foreign-born status, 
which includes both naturalized and non-citizens.  
 Table 2 provides the summary statistics of individuals by their residence in states 
with or without an Official English law. Individuals in states with an Official English law 
and those in states without such a law are strikingly similar: they both have roughly 
thirteen years of education and are roughly 40 years old on average. Those in states 
without an Official English law earn only 38 cents less per hour on average than 
individuals that reside in Official English states ($22.54 per hour compared to $22.16 per 
hour in 2010 dollars). There are also more total immigrants in states that have Official 
English laws. I address the potential for selective migration of LEP workers in subsection 
F. 
Table 3 compares demographics of LEP individuals based on state of residency. LEP 
individuals in states with or without Official English laws are strikingly similar: they 
have almost identical average years of education and ethnic makeups. In this raw data, 
LEP workers that reside in states without official English laws earn 9 cents more per hour 
than LEP workers in states with such a law. Table 4 compares LEP individuals to the 
other workers in my sample. English proficient foreign-born individuals look more like 
natives than LEP workers: they are as equally educated as natives on average and also 
earn more per hour than natives. In contrast, LEP workers earn roughly one-half of the 
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hourly wage of individuals who are proficient in English. Roughly half of the English 
proficient foreign-born individuals in my sample are white, and roughly one third of 
English proficient foreign-born individuals workers are Hispanic. Most of my sample is 
natives, but my sample also contains 67,324 LEP workers and 240,746 English proficient 
foreign-born individuals.  
B. Methodology 
 
I use a differences-in-differences-in-differences, also known as a triple difference, 
framework to examine the impact of Official English laws on the labor market outcomes 
of LEP workers. This specification has the advantage of eliminating different trends in 
the wages of LEP and non-LEP individuals over time. My main specification is: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∝  +𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖β1 + β2𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + β3𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + β4(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)      +β5(𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) + β6(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + β7(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  + X𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆 +  ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (1) 
where i indexes individuals, k indexes state, and t indexes years. W represents the real 
hourly wage of an individual in 2010 dollars.  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 is equal to one if a worker i reports 
limited English proficiency, while OE equals one if the state in which the individual is 
located has adopted an Official English law in year t. X is a vector of demographic 
variables including veteran status, race, age, age squared divided by 100, years of 
education, children present, married, occupation, and whether the individual identifies as 
Hispanic. I cluster standard errors at the state level.  
The three interaction terms in the model are between LEP status and state, 
between year and state, between LEP status and year. The triple difference term interacts 
LEP status and whether an Official English law was passed in the given state at the time.  
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β7 is the coefficient of interest and represents the change in the LEP wage penalty 
between Official English and non-Official English states. 
The benefit of this triple difference framework is that it requires few identifying 
assumptions to give β7 a causal interpretation. The triple difference framework should 
not be affected by unobserved ability or other unobserved heterogeneity that can bias 
other estimates. For example, if English ability is correlated with other unobserved 
abilities that affect earnings, omitting these variables would bias the estimates. Triple 
difference estimates do not suffer the same bias if unobservable ability or other 
characteristics of LEP workers in states with or without Official English laws did not 
change during the studied period. Should there be any shock in the sample period that 
affects the wages of LEP workers in states that adopted official English laws differently 
than it affects the wages of LEP workers in other states, these identifying assumptions 
could be violated.12 I address threats to these identifying assumptions in later portions of 
this Section.  
C. Results 
 
Table 5 reports the results of Equation 1 using Census and ACS data for men and 
women. Consistent with prior research, individuals who do not know English well or at 
all are at a large wage disadvantage.13 I find that the there exists a 3.7 log point wage 
                                                 
12 My analysis assumes that these laws are exogenous and are not influenced by factors such as the in-
migration of LEP workers. Using the methodology of Liu (2014), I predict whether states adopted a law 
over the 1980–2010 time period controlling for the presence of voter initiatives, whether the state was in 
the south, whether the state voted for a democrat in the 1992 presidential election, and the change in LEP 
population over the preceding decade. The coefficient of change in the LEP population is not significant at 
the 10 percent level, lending support to the fact that these are exogenous laws unexplained by underlying 
factors such as inflows of LEP workers.    
13 I describe my results in log points, as the straightforward interpretation of continuous regressors as a 
percentage difference in semi-log equations does not hold in the case of estimated coefficients of dummy 
variables. (Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980). The proper representation of the marginal effect (𝑔𝑔) of a 
dummy variable on the dependent variable is 𝑔𝑔 ∗ 100= [exp (𝐶𝐶)-1]*100, where C represents the coefficient 
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penalty between male LEP workers in Official English as compared to LEP workers in 
non-Official English states. The 3.7 log point coefficient on β7 is relatively large, as it 
expands the gap between male LEP workers and their English proficient counterparts by 
20%. These results are consistent with—but smaller in magnitude than—past research on 
Official English laws: Zavodny (2000) finds an 8 percent wage gap for LEP male 
workers in Official English states during the years of 1980–1990.  The smaller wage 
penalty for male LEP workers in Official English states could be explained by the 
productivity or quality of LEP workers in official English states improving over time. 
This smaller wage penalty could also signify that the more recent laws are not enforced 
as stringently as older laws. I examine enforcement and ties to productivity in Section VI 
of this Chapter.   Given that these laws result in larger wage penalties for LEP male 
workers, I examine the potential occupation-based mechanisms behind these negative 
effects in Section V.  
Consistent with past research, I find that the wage penalty for LEP women does 
not differ with the adoption of Official English laws. Table 5 shows that while female 
LEP workers in non-Official English states are at a wage disadvantage of roughly 10 
percent compared to female non-LEP workers, female LEP workers residing in states 
with Official English laws do not experience any incremental penalty in wages over time. 
This could be due to female LEP worker’s occupational distribution—for example, if 
they were already in jobs that required little English knowledge both before and after the 
Official English law was passed. I examine this possibility in Section V.  
                                                                                                                                                 
from the equation. One log point represents the regression coefficient that has not undergone this 
transformation. However, for most of my coefficients, log points are roughly equivalent to marginal effects 
multiplied by 100. For example, a 3 log point change would be equivalent to a marginal effect of 0.03045, 
or 3 percent. 
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Though my analysis focuses on only wages as an outcome for LEP workers, I also 
examine the effects of these laws on other employment outcomes, such as probability of 
employment, in the Appendix. I find evidence that LEP women and men in Official 
English states work fewer weeks and hours than their counterparts in Official English 
states, which could be due to the shift of LEP workers in Official English states to part-
time work. I also find evidence that LEP men in Official English states are less likely to 
be employed. 
D. Placebo Tests 
 
Though I find significant effects of Official English laws on LEP male workers, 
the treatment of residing in a state with an Official English law is not randomly assigned. 
However, the triple differences methodology that I employ estimates the average 
treatment effect on the treated as long as LEP worker trends are uncorrelated with the 
adoption of these laws.  
To test this identifying assumption, I conduct a placebo test that examines 
whether the resulting effects are persistent to an arbitrary change in the date of enactment 
to a different time period as suggested in Bertrand and Duflo (2004).14 To perform a 
placebo test, I adjust all laws that were passed in the 1990–2000 time frame in my sample 
to reflect that they were instead passed from 1980–1990. I then examine whether I find a 
similar effect of these laws by using Equation 1. I repeat this by adjusting all laws that 
were passed in the 1980–1990 time frame to reflect that they were instead passed from 
2000–2010. Table 6 shows the results from this placebo test. I find that coefficient for 𝛽𝛽7 
                                                 
14 Ideally, I would be able to perform an event study, which would require measuring the years leading up 
to the passage of Official English laws. However, because the Census is conducted every decade, I am 
unable to observe Census data during the years immediately preceding passage of an Official English law.  
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with these placebo laws is statistically insignificant for all specifications for men and 
women, providing evidence of a causal effect of Official English laws on LEP wages. 
E. Shifts in the LEP Worker Population 
 
During the observed time period, many states that enacted Official English laws 
also had increasing limited English proficient populations. The influx of foreign 
individuals to many states could be underlying the observed negative impact of Official 
English laws on LEP wages. In my main specifications, I include state, year, and state-
by-year fixed effects to control for any variation over time in each state. However, this 
does not specifically control for the underlying trends in LEP population growth. 
Controlling for the increased percentage of the LEP population in each state will capture 
any spillover effects that occur due to changes in the LEP population, such as spillovers 
to non-LEP workers who may complement or substitute LEP workers. 
To control for the effect of the change in the limited-English-proficient population 
share, I use the following equation:  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∝ + 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖β1 + β2𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + β3𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + β4(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) +β5(𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ×  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) + β6(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + β7(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +δ1(%ΔPop𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + X𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆 + ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
(2) 
where %ΔPop𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the percentage change between observation years in the fraction of the 
state population that does not speak English or does not speak English well. I derive this 
variable from the 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010 census data. This variable takes the value of 
0 for all observations within the 1980 census sample. Interacting this variable with the 
indicator variable for LEP status of each individual will allow me to compute the effect 
of the percentage change in the LEP population share on earnings for LEP workers. 
Comparing β7 with the values that I obtained from the main specification in Equation 1 
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will allow me to analyze whether the change in the LEP population has an effect on LEP 
worker wages in states with Official English laws. Further, the coefficient of interest, δ1, 
will allow me to determine whether there is a effect of the increasing LEP population 
share on LEP status. 
Table 7 depicts the results from Equation 2. I find that my main results hold: LEP 
male workers in Official English states experience a wage penalty of roughly 3 log points 
relative to others while women do not experience a significant wage penalty. The 
coefficient on the percentage change of the LEP population is positive in Table 7, which 
shows that an increase in the LEP population positively affects all male wages. My main 
coefficient of interest, δ1, is not significant for either men or women, providing evidence 
that there is no confounding effect of LEP population shifts in my main specification. 
Given this analysis, my main results are not sensitive to shifting demographics of the 
LEP worker population and potential spillover effects that may occur due to inflows of 
LEP workers.  
F. Selective Migration 
 
One of the identifying assumptions of the triple difference framework is that any 
shock during the sample period that affects the wages of LEP workers in states that 
adopted official English laws does not differently affect the wages of LEP workers in 
other states. One such shock could be selective migration, or inflows of LEP workers to 
states that have not enacted Official English laws to avoid the perceived negative impacts 
of these laws. Selective migration is particularly problematic for my estimates if the most 
skilled LEP workers are choosing to leave Official English states in favor of states 
without such laws.  
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The Census asks specific questions regarding migration, namely where the 
individual lived 5 years ago. To partially control for selective migration, I drop all 
individuals who did not live in the same state when surveyed for the Census and five 
years prior to the Census survey. As immigrants who are more educated and have better 
skills are more likely to move to a different city (Bartel and Koch 1991), removing these 
individuals may also remove individuals that have greater unobservable skills in the labor 
market. Among my sample, 14 percent of non-LEP individuals moved to a new state in 
the past 5 years while 9 percent of LEP individuals that did not immigrate to the United 
States within the past 5 years moved to a new state. When dropping these individuals 
from the sample, I find similar results for wage outcomes for both men and women. 
Table 8 shows that LEP men incur roughly a 4 log point wage penalty in Official English 
states, while LEP women do not incur a significant wage premium or penalty.  
In addition to restricting the sample to non-movers, I also test for migration 
response. Using an individual’s residence five years ago, I examine whether an individual 
residing in a state with an Official English law was more likely to have moved to a non-
Official English state. To do this, I use a probit model to test the likelihood of movement 
with this restricted sample. The dependent variable in this equation is the equal to one if 
the individual moved from an Official English state to a state without an Official English 
law. The independent variables are the same as those in Equation 1. Table 9 shows the 
results from this probit equation. I find that individuals are not more likely to move from 
an Official English law state to a state without an Official English law, as the coefficient 
on β7 is insignificant and close to 0. Therefore, I am confident that my results are not 
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driven by selective migration of individuals moving away from Official English states 
after these laws are passed.  
G. Heterogeneity of Official English Laws 
Official English laws vary in form. These laws appear as either statutes or 
constitutional amendments. It is both theoretically ambiguous and empirically unknown 
whether constitutional amendments or statutes carry more force in practice. While 
constitutional amendments require more support to pass, they also require more support 
to overturn. However, they generally do not provide the level of detail that is present in a 
statute. Official English statutes generally enumerate specific details or exceptions, but 
require less support to pass and overturn. Further, broad language such as that usually 
found in constitutional amendments may be interpreted broadly by courts, while clear 
statutes that detail the effect of the law may be subject to a more restrained interpretation. 
Notably, though Georgia already has an Official English statute, legislators in Georgia 
recently announced plans to lobby for an Official English Constitutional amendment 
because they believe that this amendment would be more difficult to overturn should the 
political sentiment for Official English in the state shift.  
Table 10 shows that states with statutes and those with constitutional amendments 
are quite similar along a variety of metrics, including average years of education, age, 
and gender. The two differ greatly, however, when comparing the proportion of foreign-
born individuals and the proportion of Hispanic individuals. There exists a greater 
proportion of foreign-born (22 percent) and Hispanic individuals (18 percent) in states 
with Official English constitutional amendments than in states with Official English 
statutes  (2 percent and 6 percent, respectively). Though this disparity exists, it does not 
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follow that there is also a similar gap when considering LEP individuals: LEP individuals 
make up 4 percent of the workforce in states with Official English statutes and just 6 
percent of the workforce in states with Official English constitutional amendments. 
I test whether my results are sensitive to the form of these laws to determine other 
potential explanations for the differences in enforcement of these laws. To test whether 
statutes or constitutional amendments have differing impacts on LEP worker wages, I 
modify Equation 1 to include the form (statute or constitutional amendment) of the law. 
To directly compare these forms, I use the following specification:  
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∝  +𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖β1 + β2𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + β3𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + β4(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) +β5(𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ×  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) + β6(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + β7(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×   𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + β8(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×   𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ) +  X𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆 +  ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
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where the variable definitions are identical to Equation 1 except for the inclusion of a 
variable, statute, indicating that the state had an Official English statute in effect and 
constitution, indicating that the state had an Official English constitutional amendment in 
effect. This specification allows me to use states without any Official English law as the 
control group. β7 and β8 are the coefficients of interest in this equation, and they 
represent the change in the LEP wage penalty between states with Official English 
statutes and non-Official English states and the change in the LEP wage penalty between 
states with Official English Constitutional amendments and non-Official English states. 
Table 11 shows the results of Equation 3. I find that while the form of the law 
does not affect the wages of female LEP workers, it greatly impacts those of male LEP 
workers. I find a 9 log point wage penalty associated with being an LEP male worker in a 
state that has enacted an Official English statute instead of a Constitutional amendment. I 
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do not find any effect of the form of each law on LEP women’s wages. These large 
effects could be due to the level of detail present in statutes that allow for greater 
enforcement of the law as compared to Constitutional amendments that usually allow for 
broad language. These large effects could also be due to other qualities that states with 
Official English statutes have in common, such as region or large immigrant populations, 
but my identification strategy addresses these qualities by controlling for state fixed 
effects. 
These results suggest that the large negative impact of these laws is not driven by 
California, which boasts the highest LEP population of any state. California, as shown in 
Table 1, adopted an Official English law through a Constitutional amendment rather than 
a statute. Yet, more negative effects on LEP worker wages are found in states that 
adopted statutes, which alleviates concern that California is driving my results.15 
However, California does have a voter initiative, which I next examine. 
Official English laws also may be adopted through a voter initiative, which allows 
the public to vote on whether it wants its state to adopt an Official English law. Not 
unique to either Constitutional amendments or statutes, voter initiatives have the unique 
ability of testing the voting public’s approval of legislative policies, which could examine 
the general public sentiment towards LEP workers. Voter initiatives to make English the 
official language of the state have appeared on nine statewide ballots since the beginning 
of the Official English movement. Surprisingly, all nine such initiatives have passed. 
Table 1 indicates whether the Official English law in place in a state was adopted by 
statute or constitutional amendment, and if adopted through voter initiative, what 
percentage of the voters approved the initiative.  
                                                 
15 I also drop California from the sample and find no marked change in my results from Equation 1. 
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Though little evidence exists whether statutes or Constitutional amendments 
should be stronger in effect, there is theoretical and empirical evidence showing laws that 
are enacted by voter initiative are more divisive and are more restrictive on the 
underlying minority population (Arington 1991; Matsusaka 1992). The fact that many of 
the most recent Official English laws have been passed by voter initiative highlights the 
importance of divisiveness in this decision. Additionally, it may be in the best interest of 
a voting politician to disguise their ideologies by not committing to either side and 
instead allowing voter initiatives to occur (Alesina and Cukierman 1990). Table 1 
indicates if the Official English law in each state was passed by voter initiative, and by 
what margin the initiative won. Many of the most recent initiatives passed by margins of 
more than 75 percent.  
I modify Equation 1 to capture the difference in states with voter initiatives to the 
following: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∝  +𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖β1 + β2𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + β3𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + β4(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) +β5(𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 × 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) + β6(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + β7(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×   𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  + β8(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×   𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  X𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆 +  ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
(4) 
 
where the variable definitions are identical to Equation 1 except for the inclusion of a 
variable, VI, which indicates that the state had an Official English voter initiative in 
effect, and NoVI, which indicated that the state had an Official English law that was not 
passed via voter initiative. States without Official English laws serve as the control group 
for this specification. The coefficient of interest, β7, represents the change in the LEP 
wage penalty in states that have enacted a voter initiative.  
Table 12 sheds light on the differences between states that have enacted their 
Official English laws through voter initiatives and those that have not. There is a far 
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greater percentage of Hispanic individuals in voter initiative states than other states (22 
percent compared to 3 percent) and the population of voter initiative states is 26 percent 
foreign born compared with only 6 percent of foreign-born individuals in other states. 
Table 13 shows the results of Equation 4. I find that LEP men in states with voter 
initiatives earn a wage penalty of 3.5 log points. This coefficient is significant at the 5 
percent level. Consistent with prior results, I find no effect for women. These findings are 
robust even when I exclude California residents from my sample, again providing 
evidence that California is not driving my main results. These results show that states 
with Official English voter initiatives are having a sizeable impact on the wages of LEP 
workers, and not all Official English laws have the same impact on LEP workers. 
V. Occupational Representation in Official English States 
 
Though I find an impact of Official English laws on male LEP worker wages, it is 
unclear through which mechanism these effects are occurring. I supplement my analysis 
with detailed data on occupational requirements to determine if Official English laws 
affect occupational distribution. If I do not find evidence of worker behavior changes in 
response to these laws, other mechanisms—such as differences in productivity or 
employer discrimination—will underlie my results.  
Past work has examined the differences in immigrant earnings among 
occupational classifications (Kossoudji 1998; Chiswick et al. 2005). These studies do not 
take into account the substantial variation in job requirements among these 
classifications. For example, the occupational category “managers” encompasses both 
Chief Executive Officers and cafeteria directors, which have differing levels of English 
level requirements. I use the Occupational Information Network (O*NET), a detailed 
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dictionary of job descriptors for 798 occupations to capture this variation in English 
language requirements across and within occupational classifications. 
Researchers have used O*NET to examine immigrant workers’ specialization and job 
matching, but have not examined how legal changes affect occupational matching.  Peri 
and Sparber (2009) use O*NET measures of physical tasks and language ability 
requirements and find that immigrants and native-born workers specialize in jobs with 
different tasks. Chiswick and Miller (2010) use O*NET language requirement measures 
coupled with the 2000 Census to show that there is an earnings premium for workers that 
match their language skills with job requirements. This section extends this work by 
examining occupation matching not only by occupational language requirements, but also 
within the context of legal changes regarding language. This Chapter is the first to 
examine how occupational choice is affected when Official English laws are adopted.  
A. Data 
 
O*NET is a comprehensive data source on job characteristics and worker 
attributes within occupations. O*NET is administered by the Department of Labor as a 
replacement for the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). O*NET provides ratings of 
occupational characteristics and skill requirements, including communication and 
interpersonal contact requirements.  Since the inception of the O*NET 1.0 in 1998, 
O*NET has been extended and updated based on input from job analysts and workers.   I 
use O*NET Version 21.3, which was released in May 2017.   
O*NET contains two questions of particular relevance to this analysis: “how 
important is knowledge of the English language to the performance of your current job?” 
and “how important is communicating with others outside of your organization to the 
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performance of your current job?”. I use both of these questions to determine the 
importance of communication in English to individual’s occupations. O*NET rates the 
importance of both speaking English and communicating with the public on a five-point 
scale: (1) not important, (2) somewhat important, (3) important, (4) very important, and 
(5) extremely important.  
To examine how pay varies with job attributes, I merge O*NET with Census and 
ACS data. O*NET identifies 798 occupations using detailed Standard Occupational 
Classification (SOC) codes, while the Census and ACS identify workers based on Census 
occupation codes, which is comprised of 533 occupations. To bridge the gap between 
these two occupation codes, I created a crosswalk between O*NET and Census 
occupations using the methodology of Hirsch and Schumacher (2012). There is a one to 
one match from O*NET occupation codes to Census occupation codes for 491 
occupations. Many of the remaining involve mapping two or more O*NET occupations 
to the Census category. To map these occupations onto the Census, I weight the O*NET 
descriptor scores of each O*NET occupation using the employment from the 
corresponding year reported in the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Occupational Employment 
Statistics (OES) as weights. If the OES employment is unavailable, I equally weight the 
O*NET descriptor scores. The SOC also contains codes that encompass “all other” 
categories, such as “sales and related workers, all others.” O*NET does not have ratings 
for these occupation codes. Therefore, I assign O*NET values based on average ratings 
(using employment weights) among similar occupations.  
The relevant O*NET variables for my analysis are “speaking,” or how important 
speaking English is in the occupation, and the importance of communicating with persons 
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outside of the individual’s organization. On average, LEP workers are represented in 
occupations that have lower importance ratings for both speaking English and 
communicating with the public. The average importance of speaking English score for 
LEP worker occupations is 3.12 on a scale of 1–5, with a standard deviation of 0.44. This 
average importance is slightly lower than the mean score of English proficient workers, 
who have a mean importance score of 3.54 and a standard deviation of 0.45. The 
importance scores of communicating with the public tell a similar story: the average for 
LEP workers is 2.76 with a standard deviation of 0.64, while the average for English 
proficient workers is 3.28 with a standard deviation of 0.69. These statistics accord with 
Chiswick and Miller’s findings (2010) that LEP workers are likely to be in occupations 
that place a lower importance on speaking English or communicating with the public. I 
next determine if these differences are also apparent in states with or without Official 
English laws.  
B.  Are LEP Workers Less Represented in Occupations that Require English Skills 
in Official English States? 
 
I next test whether workers alter their occupational preferences based on the 
presence of an Official English law in their state of residence. To determine how 
occupational sorting and official English laws impact occupational representation, I 
modify Equation 1 to the following structure: 
𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∝  +𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖β1 + β2𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + β3𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + β4(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) +β5(𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ×  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) + β6(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + β7(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + X𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆 +  ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
(5) 
where the dependent variable,  𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, represents either how important speaking English or 
communicating with the public is in the individual’s occupation. The independent 
variables remain the same as in Equation 1. β7 is the variable of interest and represents 
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the change in the importance of speaking English or communicating with the public for 
LEP individuals in Official English states.  
Table 14 reports the results from Equation 5. My results show that, consistent 
with my hypothesis, LEP workers are not, over time, less represented in jobs that require 
English based on whether their state of residence has an Official English law. For both 
men and women, the coefficient of interest, β7, is not statistically significant when 
considering both the importance of speaking English or the importance of communicating 
with others as the dependent variable. Hispanic men and women are likely to be less 
represented in jobs that place high levels of importance on speaking English or 
communicating with others. LEP men and women are neither more nor less likely to be 
represented in occupations with high importance on the English language.  
Despite this lack of differences in representation in occupations that place a high 
level of importance on the English language, there still exists a wage penalty over time 
for LEP workers in Official English states. I examine whether this wage penalty persists 
when controlling for occupation characteristics. To do this, I modify Equation 1 to the 
following: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∝  +δ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖β1 + β2𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + β3𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 +β4(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) + β5(𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ×  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) + β6(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + β7(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  X𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆 +  ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
(6) 
where 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 represents either how important speaking English or communicating with the 
public is in the individual’s occupation. The independent variables remain the same as in 
Equation 1. β7 is the coefficient of interest and represents the change in the LEP wage 
penalty between Official English and non-Official English states after controlling for the 
importance of communication in the individual’s occupation.  
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Table 15 shows the results of Equation 6. I find that the wage gap persists for LEP 
men in Official English states when controlling for occupational level characteristics. 
Workers in occupations with high importance levels of speaking English or 
communicating with others earn significant wage premiums. Men in jobs that place a 
high importance on speaking English earn 12.5 log points more, while women in high 
earn 16.5 log points more than those in jobs that place a lesser importance on speaking 
English. However, this does not explain the wage gap over time for LEP men. Even when 
controlling for these occupational characteristics, male LEP workers still experience a 
wage penalty of roughly 3.4 to 3.7 log points. Consistent with my main results, women 
do not experience any wage penalty. Therefore we must consider other qualities, other 
than the importance of the English language in individual’s occupations, to explain the 
wage gap. I next turn to worker productivity.  
VI. LEP Worker Productivity in Official English States 
 
Official English laws could also affect LEP worker wages if these laws caused a 
decrease in productivity of LEP workers. However, worker productivity should not vary 
depending on whether the state of residence has adopted an Official English law, given 
that the quality of LEP workers is not markedly different between states.  There is a 
possibility for these laws to affect the productivity of workers given that they can directly 
impede the ability of LEP workers to obtain necessary services, such as driver’s licenses. 
As stronger enforcement of these laws will lead to greater restrictions on government 
services that LEP workers may rely on, I proxy for worker productivity and enforcement 
by looking at states that only allow driver’s license exams in English.   
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Though all modern state Official English laws stem from the same Official 
English movement, they are heterogeneous in level of enforcement. For example, though 
Kentucky’s Official English law declares English the official language of the state and 
requires all government workers to conduct government business in English, Kentucky’s 
Department of Labor employees were placed in mandatory Spanish language training to 
“effectively communicate” with workers. This suggests that Kentucky’s Official English 
law may be only symbolic and have no legal force. Yet, even symbolic laws may lead to 
negative consequences if they encourage discrimination against LEP workers (Califa 
1989). This section uses proxies for enforcement to determine whether stronger laws 
have a greater impact on LEP worker wages or if the presence of the law, regardless of 
enforcement, impacts LEP worker wages.  
To determine how enforcement measures after laws are enacted may impact LEP 
workers, I look to states that allow driver’s license tests to be taken in only English. I 
modify my main specification to interact the LEP coefficient with a dummy variable 
equal to one if a state only allows a driver’s license test in English. There are currently 
eight states with driver’s license tests in English only: Hawaii, Arizona, Wyoming, South 
Dakota, Kansas, Oklahoma, New Hampshire, and Maine. Maine is the only one of those 
that does not have a corresponding Official English law, and I therefore exclude Maine 
from my analysis in this section.  
To examine the impacts of driver’s license exams on LEP worker’s wages, I 
modify Equation 1 to the following: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∝  +𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖β1 + β2𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + β3𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + β4(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +β5(𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 × 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + β6(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) +β7(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + X𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆 + ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
(7) 
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where the variable definitions are identical to Equation 1 except for the inclusion of a 
variable, OED, which indicates that the state had a law that allowed driver’s license 
exams in English only. States without Official English laws that allow for driver’s license 
exams in other languages serve as the control group for this specification. The coefficient 
of interest is β7, which represents the change in the LEP wage penalty in states with 
driver’s license exams in English only. 
Table 16 shows that there are 71,672 individuals in my sample that live in states 
that have enacted driver’s license tests in English only, and these individuals look similar 
to those in states offering driver’s license tests in other languages. A greater proportion of 
foreign-born individuals (11 percent) live in states with tests offered in other languages 
than those with tests offered in English only, where the foreign-born population makes up 
8 percent of individuals. There are also more LEP individuals in states that offer these 
driver’s license exams in other languages.  
Table 17 shows the results of Equation 7 and shows that LEP workers wages are 
unaffected by whether states with driver’s license exams in English only. The impact on 
men’s wages is negative, but insignificant at the 10 percent level, while the impact on 
LEP women is positive but insignificant at the 10 percent level. Therefore, greater 
enforcement of Official English laws, which would lead to less access to important 
government services—in this case driver’s licenses—does not appear to have an impact 
on the productivity of LEP workers. Yet, Official English laws continue to have an effect 
on LEP worker wages. The next section discusses an alternative mechanism—
employment discrimination—that could account for the unexplained effects of Official 
English laws on LEP workers.   
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VII. Employment Discrimination 
 
Thus far, there exist differences in LEP worker wages in Official English states 
that remain unexplained by observable characteristics, including occupational choice and 
worker productivity. This suggests that employers may be discriminating against LEP 
workers, or foreign-born workers generally. In the employer discrimination model of 
Becker (1957), some employers are unwilling to hire minority workers at the majority 
wage because they derive disutility from doing so. This can result from distaste for a 
specific subset of the population or could be due to profit-focused motives, which could 
be driven by observations that workers become more productive when they share a 
common language or business culture (Aslund et. al 2014). To determine whether 
employers are motivated by profit-driven motives or by taste-based discrimination, I first 
look at whether these laws operate to impact all foreign-born minorities, which should 
not occur if the employer does not exhibit taste-based discrimination. Next, if profit-
driven motives are occurring, all LEP workers should be treated equally. I examine 
whether the effects of these laws disadvantage particular LEP minority groups and find 
that a taste-based discrimination story is likely.  
There are profit-motivated reasons for why employers would discriminate against 
LEP workers. For example, there is evidence that workers are more productive if they 
share a language with their managers (Lazear 1999), and managers could therefore 
reward English proficient workers with higher wages compared to their LEP 
counterparts, especially in states with Official English laws due to the emphasis on the 
English language. If managers are risk averse, or acquiring information about applicants 
is costly, managers can experience more efficient selection processes by focusing on 
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workers with a similar background to their own due to less noise in productivity signals 
from applicants (Fang and Moro 2011). This would cause managers to hire fewer LEP 
workers, especially in Official English states where the productivity signals from LEP 
workers may carry more noise due to the salience of the importance of the English 
language. However, under these assumptions, all LEP workers should be treated equally. 
If white LEP individuals do not suffer the same labor market consequences in Official 
English states as do LEP individuals of other races, something other than LEP status is 
working to disadvantage LEP workers.  
To test whether this is occurring in my sample, I restrict my sample to just one 
ethnic group (Hispanic, Asian, and White) to compare results between LEP and English 
proficient workers using Equation 1. The coefficient of interest remains β7, but here this 
coefficient represents the change in LEP worker wages in Official English states over 
time relative to workers of their same minority group. Table 18 shows that male LEP 
Hispanic workers in Official English states experience a 6 log point wage penalty in 
Official English states. LEP Hispanic women in Official English states are neither better 
nor worse off over time, but LEP Hispanic women do experience a 9 log point wage 
penalty that is significant at the 10 percent level. These results show that these laws are 
strongly affecting LEP workers of Hispanic ethnicity. 
Table 19 reports that Asian LEP workers in states with Official English laws 
experience an 11 log point wage penalty.  Like LEP Hispanic women, LEP Asian women 
in Official English states are neither better nor worse off than their ethnic counterparts. 
Given these results, it is not foreign-born status that is driving the negative impacts of 
Official English laws on LEP workers, but LEP status. Table 20 shows that being a white 
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LEP worker does not translate to a wage penalty relative to other white workers in 
Official English states. Though being a white LEP worker is disadvantageous, there is no 
significant effects over time for white LEP workers residing in Official English states. 
This result could be driven by the relatively few LEP workers in my sample. However, 
my results do provide limited evidence for the existence of employment discrimination in 
Official English states. 
Therefore, though these laws do not operate to produce discrimination against 
specific ethnicities as a whole, they may allow employers to discriminate against non-
white LEP workers. The mechanism underlying these Official English laws may be 
employer discrimination that does not exhibit a distaste for all foreign-born individuals 
but rather for LEP minority workers. The differential treatment of white LEP individuals 
shows that this discrimination is unlikely to be attributed to profit-maximizing behavior. 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that modern Official English laws are associated with a 
decline in male LEP wages. The contribution of this chapter to the existing literature on 
Official English laws shows that these negative effects on male LEP wages cannot be 
explained by occupational representation or individual characteristics. I conclude that one 
likely mechanism behind the effects of these laws is employer discrimination, focused 
specifically on minority LEP workers rather than on all foreign-born individuals.  
 Rather than focus on the change in actual English knowledge of LEP individuals, 
my analysis examines the employment outcomes of workers. My analysis still allows for 
the unintended consequences of these laws to be another driver behind negative LEP 
worker outcomes. These laws can encourage the ethnocentrism of LEP individuals, and 
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through this mechanism, workers may turn to networks to obtain employment that would 
not require the use of the English language. Through these networks, or through an LEP 
worker’s own observations, there may be a feedback mechanism such that workers in 
Official English states anticipate employer discrimination in jobs that place an 
importance on the English language and therefore they choose other jobs through this 
mechanism. Future research is needed to determine whether these unintended 
consequences are occurring and the magnitude of their effects.  
 Further these Official English laws may coincide with the passage of other 
immigration-related measures, and these effects could capture anti-immigrant sentiment 
more generally. In this way, Official English laws are only one manifestation of nativism 
and the defenses to vulnerability observed in Official English states. My next Chapter 
looks at another immigration-related measure to determine how laws focused on crime, 
rather than language, can impact immigrant worker labor market outcomes. 
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Figure 2: States with an Official English Law as of 2000 
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Figure 3: States with an Official English Law as of April 2016, by Form 
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Table 1: List of All States with Official English Laws 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State Year of 
Adoption 
Form of Law Popular Voter 
Initiative, 
Percentage in 
Favor 
Alabama 1990 Constitutional Amendment Yes, 90% 
Alaska 1998 Statute Yes, 69%  
Arizona 2006 Constitutional Amendment Yes, 74%  
Arkansas 1987 Statute No 
California 1986 Constitutional Amendment Yes, 73% 
Colorado 1988 Constitutional Amendment Yes, 61%  
Florida 1988 Constitutional Amendment Yes, 84% 
Georgia 1996 Statute No 
Hawaii 1978 Constitutional Amendment No 
Idaho 2007 Statute No 
Illinois 1969 Statute No 
Indiana 1984 Statute No 
Iowa 2002 Statute No 
Kansas 2007 Statute No 
Kentucky 1984 Statute No 
Louisiana 1807 Statute No 
Massachusetts 1975 Constitutional Amendment No 
Mississippi 1987 Statute No 
Missouri 2008 Constitutional Amendment Yes, 86% 
Montana 1995 Statute No 
Nebraska 1920 Constitutional Amendment Yes, 63% 
New Hampshire 1995 Statute No 
North Carolina  1987 Statute No 
North Dakota 1987 Statute No 
Oklahoma 2010 Constitutional Amendment Yes, 76% 
South Carolina 1987 Statute No 
South Dakota 1995 Statute No 
Tennessee 1984 Statute No 
Utah 2000 Statute Yes, 67% 
Virginia 1981,1996 Statute No 
West Virginia 2016 Statute  No 
Wyoming 1996 Statute  No 
 
47 
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Presence of Official English Law in State of 
Residence, 1980–2010 
 
 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics by Presence of Official English Law in State of 
Residence, LEP Workers Only 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Official English Law No Official English Law 
Male   0.59   0.61 
Age 40.17 39.68 
Married   0.61   0.64 
Years of Education 13.35 13.22 
Hispanic   0.11   0.08 
Black   0.12   0.09 
Asian   0.05   0.03 
Disabled   0.01   0.02 
Limited English Proficient   0.04   0.02 
Foreign Born    0.14   0.10 
Wage (in 2010 dollars) 22.54 22.16 
N   1,277,402   1,642,934 
Note: Data shown is comprised of the 1% Census during the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 1% 
sample of the 5-year 2009–2013 American Community Survey. Weighted using sample weights. 
Individuals are considered limited English proficient if they reported that they speak English “not-well” 
or “not at all.” Sample is restricted to full-time and full-year workers earning between $1.50 and $300 
per hour who are not self-employed. Age was restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Those 
born in Guam, Puerto Rico, or the U.S. Virgin Islands were excluded from this analysis, as were citizens 
born abroad.  
 
Variable Official English Law No Official English Law 
Male   0.68   0.68 
Age 38.46 38.85 
Married   0.55   0.57 
Years of Education   9.44   9.45 
Hispanic   0.75   0.72 
Black   0.03   0.03 
Asian   0.05   0.06 
Wage (in 2010 dollars) 13.03 13.12 
N 37,668 29,656 
Note: Data shown is comprised of the 1% Census during the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 1% 
sample of the 5-year 2009–2013 American Community Survey. Weighted using sample weights. 
Individuals are considered limited English proficient if they reported that they speak English “not-well” 
or “not at all.” Sample is restricted to full-time and full-year workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per 
hour who are not self-employed. Age was restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Those born 
in Guam, Puerto Rico, or the U.S. Virgin Islands were excluded from this analysis, as were citizens born 
abroad. 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics by English Proficiency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Limited English 
Proficient Immigrant 
English Proficient 
Immigrant 
Native 
Male    0.68      0.62   0.60 
Age  38.66    39.99 39.92 
Married    0.56      0.64   0.62 
Years of Education    9.11    13.43 13.37 
Hispanic    0.72      0.32   0.07 
Black    0.02      0.10   0.10 
Asian    0.16      0.17   0.00 
Disabled    0.00      0.00   0.01 
Wage (in 2010 dollars)  12.44    23.51 22.50 
  67,324  240,746   2,612,266 
Note: Data shown is comprised of the 1% Census during the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 1% sample of 
the 5-year 2009–2013 American Community Survey. Weighted using sample weights. Individuals are 
considered limited English proficient if they reported that they speak English “not-well” or “not at all.” I 
restrict the sample to those working full time, with usual hours greater than 35 hours per week and weeks 
worked per year greater than 50. Sample is restricted to workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour 
who are not self-employed. Age was restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Those born in Guam, 
Puerto Rico, or the U.S. Virgin Islands were excluded from this analysis, as were citizens born abroad.  
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Table 5: Triple Difference Estimates of Official English Laws, 1980–2010 
 
 
Men Women 
      
Age  0.0627*** 0.0544*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0604*** -0.0562*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Years of Education 0.0709*** 0.0853*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.00027) 
Hispanic -0.0964*** -0.0513*** 
 
(0.0022) (0.0025) 
Asian -0.0731*** -0.0010 
 
(0.0053) (0.0054) 
LEP  -0.2055*** -0.1020*** 
 
(0.0333) (0.0341) 
OE Law × LEP -0.0369** -0.0008 
 
(0.0149) (0.0194) 
Constant 0.1734*** -0.1720*** 
 
(0.0354) (0.0376) 
   Observations      1,744,056   1,163,228 
R-squared 0.3133   0.3145 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. Data 
shown is comprised of the 1% Census during the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 1% sample of the 5-year 
2009-2013 American Community Survey.  Sample weights are used. Sample is restricted to full-time and 
full-year workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not self-employed.  Age was restricted 
to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include occupation, marital status, race, Hispanic 
status, children present, year of entry, and veteran status. Individuals are considered limited English 
proficient (LEP) if they reported that they speak English “not-well” or “not at all.” Sample is restricted to 
workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not self-employed. “OE Law” indicates the 
presence of an Official English law in state k at time t. Table also shows robust standard errors clustered at 
the state level.  
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Table 6: Triple Difference Estimates of Official English Laws, Placebo Tests 
 
 1990s Law Passed in 1980 1980s Law Passed in 2000s 
 
Men Women Men Women 
        
Age  0.0664*** 0.0551*** 0.0595*** 0.0558*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Age Squared / 
100 -0.0643*** -0.0589*** -0.0574*** -0.0589*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Years of 
Education 0.0629*** 0.0747*** 0.0791*** 0.0922*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Hispanic -0.0795*** -0.0333*** -0.0806*** -0.0602*** 
 
(0.0031) (0.0036) (0.0027) (0.0028) 
Asian 0.0261*** 0.0433*** 0.0606*** 0.0291*** 
 
(0.0088) (0.0090) (0.0071) (0.0068) 
LEP  -0.1908*** -0.0659 -0.2152*** -0.1411*** 
 
(0.0420) (0.0508) (0.0447) (0.0405) 
OE Law × LEP 0.0038 -0.0041 0.0087 -0.0311 
 
(0.0202) (0.0252) (0.0202) (0.0252) 
Constant 0.3368*** 0.2277*** 0.3368*** 0.2277*** 
 
(0.0437) (0.0525) (0.0150) (0.0525) 
   
  
Observations 783,902 459,010 960,154 704,218 
R-squared     0.2848     0.2463     0.3319     0.2463 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. Data 
shown is comprised of the 1% Census during the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 1% sample of the 5-year 
2009–2013 American Community Survey.  Sample weights are used. Sample is restricted to full-time and 
full-year workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not self-employed.  Age was restricted 
to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include occupation, marital status, race, 
Hispanic status, children present, year of entry, and veteran status. Individuals are considered limited 
English proficient (LEP) if they reported that they speak English “not-well” or “not at all.” Sample is 
restricted to workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not self-employed. “OE Law” 
indicates the presence of an Official English law in state k at time t. Table also shows robust standard errors 
clustered at the state level.  
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Table 7: The Effects of Changes in the LEP Population on Wages 
 
 
Men Women 
Age 0.0627*** 0.0544*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0604*** -0.0562*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Years of Education 0.0709*** 0.0853*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0003) 
Hispanic -0.0964*** -0.0513*** 
 
(0.0022) (0.0025) 
Asian -0.1002*** -0.0141*** 
 
(0.0034) (0.0034) 
% Change in LEP Population 0.0059*** 0.0054 
 
(6.7501) (5.9691) 
% Change in LEP Population × LEP  0.0032 0.0053 
 
(0.0059) (0.0072) 
LEP -0.2069*** -0.1040*** 
 
(0.0334) (0.0342) 
OE Law × LEP -0.0348** 0.0019 
 
(0.0149) (0.0194) 
Constant 0.1694*** -0.1980*** 
 
(0.0340) (0.0357) 
   Observations     1,744,056     1,163,228 
R-squared 0.3133 0.3140 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. Sample 
weights are used. Data shown is comprised of a 1% sample of the Census during the years 1980, 1990, and 
2000 and a 1% sample of the 5-year 2009–2013 American Community Survey. Sample restricted to those 
working full time, with usual hours greater than 35 hours per week and weeks worked per year greater than 
50. Sample restricted to workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour. Age was restricted to those 
between the ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include industry, marital status, race, Hispanic status, 
children present, year of entry, and veteran status. Individuals are considered limited English proficient if 
they reported that they speak English “not-well” or “not at all.” The change in the LEP population was 
measured between each Census year from 1980–2010 using Census data.  “OE Law” indicates the presence 
of an Official English law in state k at time t. Table also shows robust standard errors clustered at the state 
level. 
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Table 8: Triple Difference Estimates Without Migrants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Men Women 
Age 0.0617*** 0.0549*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0610*** -0.0512*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Years of Education 0.0756*** 0.0853*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0003) 
Hispanic -0.0965*** -0.0521*** 
 
(0.0022) (0.0024) 
Asian -0.0987*** -0.0121*** 
 
(0.0033) (0.0034) 
LEP -0.2012*** -0.1029*** 
 
(0.0333) (0.0342) 
OE Law × LEP -0.0430** 0.0019 
 
(0.0149) (0.0194) 
Constant 0.1710*** -0.1720*** 
 
(0.0352) (0.0372) 
 
  
Observations    1,395,291 940,290 
R-squared 0.3323   0.3120 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. 
Data shown is comprised of a 1% sample of the Census during the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 
1% sample of the 5-year 2009–2013 American Community Survey. Sample weights are used. Sample 
restricted to those working full time, with usual hours greater than 35 hours per week and weeks 
worked per year greater than 50. Sample restricted to workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per 
hour. Age was restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include industry, 
marital status, race, children present, year of entry, and veteran status. Individuals are considered 
limited English proficient (LEP) if they reported that they speak English “not-well” or “not at all.” 
“OE Law” indicates the presence of an Official English law in state k at time t. Individuals that moved 
states in the past five years were excluded from the sample. 
 
 
 
 
53 
Table 9: Probit Estimates, Probability of Moving to an Official English State  
 
 
Men Women 
Age -0.0046** -0.1123*** 
 
(0.0018) (0.0023) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0357*** -0.0260*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0028) 
Years of Education 0.0346*** 0.0271*** 
 
(0.0111) (0.0015) 
Hispanic -0.0431*** -0.0737*** 
 
(0.0022) (0.0024) 
Asian -0.0163*** -0.0469*** 
 
(0.0033) (0.0034) 
LEP -0.2434 0.1429*** 
 
(0.1866) (0.0342) 
OE Law × LEP 0.0055 -0.0019 
 
(0.3749) (0.4608) 
Constant -1.1710*** -0.1237*** 
 
(0.0374) (0.0372) 
 
  
Observations    1,744,056    1,163,228 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual moved from a 
state with an Official English law to a state without an Official English law. Data shown is comprised 
of a 1% sample of the Census during the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 1% sample of the 5-year 
2009–2013 American Community Survey. Sample weights are used. Sample restricted to those 
working full time, with usual hours greater than 35 hours per week and weeks worked per year greater 
than 50. Sample restricted to workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour. Age was restricted to 
those between the ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include industry, marital status, race, children 
present, year of entry, and veteran status. Individuals are considered limited English proficient (LEP) 
if they reported that they speak English “not-well” or “not at all.” “OE Law” indicates the presence of 
an Official English law in state k at time t. Individuals that lived in the same state five years ago at the 
time of survey were excluded from the sample.  
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Table 10: Summary Statistics: Official English Laws by Form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Statute Constitutional Amendment 
Male       0.57     0.58 
Age     40.19   40.25 
Married       0.61    0.63 
Years of Education     13.20   13.40 
Hispanic       0.06     0.18 
Black       0.17     0.10 
Asian       0.02     0.07 
Disabled       0.01     0.01 
Limited English Proficient       0.04     0.06 
Foreign Born        0.02     0.22 
Wage (in 2010 dollars)     20.16   23.71 
N   323,699 571,810 
Note: Data shown is comprised of a 1% sample of the Census during the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 
1% sample of the 5-year 2009-2013 American Community Survey. Weighted using sample weights. Sample 
is restricted to workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not self-employed. Age was 
restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Only states with an Official English law are included in this 
sample. 
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Table 11: Triple Difference Estimates, Form of Official English Laws 
 
 
Men Women 
      
Age  0.0627*** 0.0544*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0604*** -0.0562*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Years of Education 0.0709*** 0.0853*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0003) 
Hispanic -0.0963*** -0.0513*** 
 
(0.0022) (0.0025) 
Asian -0.1002*** -0.0141*** 
 
(0.0034) (0.0034) 
LEP  -0.2057*** -0.1032*** 
 
(0.0333) (0.0341) 
Statute × LEP -0.0933*** 0.0274 
 
(0.0325) (0.0377) 
Constitutional Amendment × LEP 0.0095 -0.0017 
 (0.0118) (0.0157) 
Constant 0.1734*** -0.1721*** 
 
(0.0354) (0.0376) 
   Observations      1,744,056   1,163,228 
R-squared 0.3133   0.3140 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. Sample 
weights are used. Data shown is comprised of a 1% sample of the Census during the years 1980, 1990, and 
2000 and a 1% sample of the 5-year 2009-2013 American Community Survey. Sample restricted to those 
working full time, with usual hours greater than 35 hours per week and weeks worked per year greater than 
50. Sample is restricted to full-time and full-year workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are 
not self-employed.  Age was restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include 
occupation, marital status, race, Hispanic status, children present, year of entry, and veteran status. 
Individuals are considered limited English proficient (LEP) if they reported that they speak English “not-
well” or “not at all.” “Statute” indicates the presence of an Official English law in the form of a statute in 
state k at time t. “Constitution” indicates the presence of an Official English law in the form of a 
constitutional amendment in state k at time t. 
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Table 12: Summary Statistics: Voter Initiatives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Voter Initiative  No Voter Initiative  
Male     0.59     0.58 
Age   40.13   40.32 
Married     0.57    0.63 
Years of Education   13.37   13.28 
Hispanic     0.22     0.03 
Black     0.09     0.16 
Asian     0.08     0.02 
Disabled     0.01     0.01 
Limited English Proficient     0.07     0.02 
Foreign Born      0.26     0.06 
Wage (in 2010 dollars)   24.01   20.84 
N  447,191 448,288 
Note: Data shown is comprised of a 1% sample of the Census during the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 
1% sample of the 5-year 2009-2013 American Community Survey. Weighted using sample weights. 
Sample is restricted to full-time and full-year workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are no  
self-employed. Age was restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Only individuals living in state 
with Official English laws are included.  
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Table 13: Triple Difference Estimates, Voter Initiatives 
 
 
Men Women 
      
Age  0.0633*** 0.0546*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0609*** -0.0563*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Years of Education 0.0705*** 0.0851*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0003) 
Hispanic -0.0835*** -0.0562*** 
 
(0.0020) (0.0022) 
Asian -0.0725*** -0.0005 
 
(0.0052) (0.0051) 
LEP  -0.2021*** -0.1031*** 
 
(0.0329) (0.0347) 
Voter Initiative × LEP -0.0353** -0.0117 
 (0.0149) (0.0198) 
Non-Voter Initiative × LEP 0.0519*** 0.0549*** 
 
(0.0064) (0.0076) 
Constant 0.1613*** -0.1410*** 
 
(0.0344) (0.0371) 
   Observations      1,744,056   1,163,228 
R-squared 0.3133   0.3140 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. Data shown 
is comprised of a 1% sample of the Census during the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 1% sample of the 5-
year 2009–2013 American Community Survey.  Sample weights are used. Sample is restricted to full-time 
and full-year workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not self-employed. Age was 
restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include occupation, marital status, race  
Hispanic status, children present, year of entry, and veteran status. Individuals are considered limited English 
proficient (LEP) if they reported that they speak English “not-well” or “not at all.” “Voter Initiative” 
indicates the presence of an Official English law that was passed via voter initiative in state k at time t. “Non-
Voter Initiative” indicates whether a state had an Official English law but no voter initiative at time t. 
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Table 14: Occupational Representation in Official English States 
 
 
Men 
 
Importance 
of Speaking 
English 
Women 
 
Importance of 
Speaking 
English 
Men 
 
Importance of 
Communicating 
with Others 
Women 
 
Importance of 
Communicating 
with Others  
        
Age  0.0137*** 0.0043*** 0.0160*** 0.0073*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Age Squared / 
100 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Years of 
Education 0.0699*** 0.0625*** 0.0757*** 0.0624*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Hispanic -0.0080*** -0.0257*** -0.0193*** -0.0426*** 
 
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0030) 
Asian -0.0065 -0.0108 -0.0117 -0.0147 
 
(0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0033) (0.0037) 
LEP  0.0018 -0.0254 0.0480 -0.0084 
 
(0.0230) (0.0313) (0.0318) (0.0442) 
OE Law × 
LEP -0.0001 0.0042 -0.0101 0.0091 
 (0.0091) (0.0132) (0.0127) (0.0183) 
Constant 1.7437*** 2.0492*** 1.3875*** 1.7689*** 
 
(0.0241) (0.0331) (0.0340) (0.0476) 
   
  
Observations      1,744,056   1,163,228   1,744,056   1,163,228 
R-squared 0.3401   0.2960   0.2259   0.1897 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is the importance of speaking English or the 
importance of communicating with others in each individual’s occupation. Data shown is comprised of a 1% 
sample of the Census during the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 1% sample of the 5-year 2009–2013 
American Community Survey merged with O*NET Version 21.3. Sample weights are used. Sample is 
restricted to full-time and full-year workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not self-
employed. Age was restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include occupation  
marital status, race, Hispanic status, children present, year of entry, and veteran status. Individuals are 
considered limited English proficient (LEP) if they reported that they speak English “not-well” or “not at all.” 
The dependent variables, “Speak” and “Communicating with Others,” indicate the importance of speaking or 
communicating with others in the individual’s occupation. These importance levels are reported in O*NET 
and represent a score on a 5-point scale for each occupation. For more information about the scores, see 
Section V.A.  
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Table 15: LEP and Occupational Characteristics in Official English States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Men Women Men Women 
        
Age  0.0610*** 0.0536*** 0.0619*** 0.0537*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Age Squared / 
100 -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Years of 
Education 0.0621*** 0.0751*** 0.0673*** 0.0797*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Hispanic -0.0954*** -0.0470*** -0.0955*** -0.0474*** 
 
(0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0025) 
Asian -0.0921*** 0.0026 -0.0944*** -0.0007 
 (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0034) 
Speak 0.1250*** 0.1648***   
 (0.0012) (0.0014)   
Communicate   0.0478*** 0.0897*** 
   (0.0007) (0.0008) 
LEP  -0.2065*** -0.1022*** -0.2086*** -0.1057*** 
 
(0.0328) (0.0328) (0.0332) (0.0337) 
OE Law × LEP -0.0342** 0.0018 -0.0368** 0.0021 
 
(0.0149) (0.0194) (0.0156) (0.0204) 
Constant -0.6410*** -0.5067*** 0.8760*** -0.3277*** 
 
(0.0344) (0.0355) (0.0347) (0.0363) 
Observations  1,744,056  1,163,228  1,744,056  1,163,228 
R-squared  0.3188  0.3239  0.3155  0.3226 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is natural log of an individual’s wage in 2010 dollars. Data 
shown is comprised of a 5% sample of the Census during the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 1% sample of the 5-
year 2009-2013 American Community Survey merged with O*NET Version 21.3. Sample weights are used. Sample 
is restricted to full-time and full-year workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not self-employed. 
Age was restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include occupation, marital status, 
race, Hispanic status, children present, year of entry, and veteran status. Individuals are considered limited English 
proficient (LEP) if they reported that they speak English “not-well” or “not at all.” Sample is restricted to workers 
earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not self-employed. OE Law” indicates the presence of an Official 
English law in state k at time t. “Speak” and “Communicating with Others” indicate the importance of speaking or 
communicating with others in the individual’s occupation. These importance levels are reported in O*NET and 
represent a score on a 5-point scale for each occupation. For more information about the scores, see Section V.A.  
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Table 16: Summary Statistics: Driver’s License Tests in Only English 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Tests Offered in English Only Tests Offered in Other 
Languages 
Male    0.61        0.58 
Age  40.97      40.21 
Married    0.64        0.60 
Years of Education  13.67      13.32 
Hispanic    0.07        0.13 
Black    0.09        0.16 
Asian    0.08        0.02 
Disabled    0.01        0.13 
Limited English Proficient    0.02        0.04 
Foreign Born     0.08        0.11 
Wage (in 2010 dollars)  23.05      22.42 
N  71,672 2,848,913 
Note: Data shown is comprised of a 1% sample of the Census during the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 
1% sample of the 5-year 2009–2013 American Community Survey. Weighted using sample weights. Sample 
is restricted to workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not self-employed. Age was 
restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Only states with an Official English law are included in this 
sample. 
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Table 17: Triple Difference Estimates, English Only Drivers’ License Exams 
 
 
Men Women 
      
Age  0.0627*** 0.0544*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0604*** -0.0562*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Years of Education 0.0707*** 0.0854*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0003) 
Hispanic -0.0843*** -0.0555*** 
 
(0.0021) (0.0023) 
Asian -0.0731*** 0.0000 
 
(0.0053) (0.0052) 
LEP  -0.2050*** -0.1057*** 
 
(0.0332) (0.0340) 
EO Driver’s License Exam ×  LEP -0.0121 0.1175 
 
(0.0683) (0.0820) 
Constant 0.1565*** -0.1741*** 
 
(0.0348) (0.0367) 
   Observations      1,744,056   1,163,228 
R-squared 0.3132   0.3140 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. Data shown is 
comprised of a 1% sample of the Census during the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 1% sample of the 5-year 
2009–2013 American Community Survey.  Sample weights are used. Sample is restricted to full-time and full-
year workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not self-employed. Age was restricted to those 
between the ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include industry, marital status, race, children present, year of 
entry, and veteran status. Individuals are considered limited English proficient (LEP) if they reported that they 
speak English “not-well” or “not at all.” “EO Driver’s License Exam” indicates whether a state allowed their 
exam to obtain drivers’ license laws in only English in state k at time t.  
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Table 18: Triple Difference Estimates on Wages, Hispanic Only 
 
 
Men Women 
Variable ln(wages) ln(wages) 
Age 0.0557*** 0.0512*** 
 
(0.0010) (0.0012) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0570*** -0.0544*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0016) 
Years of Education 0.0385*** 0.0513*** 
 
(0.0005) (0.0007) 
LEP -0.2389*** -0.0964* 
 
(0.0608) (0.0585) 
OE Law × LEP -0.0621*** 0.0144 
 
(0.0177) (0.0519) 
Constant 0.7418*** 0.2933*** 
 (0.0910) (0.0911) 
   
Observations  147,780   87,369 
R-squared      0.3060 0.3154 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. 
Sample weights are used. Data shown is comprised of a 1% sample of the Census during the years 
1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 1% sample of the 5-year 2009–2013 American Community Survey. 
Sample restricted to those working full time, with usual hours greater than 35 hours per week and 
weeks worked per year greater than 50. Sample is restricted to full-time and full-year workers earning 
between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not self-employed. Age was restricted to those between the 
ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include industry, marital status, race, children present, year of 
entry, and veteran status. Individuals are considered limited English proficient if they reported that 
they speak English “not-well” or “not at all.” The change in the LEP population was measured 
between each Census year from 1980–2010 using Census data. Only Hispanic individuals were 
included in the sample.  
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Table 19: Triple Difference Estimates on Wages, Asian Only 
 
 
Men Women 
Variable ln(wages) ln(wages) 
Age 0.0638*** 0.0482*** 
 
(0.0022) (0.0021) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0570*** -0.0544*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0016) 
Years of Education 0.0814*** 0.0744*** 
 
(0.0012) (0.0013) 
LEP -0.1453* 0.0843 
 
(0.0791) (0.1004) 
OE Law × LEP -0.1099** -0.0512 
 
(0.0550) (0.0504) 
Constant -0.1394 -0.3050 
 
(0.1394) (0.2192) 
   Observations    55,119   43,063 
R-squared 0.3267 0.3501 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. 
Sample weights are used. Data shown is comprised of a 1% sample of the Census during the years 
1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 1% sample of the 5-year 2009–2013 American Community Survey. 
Sample restricted to those working full time, with usual hours greater than 35 hours per week and 
weeks worked per year greater than 50. Sample is restricted to full-time and full-year workers earning 
between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not self-employed. Age was restricted to those between the 
ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include industry, marital status, race, children present, year of 
entry, and veteran status. Individuals are considered limited English proficient if they reported that 
they speak English “not-well” or “not at all.” The change in the LEP population was measured 
between each Census year from 1980–2010 using Census data. Only Asian individuals were included 
in the sample. 
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Table 20: Triple Difference Estimates on Wages, Whites Only 
 
 
Men Women 
Variable ln(wages) ln(wages) 
Age 0.0644*** 0.0556*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0004) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0604*** -0.0562*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0016) 
Years of Education 0.0749*** 0.0883*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0003) 
LEP -0.1568*** -0.0886** 
 
(0.0408) (0.0447) 
OE Law × LEP -0.0275 0.0122 
 
(0.0175) (0.0240) 
Constant -0.0192 -0.2575*** 
 
(0.0424) (0.0473) 
   Observations      1,485,026  940,358 
R-squared 0.3014    0.3095 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10.. The dependent variable is the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. 
Sample weights are used. Data shown is comprised of a 1% sample of the Census during the years 
1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 1% sample of the 5-year 2009–2013 American Community Survey. 
Sample restricted to those working full time, with usual hours greater than 35 hours per week and 
weeks worked per year greater than 50. Sample is restricted to full-time and full-year workers earning 
between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not self-employed. Age was restricted to those between the 
ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include industry, marital status, race, children present, year of 
entry, and veteran status. Individuals are considered limited English proficient if they reported that 
they speak English “not-well” or “not at all.” The change in the LEP population was measured 
between each Census year from 1980–2010 using Census data. Only White individuals were included 
in this sample. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A. Official English Laws Pre-1980 
My analysis focuses only on Official English laws that were passed between the 
years of 1980 until 2010, during the modern Official English movement. However, I find 
that Official English laws passed before 1980 that are still current have similar effects. 
Table 3A shows that my results are robust to the inclusion of these laws: LEP men 
experience a 3.7 log point wage penalty in Official English states while women do not. 
Therefore, even though these earlier laws were often passed with different motives (recall 
the “American” to “English” change in Illinois) my results do not change. For the bulk of 
my analysis, I only focus on states with Official English laws coinciding with the Official 
English movement from 1980 until 2010, though I also perform robustness checks to 
ensure that my results do not change when adding in current laws that existed before the 
modern Official English movement.  
B. The Effects of Official English Laws on Other Labor Market Outcomes 
Wages may not be the only labor market outcome that Official English laws 
affect. Other labor outcomes are important, as they assess whether LEP worker are being 
excluded from the labor market or are matched to jobs that are part-time. I test to see if 
these laws also affect the usual hours worked in a week, weeks worked in a year, and the 
probability of employment. To do so, I keep all of the restrictions of my previous analysis 
except for the restrictions that the individual must be working and the individual must be 
working full time.  
 Table 4A reports the results of modifying the dependent variable of Equation 1 to 
the natural log of usual hours and usual weeks worked on all workers, not just those who 
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are full time. The impact of Official English laws on male LEP worker hours and weeks 
is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, and therefore these laws are 
associated with not only with a reduction in wages, but a reduction in hours and weeks 
worked for men in Official English states. I find, unlike when I simply looked at wages, 
that Official English laws negatively affect women’s hours and weeks, and the results are 
significant at the 1% level. Therefore, these laws are working to hinder the employment 
opportunities of both male and female LEP workers, not just their wages. 
 These laws can also impact an LEP worker’s chances of getting hired in the first 
place. To determine the effects of these laws on the employment of LEP workers, I use a 
probit model where the dependent variable, emp indicates whether the individual is 
currently employed. I use the same vector X of demographic variables as in Equation 1, 
and all other variable definitions remain the same. Table 5A shows that I find that LEP 
men in Official English law states have a 17 percent less likelihood of being employed 
simply because they reside in Official English states, but find no effect on LEP women’s 
chances of employment. This change in employment could be due to LEP workers 
exiting the labor market or employers choosing to not hire these individuals. Consistent 
with my findings on LEP worker wages, these results show that Official English laws 
disadvantage LEP male workers. 
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Table 1A: Example of State Official English Constitutional Amendments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State Amendment Language  
Alabama 
 
ALABAMA 
CONSTITUTION, 
AMENDMENT 509 
English is the official language of the state of Alabama. The legislature shall enforce this 
amendment by appropriate legislation. The legislature and officials of the state of 
Alabama shall take all steps necessary to insure that the role of English as the common 
language of the state of Alabama is preserved and enhanced. The legislature shall make 
no law which diminishes or ignores the role of English as the common language of the 
state of Alabama. 
Any person who is a resident of or doing business in the state of Alabama shall have 
standing to sue the state of Alabama to enforce this amendment, and the courts of record 
of the state of Alabama shall have jurisdiction to hear cases brought to enforce this 
provision. The legislature may provide reasonable and appropriate limitations on the 
time and manner of suits brought under this amendment. 
 
Florida 
 
FLORIDA 
CONSTITUTION, 
ARTICLE II, 
SECTION 9 (1988) 
 
(a) English is the official language of the state of Florida. 
(b) The legislature shall have the power to enforce this section by appropriate 
legislation. 
 
Missouri 
 
MISSOURI 
CONSTITUION,  
ARTICLE II,  
SECTION 34 (2008) 
 
 
That English shall be the language of all official proceedings in this state.  Official 
proceedings shall be limited to any meeting of a public governmental body at which any 
public business is discussed, decided, or public policy formulated, whether such meeting 
is conducted in person or by means of communication equipment, including, but not 
limited to, conference call, video conference, Internet chat, or Internet message 
board.  The term “official proceeding” shall not include an informal gathering of 
members of a public governmental body for ministerial or social purposes, but the term 
shall include a public vote of all or a majority of the members of a public governmental 
body, by electronic communication or any other means, conducted in lieu of holding an 
official proceeding with the members of the public governmental body gathered at one 
location in order to conduct public business. 
 
Oklahoma 
 
OKLAHOMA 
CONSTITUTION,  
ARTICLE XXX 
(2010) 
As English is the common and unifying language of the State of Oklahoma, all official 
actions of the state shall be conducted in the English language, except as required by 
federal law.  No person shall have a cause of action against an agency or political 
subdivision of this state for failure to provide any official government actions in any 
language other than English.  Nothing in this Article shall be construed to diminish or 
impair the use, study, development, or encouragement of any Native American language 
in any context or for any purpose.  The legislature shall have the power to implement, 
enforce and determine the proper application of this Article by appropriate legislation. 
 
68 
Table 2A: Example of State Official English Statutes 
 
State Statute Language  
Georgia; 
 
OFFICIAL 
GEORGIA CODE 
§ 50-3-100: 
OFFICIAL 
LANGUAGE 
(1986)  
 
(a) The English language is designated as the official language of the State of Georgia. 
The official language shall be the language used for each public record, as defined in 
Code Section 50-18-70, and each public meeting, as defined in Code Section 50-14-1, 
and for official Acts of the State of Georgia, including those governmental documents, 
records, meetings, actions, or policies which are enforceable with the full weight and 
authority of the State of Georgia. 
(b) This Code section shall not be construed in any way to deny a person’s rights under 
the Constitution of Georgia or the Constitution of the United States or any laws, statutes, 
or regulations of the United States or of the State of Georgia as a result of that person’s 
inability to communicate in the official language. 
(c) State agencies, counties, municipal corporations, and political subdivisions of this 
state are authorized to use or to print official documents and forms in languages other 
than the official language, at the discretion of their governing authorities. Documents 
filed or recorded with a state agency or with the clerk of a county, municipal 
corporation, or political subdivision must be in the official language or, if the original 
document is in a language other than the official language, an English translation of the 
document must be simultaneously filed. 
(d) The provisions of subsection (a) of this Code section shall not apply: (1) When in 
conflict with federal law; (2) When the public safety, health, or justice require the use of 
other languages; (3) To instruction designed to teach the speaking, reading, or writing of 
foreign languages;(4) To instruction designed to aid students with limited English 
proficiency in their transition and integration into the education system of the state; and 
(5) To the promotion of international commerce, tourism, sporting events, or cultural 
events. 
 
Iowa 
 
IOWA SF 165 
 (2002) 
 
1. The general assembly of the state of Iowa finds and declares the following: 
a.) The state of Iowa is comprised of individuals from different ethnic, cultural, and 
linguistic backgrounds. The state of Iowa encourages the assimilation of Iowans into 
Iowa’s rich culture. 
b.) Throughout the history of Iowa and of the United States, the common thread binding 
individuals of differing backgrounds together has been the English language. 
c.) Among the powers reserved to each state is the power to establish the English 
language as the official language of the state, and otherwise to promote the English 
language within the state, subject to the prohibitions enumerated in the Constitution of 
the United States and in laws of the state. 
 
2. In order to encourage every citizen of this state to become more proficient in the 
English language, thereby facilitating participation in the economic, political, and 
cultural activities of this state and of the United States, the English language is hereby 
declared to be the official language of the state of Iowa. 
3. Except as otherwise provided for in subsections 4 and 5, the English language shall be 
the language of government in Iowa. All official documents, regulations, orders, 
transactions, proceedings, programs, meetings, publications, or actions taken or issued, 
which are conducted or regulated by, or on behalf of, or representing the state and all of 
its political subdivisions shall be in the English language. 
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For the purposes of this section, “official action” means any action taken by the 
government in Iowa or by an authorized officer or agent of the government in Iowa that 
does any of the following: a.) Binds the government, b.) Is required by law,.c.) Is 
otherwise subject to scrutiny by either the press or the public. 
4. This section shall not apply to: a.) The teaching of languages, b.) Requirements under 
the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, c.) Actions, documents, or 
policies necessary for trade, tourism, or commerce, d.) Actions or documents that 
protect the public health and safety, e.) Actions or documents that facilitate activities 
pertaining to compiling any census of populations, f.) Actions or documents that protect 
the rights of victims of crimes or criminal defendants, g.) Use of proper names, terms of 
art, or phrases from languages other than English, h.) Any language usage required by or 
necessary to secure the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States of America or the Constitution of the State of Iowa. 
 
70 
Table 3A: Triple Difference Estimates Including All Official English Laws 1920–
2010  
 
 
Men Women 
     
Age  0.0627*** 0.0544*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.000331) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0604*** -0.0562*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Years of Education 0.0707*** 0.0854*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.000265) 
Hispanic -0.0843*** -0.0555*** 
 
(0.0022) (0.00248) 
Asian -0.0731*** -0.0010 
 
(0.0034) (0.00520) 
LEP  -0.2018*** -0.1050*** 
 
(0.0333) (0.0341) 
OE Law × LEP -0.0367** -0.0009 
 
(0.0149) (0.0194) 
Constant 0.1735*** -0.1700*** 
 
(0.0353) (0.0375) 
   Observations      1,744,056   1,163,228 
R-squared 0.3132   0.3140 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. Data shown is 
comprised of the 1% Census during the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 1% sample of the 5-year 2009–2013 
American Community Survey. Sample weights are used. Sample is restricted to full-time and full-year workers 
earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not self-employed. Age was restricted to those between the 
ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include occupation, marital status, race, children present, year of entry, and 
veteran status. Individuals are considered limited English proficient (LEP) if they reported that they speak English 
“not-well” or “not at all.” Sample is restricted to workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not 
self-employed. “OE Law” indicates the presence of an Official English law in state k at time t.  
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Table 4A: Triple Difference Estimates on the Natural Log of Usual Hours Worked 
and Weeks Worked 
 
 
Men 
ln(hours) 
Women 
ln(hours) 
Men 
ln(weeks) 
Women 
ln(weeks) 
        
Age  0.0011*** 0.0014*** 0.0047*** 0.0041*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0011*** -0.0015*** -0.0058*** -0.0047*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Years of Education 0.0004*** -0.0007*** 0.0057*** 0.0062*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Hispanic -0.0010*** -0.0014*** -0.0167*** -0.0083*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Asian -0.0020*** -0.0006 -0.0170*** 0.0035** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0015) (0.0014) 
LEP  0.0005 -0.0034 0.0118 -0.0090 
 
(0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0097) (0.0068) 
OE Law × LEP -0.0035*** -0.0034** -0.0161*** -0.0133*** 
 
(0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0038) (0.0042) 
Constant 3.9116*** 3.9143*** 3.6095*** 3.5749*** 
 
(0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0103) (0.0077) 
   
  
Observations     1,844,477   1,223,764   1,844,477   1,223,764 
R-squared 0.0535   0.0409   0.0442   0.0417 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is indicated as the natural log of the usual hours 
worked, and the natural log of weeks worked, respectively. Data shown is comprised of the 1% Census during 
the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 1% sample of the 5-year 2009–2013 American Community Survey.  
Sample weights are used. Age was restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls 
include industry, marital status, race, children present, year of entry, and veteran status. Individuals are 
considered limited English proficient (LEP) if they reported that they speak English “not-well” or “not at all.” 
Sample is restricted to workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not self-employed. “OE 
Law” indicates the presence of an Official English law in state k at time t. 
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Table 5A: Probit, Employment  
 
 
Men 
Pr(emp) 
Women 
Pr(emp) 
      
Age  0.0675*** 0.0739*** 
 
(0.0012) (0.0014) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0824*** -0.0845*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0018) 
Years of Education 0.0500*** 0.0508*** 
 
(0.0008) (0.0010) 
Hispanic -0.0987*** -0.1050*** 
 
(0.0083) (0.0093) 
Asian -0.0489** -0.0409* 
 
(0.0210) (0.0224) 
LEP  -0.0560 0.0508 
 
(0.1880) (0.1677) 
OE Law × LEP -0.1713*** -0.0514 
 
(0.0560) (0.0715) 
Constant 0.0597 -0.2749*** 
 
(0.0457) (0.0622) 
   Observations     1,844,477   1,223,764 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual is employed. Data 
shown is comprised of the 1% Census during the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 and a 1% sample of the 5-year 
2009–2013 American Community Survey.  Sample weights are used. Age was restricted to those between the 
ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include industry, marital status, race, children present, year of entry, 
and veteran status. Individuals are considered limited English proficient (LEP) if they reported that they 
speak English “not-well” or “not at all.” “OE Law” indicates the presence of an Official English law in state 
k at time t. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION 
LAWS: A STUDY OF THE 287(G) PROGRAM 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Recently, representatives from many local jurisdictions around the United States 
negotiated agreements with representatives of U.S. Immigrations and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) to delegate enforcement of federal immigration laws to the local 
jurisdiction. Upon signing on the dotted line, these jurisdictions allowed ICE to deputize 
local officers to investigate the immigration status of individuals and turn immigration 
law violators over to ICE. These agreements, known as 287(g) agreements after the 
statute that enables them, were introduced after September 11, 2001 and gained 
popularity amidst increased immigration enforcement nationwide. Though the Obama 
administration allowed the 287(g) program to expire in 2012, the Trump administration 
has revived these agreements. In a campaign speech, now-President Donald Trump 
promised, “we will expand and revitalize the popular 287(g) partnerships, which will help 
to identify hundreds of thousands of deportable aliens in local jails that we don’t even 
know about” (Lee and Kessler 2016). The administration has adhered to its promise to 
expand the 287(g) program: there are currently 59 local jurisdictions in 17 states with 
287(g) agreements, and more are planning to ink agreements with ICE in the near future. 
287(g) agreements are one tool implemented in light of shifting “immigration 
federalism,” (Schuck 2007; Huntington 2008; Chacón 2012) in which federal 
immigration power is decentralized to local governments. By empowering local law 
enforcement agents to enforce immigration laws, 287(g) agreements allow localities to 
take ownership of what was once exclusively federal. Immigration federalism has 
allowed jurisdictions to choose to enforce—or not enforce—immigration laws. 287(g) 
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agreements are the polar opposite of sanctuary cities, another type of immigration 
federalism, which explicitly do not allow jurisdictions to engage in 287(g) agreements. 
This chapter examines how immigration federalism aimed at the enforcement of 
immigration laws can affect the wages of immigrant workers.  
As more jurisdictions continue to implement 287(g) agreements, the effects of 
these policies on immigrant wages nationwide remain unknown. The majority of 
literature on 287(g) agreements is limited to case studies in specific areas such as North 
Carolina (Weismann 2009) and Davidson County, TN (Armenta 2012; Kee 2012) and 
focus solely on the impacts of these agreements on crime rates (Wong 2012). Other 
scholars have found that the 287(g) program is adversely impacting the Latino 
community and undermining its social cohesion (Lacayo 2010), as well as creating an 
insecure environment for all immigrants (Lopez and Minushkin 2008; Quereshi 2010). 
Yet, little work has examined the impact of these agreements on immigrant labor 
markets. Studies that examine the impacts of 287(g) agreements on labor outcomes have 
been limited to the agricultural industry (Kostandini 2013), or have only looked at the 
effects within industries with large levels of immigrant workers (Pham and Van 2012).  
My analysis extends the current literature by first providing a nationwide analysis 
of 287(g) agreements enacted during the 2000–2012 period.  I use Census and ACS data 
to exploit the differences in enactment dates of 287(g) agreements in the United States. 
Using a differences-in-differences-in-differences model identifying differences in county, 
year, and immigrant status, I find that the impacts of these agreements are large and 
negative on immigrant worker wages when the individual resides in a jurisdiction with a 
287(g) agreement. To determine whether these results are driven by undocumented 
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individuals in my sample, I use the methodology of Borjas (2017) to identify potentially 
undocumented individuals. I find that potentially undocumented individuals experience 
significant wage penalties in excess of the magnitude that potentially documented 
individuals experience in 287(g) jurisdictions.  I also find that the effects of these 
agreements are not limited to wages: immigrants in 287(g) jurisdictions work fewer hours 
than their peers in non-287(g) jurisdictions.  
To determine whether underlying heterogeneity is driving the results of 287(g) 
agreements as a whole, I examine the differences in type, strength, and breadth of 
agreements. I find that agreements allowing for broader enforcement of the laws, such as 
task agreements and those that issue more detainers for low-level crimes like traffic 
violations, lead to larger wage penalties for immigrants residing in those jurisdictions. In 
addition, jurisdictions with 287(g) agreements permitting the issuance of more immigrant 
detainers also have large and negative effects on immigrant wages. As 287(g) agreements 
are introduced with renewed vigor, my results show that while all agreements 
disadvantage immigrant workers, it is the broader 287(g) agreements that are driving 
these negative results. 
II. Background 
 
 To provide for greater enforcement of immigration laws, the federal government 
began signing 287(g) agreements in the early 2000s with local law enforcement agencies. 
Under these agreements, local law enforcement officers are trained to act as immigration 
officers in the course of their daily activities. Though they are local enforcement agents, 
immigration officers in 287(g) jurisdictions have been shown to act as extensions of the 
federal government rather than independent agents (Armenta 2012). Local enforcement 
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officers under 287(g) programs are empowered by the federal government to arrest any 
individual that the officer believes to be in violation of immigration law. Officers may 
also issue ICE detainers to hold offenders before being transported to an ICE detention 
center. 
  These agreements derive their authority from Section 287(g) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, a broad statute that allows the federal government to delegate 
immigration enforcement powers to state and local officers.16 This statute was adopted in 
1996 as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) changes 
to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and has since provided the statutory 
authorization for partnerships between local governments and ICE.  
 The statute itself authorizes the attorney general to enter into written agreements 
with state and local officials empowering them to “perform the function of an 
immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in 
the United States . . . .” Under these written agreements, state and local officials must 
receive training in federal enforcement and must be supervised by federal officials. The 
statute itself provides little more than a broad framework for 287(g) agreements with 
states, but the details of each agreement are fleshed out during negotiations with 
individual localities in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), which defines the scope 
and limitations of the delegation of authority from the federal government to the local 
government. 
                                                 
16 INA § 287(g)(1) reads: “Notwithstanding section 1342 of title 31, United States Code, the Attorney 
General may enter into a written agreement with a State, or any political subdivision of a State, pursuant to 
which an officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who is determined by the Attorney General to be 
qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension or 
detention of aliens in the United States (including the transportation of such aliens across State line s to 
detention centers), may carry out such function at the expense of the State or political subdivision and to 
extent consistent with State and local law.”  
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The first jurisdictions to enter into a 287(g) agreement with ICE were Florida in 
2002 and Alabama in 2003.17  Early agreements, including the one signed by Los 
Angeles County in 2005, were focused on identifying “individuals who pose a threat to 
border security” (GAO 2009).  However, beginning with Mecklenburg County, North 
Carolina in 2006, 287(g) agreements started to become less focused on those committing 
serious crimes and more focused on civil immigration violations. Sheriff Jim 
Pendergraph testified before the House of Representatives that a benefit of the 287(g) 
program was that it permitted his officers to identify a large number of civil immigration 
law violators.18 Pendergraph soon became the head of ICE’s Office of State and Local 
Coordination (OSLC), and Mecklenburg County’s model spread to other jurisdictions.  
Under Pendergraph, 54 other jurisdictions across the U.S. included similar 
language to the Mecklenburg agreement, which allowed for broader and less targeted 
enforcement of immigration laws (Capps et al. 2011).  These new agreements allowed for 
officers to apprehend all unauthorized immigrants rather than inquiring regarding 
someone’s immigration status after they committed specific crimes. Notably, the limiting 
language on ICE’s website, which described the program as aimed at “violent crimes” 
was removed after the Mecklenburg agreement was signed. This limiting language also 
stated that the program was “not designed to allow state and local agencies to perform 
random street operations” and was “not designed to impact issues such as excessive 
                                                 
17 Salt Lake City entered into negotiations with ICE in 1999, but decided against signing a 287(g) 
agreement, reportedly due to concerns about racial profiling.  
18  Testimony of Jim Pendergraph, Sheriff of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, “Empowering Local 
Law Enforcement to Combat Illegal Immigration,” before the House Committee on Government Reform, 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., August 25, 
2006. 
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occupancy and day labor activities.” When this language was removed from ICE’s 
website no other limiting language on the scope of 287(g) agreements took its place.  
Without explicit limits on authority of 287(g) agreements, these programs began 
to focus less on serious criminal offenders and more on small violations. For example, a 
study conducted by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of North Carolina found 
that 83 percent of those detained through the 287(g) program in Gaston County, North 
Carolina in 2008 were charged with traffic violations (Weissman et al. 2009). In 
Davidson County, Tennessee, the 287(g) agreement resulted in more than half of foreign-
born arrestees being processed for removal. Of those processed for removal, 88 percent 
of individuals were processed only for civil immigration violations (Kee 2012). These 
statistics reveal a program far from the targeted enforcement that was envisioned upon 
the adoption of 287(g) agreements.  
As of December 2011, there were 67 jurisdictions with 287(g) agreements in 
place. Table 1 shows the local jurisdiction and enforcement agency under the agreements 
as well as the date and type of agreement. There are three different types or “models” of 
287(g) programs. The jail model allows officials to screen for immigration status and 
issue detainers when booking individuals into jails on non-immigration charges, while the 
task force model allows state and local officials to screen for status and issue detainers in 
the field during policing operations. ICE also prescribed a hybrid model that would allow 
local governments to implement both the task force model and the jail model. Over time, 
the 287(g) program has grown in its impact on the immigrant community: between 
October 2005 and October 2008, 287(g) officers identified over 80,000 noncitizens for 
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potential removal. In the two years that followed, 287(g) officers identified more than 
100,000 identified noncitizens for potential removal (Parrado 2012).  
As the 287(g) program expanded, it drew criticism regarding uneven application 
of its policies and rising costs amidst few benefits.19 A 2009 U.S. Government 
Accountability Office Report found that the program lacked a documented program 
objective, did not provide clear and consistent mechanisms of supervision, and provided  
unclear protocols to local governments (GAO 2009). The 287(g) program also placed a 
strain on local funding. Local agencies shoulder the bulk of costs associated with the 
program, and often these costs exceed the measured benefits. The Police Foundation 
concluded that the 287(g) program’s costs far outweighed the benefits of participation, 
particularly when a state or local law enforcement agency’s focus of a 287(g) program is 
broader than serious criminal offenders (Kashu 2009). Recently, the Sherriff of Harris 
County, Texas cited the program’s staggering costs as a key factor in his decision to end 
his county’s 287(g) agreement (Pinkerton and Smith 2017). Over the course of the 
program, Congress steadily increased the program’s funding: from $15.5 million in 
federal funds in 2007 to $68 million in 2010. Yet, states bear the burden of the costs in 
these programs, which can place a strain on already limited local resources. A study on 
Prince William County, Virginia’s participation in the program found that it would cost 
the county $6.4 million in the first year and $26 million over five years. To combat this 
cost, the county raised their property taxes (Singer et al. 2009). 
                                                 
19 Salt Lake City, Utah, ultimately decided to not sign a 287(g) agreement due to concerns that the program 
promoted racial profiling (Capps et al. 2011).  
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Concerns over cost and limited oversight, along with criticisms over controversial 
287(g) programs, such as those led by Sheriff Joseph Arpaio,20 led the Obama 
administration to decide in 2012 that it would not renew any of its agreements with state 
and local law enforcement agencies operating 287(g) programs. After these agreements 
expired in June 2013, the 287(g) program ended and most policymakers believed that it 
would not resurface (Rhodan 2017). However, the Trump administration has revived the 
287(g) program. Following an executive order that prescribed expansion of the 287(g) 
program, the Trump administration oversaw additional 287(g) agreements, including 18 
new agreements with sheriff’s offices in Texas. The administration also expanded the 
scope of the 287(g) program to prioritize aliens who have been convicted or charged with 
any criminal offense or, in the judgment of an immigration officer, “pose a risk to public 
safety or national security.” All new agreements are jail models. As more local 
governments consider adoption of 287(g) agreements, this chapter provides analysis of 
how these agreements affect immigrant worker wages, and sheds light on how these 
effects are shared between legal and undocumented workers. 
III. Conceptual Framework 
 
When a jurisdiction signs a 287(g) agreement with ICE, the jurisdiction signals 
that it seeks to increase the enforcement of federal immigration laws through the 
utilization of local officers. These agreements can have a direct effect on the immigrant 
workforce by increasing the probability that individuals are deported. A greater 
likelihood of deportation can lower wages for undocumented workers (Rivera-Batiz 
                                                 
20 In March 2009, the Department of Justice announced that it had opened an investigation into the 
practices of Sheriff Joseph Arpaio of Maricopa County, Arizona. Investigators found that Arpaio and his 
deputies engaged in “patterns or practices of discriminatory police practices,” such as “unconstitutional 
searches and seizures” and “national- origin discrimination,” including failure to provide meaningful access 
to services for persons of limited English proficiency.  
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1999; Pena 2010a; Pena 2010b; Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli 2013; Borjas 2017) or 
cause stress, which can negatively affect an individual’s health, and wages in turn 
(Cavazos-Rehg et al. 1999; Berk and Schur 2011). While the direct effects of these laws 
will target undocumented immigrants, the spillover effects to other immigrants have the 
potential to be large (Massey et al. 2002; Gentsch and Massey 2011; Quiroga et al. 2014). 
An increased likelihood of deportation can impact undocumented workers’ 
willingness to accept lower wages because they perceive that they have limited power in 
the labor market. Employers who possess monopsonistic market labor market power 
know that undocumented employees will not report wage violations or grievances to the 
necessary authorities for fears of encountering law enforcement. Rather than maximizing 
their wages, undocumented workers will be focused on minimizing detection or 
encounters with ICE (Kossoudji and Clark 2002). This focus will be more pronounced in 
jurisdictions that have adopted 287(g) agreements, as the number of individuals enforcing 
immigration laws increases drastically in 287(g) jurisdictions. While these jobs are not 
necessarily all lower paying, workers will make tradeoffs that are inconsistent with wage-
maximizing behavior to achieve these ends. As a result, workers may also sort into 
marginal occupations, or occupations in declining industries that offer comparatively 
lower pay (Rivera-Batiz 1999). These effects perpetuate wage differences between 
immigrants and non-immigrants over time. 
287(g) agreements may have effects on the supply of undocumented workers. 
Workers may choose to work fewer hours to minimize the possibility of detection, and 
some workers may exit the labor force altogether. Workers may also choose to move out 
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of jurisdictions with 287(g) agreements in favor of those that do not have 287(g) 
agreements. I test whether migrants are driving my results in Section V.  
The impacts of these agreements can also be felt on the demand side if employers 
alter their demand for undocumented workers after their jurisdiction adopts a 287(g) 
agreement. This could occur if employers want to minimize interactions with local law 
enforcement officers for fear of detection if they are employing undocumented workers. 
Knowingly hiring undocumented workers is illegal and punishable by civil and criminal 
penalties. Employers, wishing to avoid these penalties may substitute legal workers, 
whether they are foreign-born or not. Further, firms wishing to evade employer sanctions 
for hiring undocumented workers but still wishing to employ these workers can also shift 
from direct hiring to labor subcontracting. There is evidence that this subcontracting is 
associated with less bargaining power, resulting in lower wages (Phillips and Massey 
1999; Aguilera and Massey 2004).  Overall, the adoption of 287(g) agreements may 
increase the salience of immigration status, leading to more negative consequences for 
the immigrant workforce. 
There is evidence that the negative effects of a greater likelihood of deportation is 
not limited to undocumented workers, but the effects will be felt for all immigrants. 
Increases in U.S. immigration enforcement have undermined the labor market position of 
immigrants to the United States, regardless of legal status (Massey et al. 2002; Gentsch 
and Massey 2011). Though in theory legal immigrant workers have full labor rights, 
many immigrant workers are concentrated in industries where the workers around them 
do not. There is evidence that legal immigrants, particularly Hispanic legal immigrants, 
compete in labor markets where most workers lack labor rights and labor bargaining 
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power, resulting in lower wages (Rivera-Batiz 1999; Gentsch and Massey 2011). 
Community spillover effects exist for immigration benefits or penalties conferred to one 
segment of a population. Quiroga et al. (2014) find that respondents to a survey indicate a 
high degree of negative impact in their lives of immigration enforcement activity. This 
response is persistent even for minorities who are U.S.-born, and does not significantly 
differ between U.S.-born minorities and their foreign-born counterparts. There are many 
ways that an increased risk of deportation can affect the wages of legal immigrants, 
including through occupational sorting, increases in stress, and allowing employers to 
exert monopsonistic market power over their wages. However, it is likely that 
undocumented workers will experience an increase in the likelihood of deportation more 
acutely (Orrenius and Zavodny 2014), and this effect will be larger in 287(g) 
jurisdictions. 
There is also a possibility that immigrant employment outcomes will benefit from 
287(g) agreements if employers substitute legal immigrants for undocumented workers. 
If immigrants generally are willing to work for lower wages, employers in localities with 
287(g) agreements may shift their preferences towards legal immigrants rather than 
undocumented workers to minimize the potential of detection.  This substitution will 
depend on the supply of legal immigrants in the given jurisdiction as compared to 
undocumented workers and the elasticity of substitution between the two types of 
workers. 
The underlying scope of the agreement may also have a differing effect on the 
immigrant workforce. 287(g) agreements that are broadly enforced, like task force 
agreements that allow officers to ask anyone their immigration status or agreements that 
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allow individuals who commit traffic violations to be detained by ICE, can cause more 
acute effects than those that are targeted towards specific types of crimes because they 
will affect more people and increase the probability of ICE encounters. Further, the 
strength of the enforcement of the agreement matters: if a jurisdiction signs an agreement 
but does not in effect inquire about immigration status or allow ICE to detain individuals, 
we would expect that the labor market consequences of these effects to be less severe. I 
examine the effects of the underlying heterogeneity in 287(g) agreements in Section V. 
IV. Data and Methodology   
 
 To examine the effects of 287(g) agreements on the immigrant labor force, I use 
data from the Census and American Community Survey (ACS). I use a 1% sample of the 
2000 Census and a 1% sample of both the 3-year 2005–2007 and 5-year 2008–2012 
American Community Survey, as these years span the implementation and adoption of 
most 287(g) agreements in the United States. This time frame also captures the effects of 
these agreements before the Obama administration decided not to renew the agreements 
in 2013. These datasets also contain geographic identifiers beyond the state-level, such as 
county, which identify smaller jurisdictions that have implemented these 287(g) 
agreements.  
 In each Census year, all households in the United States receive a short form 
Census, which asks basic demographic questions regarding each household member. 
Additionally, through the 2000 Census, one out of six households received the long form 
Census, which asks more detailed labor market and migration questions. I use data from 
 
85 
the long form Census, as it contains data on immigration status and important 
employment measures such as employment status and income.21  
To analyze labor market outcomes, I use measures of wages, hours, and weeks 
worked. The ACS reports earnings annually and hours worked each week by asking the 
surveyed household member: “during the past 12 months, in the weeks worked, how 
many hours did you usually work each week?” The Census and ACS measure weeks 
worked each year by asking respondents how many weeks that they worked last year, 
including paid vacation, paid sick leave, and military service. The Census reports actual 
weeks worked, while the ACS reports weeks in broad ranges. For individuals in the ACS, 
I use the midpoint of the reported range as the number of weeks that individual worked. I 
construct hourly wage by dividing an individual’s earnings by the amount of weeks 
worked multiplied by usual hours worked each week. I adjust all wages to 2010 dollars. 
Consistent with prior literature on immigrant worker wages, I limit my analysis to full-
year and full-time workers, though I do examine the effects of 287(g) agreements on 
hours and wages without this restriction.22  
I create a variable for years of completed schooling.23 I create indicator variables 
for marital status, race, veteran status, and if children are present in the individual’s 
household. I also create an indicator variable for Hispanic individuals.  Finally, I create 
                                                 
21 The American Community Survey (ACS) supplemented the long-form Census in the early 2000s and 
replaced the long-form Census in 2010. The ACS is a nationally representative sample that continually 
surveys randomly sampled addresses in every state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Each year, 
the ACS samples nearly three million household unit addresses in the United States. No household will 
receive the survey more often than once every five years.   
22 Full-year workers are those that worked 50 or more weeks this year and full-time workers are workers 
that report more than 35 usual hours worked per week. 
23 The ACS provides a detailed report of the highest level of schooling completed. Each survey participant 
has an option to select the precise highest grade of schooling, but some are also reported in ranges. For 
example, individuals could report their highest level of schooling as grade 1 or grades 1, 2, 3, or 4. For 
those individuals that report their highest level of schooling as a range, I use the midpoint values of the 
ranges as their years of schooling. All individuals that spent more than four years in college and obtained a 
college degree were coded as obtaining 16 years of education.   
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indicator variables using the 2012 North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) Major Groups for 15 different industry categories including construction, 
manufacturing, and transportation.  
The ACS contains both state and county identifiers for each year.  The ACS data 
also contains city identifiers, though this is not available for all cities in the United States 
and is limited, generally, to the largest metropolitan areas. For the handful of cities that 
signed 287(g) agreements alone, I match those cities found in the ACS data to the entire 
county. I treat a locality as having a 287(g) agreement if there is a 287(g) agreement in 
place at the time of the observation. For example, Los Angeles County, California signed 
a 287(g) agreement in 2005 and ended its participation in the program in 2012. I treat Los 
Angeles as having a 287(g) agreement for all years between 2005 and 2012. During my 
sample period, there are a few 287(g) programs that ended before the Obama 
administration officially ended the program, including Alabama and Massachusetts. 
Alabama signed a 287(g) agreement in 2003 and ended its participation in the program in 
2010. Therefore, Alabama is treated as not having an agreement in the years before 2003 
and the years after 2010.  
 I restrict my sample to workers who are not self-employed or working without 
pay and are not in the armed forces. I remove individuals who were born in Puerto Rico, 
Guam, and the U.S. Virgin islands, or those born abroad with American parents. For 
those born abroad, I create an indicator variable to show that they are an immigrant to the 
United States.   
 Table 2 shows the summary statistics for my sample by presence of 287(g) 
agreement in the jurisdiction where the individual lives. There are substantially more 
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individuals in jurisdictions without a 287(g) agreement: just over 20 percent of 
individuals live in a jurisdiction with a 287(g) agreement. Despite the differences in total 
numbers, the two groups are strikingly similar, from their average age and years of 
education to their wages and marital status. Individuals in 287(g) jurisdictions are more 
likely to be foreign-born and Hispanic, so there is a potential for reverse causality as 
these agreements could be implemented in response to increasing immigrant populations. 
Table 3 shows the summary statistics by immigrant status. The plurality of immigrants 
(45%) are Hispanic, followed by Asian (24%) and individuals of multiple or other races 
(22%). On average, immigrants in my sample earn less than native-born workers and 
have fewer years of education. Given this, I next determine whether the presence of 
287(g) agreements ameliorates or exacerbates this wage gap.  
Variation in the timing of 287(g) agreements provides a quasi-experiment to 
analyze the impact of these agreements on immigrant labor markets. To capture the 
change in wages for immigrant individuals based on 287(g) agreements, I use a 
difference-in-difference-in-differences (triple difference) framework, which takes the 
form of the following semi-logarithmic equation: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∝  +𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖β1 + β2𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + β3𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + β4(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) +β5(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + β6(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) +  β7(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + X𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆 +  ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
(1) 
where i indexes individuals, k indexes county, and t indexes years. W represents the real 
hourly wage of an individual in 2010 dollars.  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is equal to one if a worker i was not 
born in the United States, while agree equals one if the county has a 287(g) agreement in 
place. X is a vector of demographic variables including veteran status, race, age, age 
squared divided by 100, years of education, children present, married, and industry. I 
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cluster all standard errors at the county level. β7 is the coefficient of interest and 
represents the difference in earnings of immigrant workers in states that adopted a 287(g) 
agreement over time. The identifying assumption of my model is that in the absence of 
the reform, the wages of immigrant workers in jurisdictions with 287(g) agreements 
would have evolved similarly to wages of immigrant workers in jurisdictions without 
such agreements. I test this assumption in Section IV using a placebo test. This 
identifying assumption may also be violated if there exists competition between 
immigrants and natives for jobs such that potential spillover effects between immigrants 
and natives occur. 
V.   Results 
 
A. All Immigrant Workers 
 
I find that the adoption of a 287(g) agreement in a jurisdiction has a large and 
negative impact on immigrant wages. Table 4 shows that my coefficient of interest, β7, is 
large and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This coefficient shows that male 
immigrant workers living in a jurisdiction with a 287(g) agreement earn roughly a 4.8 log 
point wage penalty relative to immigrants living in jurisdictions without 287(g) 
agreements. This result is large and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. I also 
find that male immigrants earn large wage penalties as compared to native-born 
individuals in my sample, consistent with decades of research confirming that foreign-
born individuals earn less on average than their native-born counterparts (Chiswick 1978; 
Borjas 1987; Friedberg 2000; Borjas and Friedberg 2009).  
My main result holds true for women as well. Female immigrant workers living in 
jurisdictions with 287(g) agreements in my sample earn roughly a 4.8 log point wage 
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penalty compared to immigrants living in jurisdictions without such agreements. This 
coefficient is also statistically significant at the 1 percent level. My findings that 287(g) 
agreements affect women’s hourly wages at an almost equal magnitude to men’s 
contradict studies showing that legal interventions have little effect on immigrant 
women’s wages (Zavodny 2000; Orrenius and Zavodny 2014). My results suggest that 
both male and female immigrant worker wages are affected by increased immigration 
enforcement performed by local authorities. 
These results show the impact of 287(g) agreements on all foreign-born 
individuals and capture the effects on both legal immigrants and undocumented 
immigrants. However, to the extent that these agreements have more of a direct effect on 
undocumented workers, I would expect the effects on undocumented workers to be 
greater. I next test whether these effects are felt more heavily in individuals who may be 
undocumented.  
B. Undocumented Workers 
 
 The effect of 287(g) agreements may be more pronounced for undocumented 
workers, as undocumented individuals are immigrants that could be deported by ICE. 
Therefore, they will be directly impacted by the possibility of an ICE detainer if an 
individual’s immigrant status is in question. Undocumented workers are those that 
entered the United States without inspection or were admitted temporarily and stayed past 
the date they were required to leave. The wages of undocumented immigrants are 
responsive to legal changes: a grant of amnesty had a positive effect on the wages of 
undocumented individuals by raising their real wage by 3 percent (Kaushal 2006), while 
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more restrictive worker policies led to a decrease in the wages of unauthorized Mexican 
workers (Orrenius and Zavodny 2015).  
 However, it is difficult to measure the effects of policy changes on 
undocumented workers because of the lack of data associated with undocumented status. 
Asking undocumented workers to report their status for a government survey would lead 
to massive underreporting due to fears of governments having information on 
individuals’ immigrant status. Yet, the undocumented population is an important—and 
sizeable—part of the immigrant population in the United States. After Warren and Passel 
(1987) first developed an algorithm to estimate the size of the undocumented population, 
government entities have attempted to identify the size of the undocumented population. 
DHS’s most recent estimates indicate that the current undocumented population totals 
roughly 11 million individuals in the United States. Though the labor market impacts of 
these individuals are thought to be substantial, quantifying these impacts has proven 
difficult due to the lack of identification of undocumented individuals in data sets.  
 To aid in the identification of undocumented workers, the Pew Research Center 
extended the work of Warren and Passel (1987) to the CPS’s 2012–13 Annual 
Socioeconomic and Economic Supplements.  These supplements contain a variable 
constructed by the Pew Research Center that indicated if a foreign-born individual is 
“likely authorized” or “likely unauthorized.” After observing these micro-level files, 
Borjas (2017) extended the classification system to flag undocumented individuals in 
both the CPS and the 2011–2012 American Community Surveys. Using this strategy, he 
confirms results of the Pew Research Center and provides a meaningful way to indicate 
undocumented status in large, publicly available datasets. With these identifiers, Borjas 
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(2017) confirms that the earnings of undocumented workers are far below those of legal 
immigrant and native workers.  
To examine how 287(g) agreements impact undocumented worker wages, I create 
a potentially undocumented status identifier using the criteria of Borjas (2017). Under 
this framework, a foreign-born individual is classified as a legal immigrant if any of the 
following conditions hold: (1) the person arrived before 1980; (2) the person is a citizen; 
(3) the person receives Social Security benefits, SSI, Medicaid, Medicare, or Military 
Insurance; (4) the person is a veteran or is currently in the armed forces; (5) the person 
works in the government sector; (6) the person resides in public housing or receives 
rental subsidies; (7) the person was born in Cuba; (8) the person’s occupation requires 
some form of licensing; (9) that person’s spouse is a legal immigrant or citizen. After 
imposing these qualifications for legal individuals, any other foreign-born individual is 
considered potentially undocumented.  
I follow these criteria to create an undocumented indicator variable in my sample. 
Table 5 provides the summary statistics for undocumented workers. Undocumented 
individuals in my sample make up 5.6 percent of the total population, which is similar to 
the 6.8 percent of the population that Borjas (2017) found when using the 2011–2012 
ACS.24 The undocumented population is comprised mostly of Hispanic individuals, with 
59 percent of undocumented individuals reporting that they are Hispanic. Undocumented 
individuals are also younger and more likely to be male than their legalized counterparts. 
Additionally, the wages of undocumented individuals are considerably lower than those 
of legalized individuals.  
                                                 24 When isolating my sample to just the 2011–2012 ACS, I find the same results as Borjas (2017): 6.8 
percent of the population in my sample is undocumented. 
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 To determine the impact of 287(g) agreements on the potentially undocumented 
population, I modify equation (1) to the following: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∝  +𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖β1 + 𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖β2  + β3𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + β4𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 +β5(𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + β6(𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ×  𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + β7(𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + β8(𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + β9(𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) 
+ β10(𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + β11(𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + X𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆 +  ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(2) 
where W represents the real hourly wage of an individual in 2010 dollars.  𝑈𝑈𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is 
equal to one if a worker i is classified as potentially undocumented using the 
methodology of Borjas (2017). 𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙 is equal to one if a worker i is classified as 
potentially legalized using the methodology of Borjas (2017). Agree equals one if the 
locality has adopted a 287(g) agreement. The definitions of all other variables are 
identical to those in Equation 1. β10 and β11 are my coefficients of interest. β10 
represents the difference in earnings of potentially undocumented workers relative to 
natives in states that adopted a 287(g) agreement over time. β11 represents the same for 
potentially legal workers.  
 Table 6 reports the results of Equation 2.  I find that both male and female 
potentially undocumented workers in jurisdictions with 287(g) agreements incur a larger 
wage penalty than those living in jurisdictions without 287(g) agreements. Male 
potentially undocumented workers earn a wage penalty of 9.8 log points in states with 
287(g) agreements, while female potentially undocumented workers earn a wage penalty 
of 14.1 log points. However, this effect is not constrained to only potentially 
undocumented workers. Male potentially legal workers earn a wage penalty of 5.9 log 
points, while female potentially legal workers earn a 5.4 log point wage penalty. The 
magnitude of the wage penalty for potentially legal workers in 287(g) agreements is 
 
93 
slightly less than for undocumented workers, lending some support that these effects are 
felt more acutely if individuals are undocumented. The coefficient on potentially 
undocumented workers, β1, is 9.8 log points for men and 14.2 log points for women, 
while the coefficient on potentially legal workers, β2, is 1.6 log points for men.  The 
coefficient on potentially legal workers for women is statistically insignificant and has a 
magnitude of 0.6 log points for women. These results confirm past literature that 
potentially undocumented workers earn less than other immigrant workers (Rivera-Batiz 
1999; Borjas 2017), but both groups are disadvantaged as compared to other workers 
(Borjas and Friedberg 2009).  
 My results show that potentially undocumented workers shoulder more negative 
effects from 287(g) agreements. I formally test the equivalence of these coefficients and 
find that these coefficients are statistically significantly different. Yet, the mechanisms 
that underlie these effects are unclear. Section V addresses the differences between 
287(g) agreements—both in form and effect—to determine whether there exists 
heterogeneity in the effects of 287(g) agreements on immigrant worker wages. 
C. Other Employment Effects  
 
These agreements may also have the effect of shifting both undocumented and 
documented workers away from employment or into jobs with fewer hours. Employers 
may not want to hire immigrant workers in 287(g) agreement jurisdictions due to worries 
about ICE encounters, or immigrant workers may be selecting out of the work force to 
decrease detection or minimize unpleasant interactions with local enforcement officers. 
To determine whether these effects are present in my sample, I use my entire sample, 
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without restrictions for number of hours worked or employment status. I modify the 
dependent variable from Equation 1 to the natural log of hours by each individual. 
Table 7 shows the effects of 287(g) agreements on the number of hours worked 
for both immigrant and undocumented individuals. I find negative effects for the 
interaction between presence of a 287(g) agreement and immigrant status for both men 
and women, though the effect for male immigrant workers is stronger. Male immigrants 
in jurisdictions with 287(g) agreements work 1.3 percent fewer hours than their peers in 
jurisdictions without these agreements. Similarly, female immigrants work 0.9 percent 
fewer hours when residing in jurisdictions with 287(g) agreements. Though these results 
are small in magnitude, they are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. These 
results provide evidence that foreign-born individuals are not only disadvantaged by 
lower wages in 287(g) agreement jurisdictions but also will work fewer hours in response 
to these agreements. 
 Table 8 shows the effects of 287(g) agreements on the probability of employment 
for immigrant individuals. I adapt Equation 1 to a probit framework and assign the 
dependent variable to be one if the individual is employed at time t. Using this model, the 
coefficient on the interaction between immigrant status and the presence of a 287(g) 
agreement is positive and statistically significant. This result provides evidence that 
individuals do not select out of the work force in response to 287(g) agreements. Instead, 
foreign-born individuals may be more likely to work in jurisdictions with a 287(g) 
agreement. However, this result may be driven by employers substituting legal 
immigrants for undocumented workers, as potentially legal immigrants are more plentiful 
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in my sample and could be replacing potentially undocumented workers in their jobs 
should undocumented workers leave these jobs. 
D. Placebo Test 
 
One of the assumptions of a triple difference model is that there are common 
trends in both the treated and untreated groups in a sample, or that the wages of both 
groups would grow in a similar manner but for the presence of a 287(g) agreement. I use 
a placebo test to examine whether there is a violation of the common trends assumption 
in my sample. To do so, I re-estimate Equation 1 by assuming that the 287(g) agreement 
was signed into law three years earlier than it was in each jurisdiction. Table 9 depicts the 
results of this falsification test. I find that, with these earlier enactment dates, my 
coefficient of interest, β7, is not statistically significant and is close to zero. This suggests 
no violation of the common trends assumption in my sample and provides evidence that 
there is not a difference in time trends in the pre-treatment period between jurisdictions 
that have adopted these agreements and jurisdictions that have not.  
E. Migration Response 
 
Immigrants may also respond to these agreements by moving from jurisdictions 
with 287(g) agreements to jurisdictions without these agreements. This migration 
response may violate the assumptions of my triple-difference model if this migration 
shifts the quality of immigrants in treated or untreated states. For example, if high-
earning immigrants leave 287(g) jurisdictions but low-earning immigrants do not, my 
model will not accurately capture the differences between the treated and treatment group 
as a result of the adoption of a 287(g) agreement. To test whether this is occurring in my 
model, I identify individuals who have moved by a question in the ACS that asks if an 
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individual has changed residence in the past year. In the 2000 Census, the relevant 
question asks if the individual has moved in the past five years. I consider individuals 
who moved at all—whether intra- or inter-state—as migrants. I include those who moved 
intra-state as a migrant because both the ACS and Census do not identify the county from 
which the individual moved, and I am unable to determine whether individuals who move 
intra-state are moving into or out of locations with 287(g) agreements. I eliminate all 
individuals that have moved from my sample. 
 Table 10 reports the results of Equation 1 on my non-migrant sample. I find that 
there is no marked change in my results when eliminating individuals that have moved. 
The coefficient of interest, β7 is negative and statistically significant, with a magnitude 
that is comparable to, but slightly large than, the results from Table 4. These results 
provide evidence of a limited migration response in my sample. These results are 
consistent with those in Parrado (2012), which found that Mexican workers did not have 
a migration response to a limited set of 287(g) agreements. As immigrants who are more 
educated and have better skills are more likely to move to a different city (Bartel and 
Koch 1991), these results without migrants provide support that the quality of individuals 
in jurisdictions with and without 287(g) agreements is not shifting in response to these 
agreements.  
VI. Heterogeneity of 287(g) Agreements 
 
 The effects of 287(g) agreements may be affected by underlying heterogeneity in 
each agreement’s text. As outrage over the scope—and increased visibility—of the 
program prompted concerns, and ultimately a temporary halt on the program, this section 
answers whether agreements with stronger enforcement mechanisms or a broader scope 
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caused more harm than other agreements.  The results of this section will inform the 
scope and strength of MOAs as they are adopted in the future.  
A. Data  
 
To examine the underlying heterogeneity present in 287(g) agreements, I use a 
dataset from ICE. This dataset derives from the Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse (TRAC), a data research organization, and was obtained from ICE using 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).25  The data contain individual records on each 
recorded I-247 detainer or notice request prepared by ICE,26 including the month and 
year when ICE prepared the I-247 form, the state, county-facility detainer sent, whether 
the detention facility was federal, state, or county, and whether ICE assumed custody 
after the detainer was issued. For each detainer, the data contain both information on the 
agency that sent the request and demographic information, such as country of citizenship 
for each individual. The data also contain the individual’s criminal history, categorized 
by both the most serious criminal conviction and whether that conviction falls under 
Level 1, Level 2, or Level 3 of the prioritization for 287(g) enforcement.  TRAC used 
ICE’s guidance to group recorded offense codes into these three categories. 
B. Type of Program 
 
I first investigate whether any of the three types of 287(g) agreements are driving 
the negative effects for immigrant wages in 287(g) jurisdictions. There exist three types 
of agreements: the jail enforcement model, the task force model, and the hybrid model, 
which is a combination of the two. These types of agreements could have differential 
                                                 
25 This data was made available to me through Vanderbilt Law School’s subscription to TRAC’s data 
warehouse. 
26 Notice requests only ask that the law enforcement agency notify ICE of a pending release during the time 
the individual is otherwise in custody, and do not request that the person be detained beyond the point at 
which he or she would otherwise be released.  
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effects on immigrant outcomes because they allow law enforcement officers to engage 
with suspected immigration law violators in a different manner. As the task enforcement 
model allows officers to enforce immigration laws in the field when they are policing, 
while the jail model allows officers to only enforce these laws in the context of a jail, I 
predict that the task force model will have a stronger negative effect on immigrant worker 
wages. 
To test this hypothesis, I use the following semi-logarithmic equation to test the 
differences among program types: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∝ + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖β1 + β2𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + β3𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 +β4(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + β5(𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ×  𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + β6(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + β7(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  β8(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + β9(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  ℎ𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  X𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆 +  ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(3) 
where the dependent variable is the real hourly wage of an individual in 2010 dollars. The 
variables task, jail, and hybrid, represent the type of 287(g) agreement that each locality 
had at time t. I code these in accordance with Table 1. The definitions of all other 
variables are identical to those in Equation 1. 
 When examining the effects of the heterogeneity of programs, I find large and 
significant negative effects of task force and jail enforcement models on immigrant 
wages. Table 11 reports these results. The magnitude of the coefficient for task force 
models is larger than that of jail enforcement models. Male immigrants residing in a 
287(g) jurisdiction with jail enforcement model earn 7.7 log points less than individuals 
residing in a state without a 287(g) agreement, while male immigrants in a jurisdiction 
with a task force agreement earn 10 fewer log points. These results are similar for female 
immigrants, with those with a jail enforcement model earning a 7.8 log point wage 
penalty and those with a task force jurisdictions earning a wage penalty of 11.7 log 
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points. I find limited evidence of a negative effect of hybrid models for men, and no 
significant effect of these hybrid models on immigrant women wages. Overall, my results 
comport with criticisms of the broad nature of task force agreements, specifically. These 
agreements allow state and local officials to screen for status and issue detainers in the 
field during policing operations, essentially enforcing immigration laws on the street as 
they are doing their usual tasks. Therefore, it is no surprise that these effects will be felt 
more acutely as these agreements allow more action to be taken by police against 
individuals that they suspect violated federal immigration laws. 
C. Strength of Program 
 
Not all 287(g) agreements are created equal, and this heterogeneity is evident 
beyond the classification of the type of agreement. The MOAs in each agreement may 
also vary significantly. Some allow local officers trained through the program to 
interrogate any individual that they encounter, while others restrict an officer’s ability to 
interrogate immigration status. Some 287(g) agreements also allow ICE to detain 
individuals and eventually assume custody of them. The bounds of each 287(g) 
agreement are important for determining what effects these agreements will have, both on 
the ultimate effects of the program and also the labor market effects of the agreement 
beyond the program. Strong levels of enforcement will magnify the effects of 287(g) 
agreements on immigrant worker wages, as they will increase the probability of 
interactions with ICE and can encourage workers to accept a wage below their true 
productivity. These effects may be particularly acute for undocumented workers, who 
have a higher fear of deportation (Arbona et al. 2010).  If a 287(g) agreement is not 
strong, or is rarely enforced, it may not have the same effects as agreements that are 
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enforced. However, if it is the presence of the agreement itself, and not enforcement, that 
is causing effects on the immigrant population, the strength of the agreement will not 
matter. 
To assess the strength of the effects of each 287(g) agreement, I use a variable 
within the TRAC data that indicates whether ICE actually assumed custody of the 
individual. This variable is important because it tracks whether the local jurisdiction 
complied with ICE’s detainer request and identifies whether the program has a strong 
level of enforcement. For each year in my sample, I compute the percentage of 
individuals that were taken into custody by ICE after a detainer request was issued. The 
mean of this proportion is 0.58 for my sample, so for any jurisdiction that has a 
proportion equal to or above 0.58, I characterize them as having a strong agreement, 
because they have a stronger effect by allowing ICE to take a greater proportion of 
individuals into custody after a detainer is issued. For any jurisdiction with a proportion 
below the mean value, I characterize them as having a low-strength agreement. 
 For the vast majority of jurisdictions, the number of individuals taken into ICE 
custody increased over time after the jurisdiction signed a 287(g) agreement. As an 
example of the program’s evolution over time, Figure 1 shows the number of individuals 
that were taken into custody by ICE in one of the largest 287(g) jurisdictions, Los 
Angeles County California. Before Los Angeles County adopted its 287(g) agreement in 
2005, there were very few individuals taken into custody by ICE. After 2005, the number 
of individuals taken into custody by ICE dramatically increased over time. 
To assess the strength of the agreement’s impact on workers, I modify Equation 1 
to include a variable that captures the strength of the program: 
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𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∝  +𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖β1 + β2𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + β3𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + β4(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) +𝛽𝛽5(𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 × 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + β6(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)+  β7(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + β8(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  X𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆 +  ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
(4) 
where highstrength equals one if the individual lives in a jurisdiction with a 287(g) 
agreement where ICE takes a percentage of individuals into custody that is above or 
equal to the mean, and lowstrength equals one if the individual lives in a jurisdiction with 
a 287(g) agreement where ICE takes a percentage of individuals into custody that is 
below the mean. The definitions of all other variables are identical to those in Equation 1. 
Table 12 reports the results of Equation 4. I find that both high and low strength 
agreements have strong negative effects on immigrant worker wages, with male 
immigrants in jurisdictions with high strength 287(g) agreements earning a 7.6 log point 
wage penalty and male immigrants in jurisdictions with low strength 287(g) agreements 
earning a 4.8 log point wage penalty. These effects are similar in magnitude, and are 
statistically different at the 1 percent level. The effect of high and low strength 
agreements on female workers is almost equivalent, with female immigrant workers 
earning 6.2 log point wage penalty in jurisdictions with high-strength agreements and 
female immigrant workers earning a 7.1 log point wage penalty in jurisdictions with low-
strength agreements. I formally test these effects and find that they are not statistically 
different. Therefore, there is evidence that male immigrant wages differ based on the 
strength of each 287(g) agreement, but there is little evidence that this difference exists 
for female immigrant wages.  
However, when examining the impact of these agreements on potentially 
undocumented workers, there is a separation between the effect of high-strength 
agreements and low-strength agreements on male undocumented worker wages. Table 13 
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reports these results. Male immigrants in jurisdictions with high strength 287(g) 
agreements earn an additional 7.7 log point wage penalty and male immigrants in 
jurisdictions with low strength 287(g) agreements earn an additional 4.6 log point wage 
penalty. Though similar in magnitude, these effects are statistically different at the 5 
percent level. The effect of high and low strength agreements on female workers is again 
unclear, with female workers earning a 5.1 log point wage penalty for high-strength 
agreements and female workers earning a 9.1 log point wage penalty for low-strength 
agreements.  
 These results show that the effects of these agreements differ based on the actual 
strength of the agreement if the individual is male and undocumented. For both 
undocumented immigrants and immigrants in general, the effects are felt simply by 
having the agreement in place, rather than the strength of the agreement itself. This 
provides evidence that the inherent nature of the agreement, rather than the strength of 
the agreement, is driving the effects of these agreements on immigrant worker wages.  
D. Targeting 
 
 One of the stated purposes of the 287(g) program is to identify immigrants that 
are committing serious crimes in order to initiate deportation proceedings. Many of these 
agreements reportedly targeted all immigrants, not just serious criminal offenders (Capps 
et. al 2011). To refocus the program, the Obama administration released a 2009 template 
to prioritize the identification and removal of dangerous criminals, rather than use the 
287(g) agreements to identify all immigration law violators. These “targeted” models 
became more widespread in later years of the 287(g) program. However, recent 287(g) 
agreements under the Trump administration have shifted to broad forms of enforcement 
 
103 
of 287(g) agreements, using template agreements that do not distinguish between 
immigrants based on seriousness of crime. This section explores whether 287(g) 
programs are more likely to target low-level criminal offenders or individuals who have 
not been charged with committing a crime and how this targeting affects immigrant 
worker wages.  
 ICE classifies criminal offenses in accordance with the National Crime 
Information Center’s (NCIC) three seriousness levels. The most serious (Level 1) covers 
what ICE considers to be “aggregated felonies”, including murder, manslaughter, rape, 
robbery, and kidnapping. Level 2 offenses include minor drug offenses and burglary, 
larceny, fraud, and money laundering. Level 3 offenses are misdemeanors, including 
petty civil offenses.  
 I determine whether these agreements that target all individuals, and not just those 
charged with serious crimes, have differential impacts on labor market outcomes of 
immigrant workers. The effects of these agreements could vary based on scope, as the 
broader these agreements are, the more people they will impact. This is especially true as 
individuals with no convictions can still fall under the purview of the agreement and end 
up detained by ICE.  
 To classify whether 287(g) agreements are broad or targeted, I use TRAC data on 
ICE detainers. For each jurisdiction with a 287(g) agreement, I examine the crimes 
charged for each individual that ICE detained. The TRAC data also classifies whether 
this crime falls under Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, or no conviction. I first determine the 
proportion of individuals that ICE detained in the jurisdiction with no conviction or with 
a Level 3 (misdemeanor) crime as compared to other crimes. The mean of this proportion 
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is 0.54 for my sample, so for any jurisdiction that has a proportion equal to or above 0.54, 
I characterize them as having a broad agreement, because they detain more low-level 
offenders and individuals without convictions than any other jurisdiction. For any 
jurisdiction with a proportion below the mean value, I characterize them as a targeted 
jurisdiction.  
To test whether the scope of the 287(g) program has an impact on immigrant 
wages, I modify Equation 1 to the following equation: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∝  +𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖β1 + β2𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + β3𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + β4(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)         (5) + β5(𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ×  𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + β6(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) +  β7(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + β8(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ×  𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + X𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆 +  ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
where broad equals one if the individual lives in a jurisdiction with a 287(g) agreement 
where the proportion of individuals that ICE detains with no convictions or Category 3 
convictions is higher than the mean, and targeted equals one if the individual lives in a 
jurisdiction with a 287(g) agreement where the proportion of individuals that ICE detains 
with no convictions or Category 3 convictions is below the mean. The definitions of all 
other variables are identical to those in Equation 1. β7 and β8 are the coefficients of 
interest and represent the change in immigrant wages if the individual lives in a 
jurisdiction with a targeted or broad 287(g) agreement, respectively.  
 Table 14 reports the results of Equation 5. I find that only those agreements with a 
broad scope have an effect on immigrant worker wages, while those with a targeted scope 
have little effect on immigrant worker wages.  Male immigrant workers in jurisdictions 
with broad 287(g) agreements suffer a 2.9 log point wage penalty compared to their 
counterparts in jurisdictions without these agreements. Male immigrant workers in states 
with targeted agreements, however, do not have wages that differ significantly from male 
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immigrant workers in jurisdictions without a 287(g) agreement. These results hold for 
female workers as well: female immigrant workers in jurisdictions with broad 287(g) 
agreements earn a 2.8 log point wage penalty, while the effects of a targeted program 
have no significant impact on female immigrant worker wages. These results provide 
support for the theory that targeted agreements, which only focus on those committing 
serious crimes, do not negatively impact the immigrant workforce.  
 When looking at the effect on potentially undocumented workers, I find similar 
results: broad scope agreements have a marked negative effect on undocumented worker 
wages. Table 15 reports that potentially undocumented male workers in states with broad 
agreements earn a wage penalty of 6.3 log points, but those in jurisdictions with targeted 
agreements do not have wages that differ significantly from male immigrant workers in 
jurisdictions without a 287(g) agreement. Female potentially undocumented workers in 
jurisdictions with 287(g) agreements earn a wage penalty of 9.4 log points. Again, the 
effects of residing in a county with a targeted scope program are insignificant. This 
follows previous literature focusing on undocumented worker wages: to the extent that 
broad agreements make undocumented workers fear deportation—because they could be 
confronted by ICE for no reason at all, or for a minor traffic violation—they will be more 
likely to accept lower wages (Rivera-Batiz 1999; Pena 2010a; Pena 2010b; Hotchkiss and 
Quispe-Agnoli 2013; Borjas 2017). As more broad continue to be signed in the modern 
era of 287(g) agreements, these will likely have a greater impact on both undocumented 
and legal immigrant wages.  
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VII. Conclusion 
 
This chapter examines a policy that engages with two important aspects of 
modern immigration law: immigration federalism, or the increasing delegation of the 
federal immigration authority to local authorities, and the increasing overlap between 
immigration law and criminal law. 287(g) agreements empower local agents to not only 
enforce federal immigration laws, but also encourage them to do so in the context of 
criminal enforcement. This chapter contributes to the existing literature on immigration 
enforcement by providing evidence that 287(g) agreements are associated with 
approximately a 5 percent wage penalty for both male and female immigrant workers. 
These penalties are even larger effect for those who can be classified as potentially 
undocumented under the methodology of Borjas (2017), with potentially undocumented 
men earning a 6 percent wage penalty in places with 287(g) agreements and potentially 
undocumented women earning a 9 percent wage penalty. As more 287(g) agreements are 
signed between ICE and local law enforcement agencies and local continue to be signed 
in 2017 and beyond, the impacts on the immigrant community itself—included 
undocumented workers—should be considered.  
This chapter also contributes to the existing literature on immigration enforcement 
by examining the effects of underlying heterogeneity in the local enforcement 
immigration of federal immigration laws. Targeted programs that focus on only 
individuals who commit crimes beyond low-level misdemeanors had no effect on the 
wages of immigrants in those jurisdictions. However, broad programs that allow for the 
detainment of any individual, even for low-level misdemeanors or no criminal violation 
at all, have large impacts on immigrant wages. These negative wage effects are not 
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confined to potentially undocumented workers, which provides evidence that the 
immigrant community as a whole is harmed by these broad partnerships. When 
negotiating these agreements, local law enforcement can limit the impact of these laws on 
the immigrant population as a whole if they limit the program’s scope, rather than 
engaging in widespread local enforcement of federal immigration laws. 
More broadly, these results provide evidence that local enforcement of 
immigration law has an impact on the labor market outcomes of immigrant workers. To 
the extent that local jurisdictions seek to discourage the negative effects that are incurred 
by immigrant workers in 287(g) jurisdictions, they could consider employing other local 
policies that fit within the framework of immigration federalism, such as sanctuary cities, 
the inverse of 287(g) programs. This chapter shows that the effects of enforcement 
through immigration federalism can be felt widely in immigrant labor markets and is not 
confined to just those workers who may be undocumented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 
REFERENCES 
 
Aguilera, Michael B., and Douglas S. Massey. 2004. “Social Capital and the Wages of 
Mexican Migrants: New Hypotheses and Tests,” Social Forces 82(3): 671–702. 
 
Arbona, Consuelo, Norma Olvera, and Nestor Rodriguez. 2010. “Acculturative Stress 
Among Documented and Undocumented Latino Immigrants in the United States,” 
Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences 32(3): 362–384.  
 
Armenta, Amada. 2012. “From Sherriff’s Deputies to Immigration Officers: Screening 
Immigrant Status in a Tennessee Jail,” Law and Policy 34(2): 191–210. 
 
Armenta, Amada. 2016. “Racializing Crimmigration: Structural Racism, Colorblindness, 
and the Institutional Production of Immigrant Criminality,” Sociology of Race and 
Ethnicity 3(1): 82–95. 
 
Bartel, Ann P., and Marianne J. Koch. 1991. “Internal Migration of U.S. Immigrants,” in 
Immigration, Trade, and the Labor Market, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Berk, Marc L., and Claudia L. Schur. 2001. “The Effect of Fear on Access to Care 
Among Undocumented Latino Immigrants,” Journal of Immigrant Health 3(3): 151–156.  
 
Borjas, George J. 1987. “Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants,” American 
Economic Review 77(4): 463–489. 
 
Borjas, George J. 2017. “The Earnings of Undocumented Immigrants,” NBER Working 
Paper no. 23236.  
 
Borjas, George J., and Rachel M. Friedberg. 2009. “Recent Trends in the Earnings of 
New Immigrants to the United States,” NBER Working Paper 15406. 
 
Capps, Randy, Marc R. Rosenblum, Cristina Rodriguez, and Muzaffar Chishti. 2011. 
“Delegation and Divergence: A Study of 287(g) State and Local Immigration 
Enforcement,” Working Paper, Migration Policy Institute. 
 
Cavazos, Patricia A., Luis H. Zayas, and Edward L. Spitznagel. 2007. “Legal Status, 
Emotional Well-Being and Subjective Health Status of Latino Immigrants,” Journal of 
the National Medical Association 99(10): 1126–1131.  
 
Chacón, Jennifer M. 2012. “The Transformation of Immigration Federalism,” William & 
Mary Bill of Rights Journal 21(2): 577–618.  
 
Chiswick, Barry R. 1978. “The Effect of Americanization on the Earnings of Foreign-
Born Men,” Journal of Political Economy 86(5): 897–921.  
 
 
109 
Coleman, Mathew, and Austin Kocher. 2011. “Detention, Deportation, Devolution and 
Immigrant Incapacitation in the US, Post 9/11,” The Geographical Journal 177(3): 228–
237. 
 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2009. “Immigration Enforcement: Better 
Controls Needed Over Program Authorizing State and Local Enforcement of Federal 
Immigration Laws,” Washington, D.C. 
 
Gentsch, Kerstin and Douglas S. Massey. 2011. “Labor Market Outcomes for Legal 
Mexican Immigrants Under the New Regime of Immigration Enforcement,” Social 
Science Quarterly 92(3): 875–893.  
 
Friedberg, Rachel. 2000. “You Can’t Take it With You? Immigrant Assimilation and the 
Portability of Human Capital,” Journal of Labor Economics 18(2): 221–251. 
 
Hotchkiss, Julie L., and Myriam Quispe-Agnoli. 2013. “The Expected Impact of State 
Immigration Legislation on Labor Market Outcomes,” Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 32(1): 34–59.  
 
Huntington, Clare. 2008. “The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism,” 
Vanderbilt Law Review 61(3): 787–856.  
 
Kandula, Namratha R., Margaret Kersey, and Nicole Lurie. 2004. “Assuring the Health 
of Immigrants: What the Leading Health Indicators Tell Us,” Annual Review of Public 
Health 25(1): 357–376. 
 
Kashu, Anita. 2009. “The Role of Police: Striking a Balance Between Immigration 
Enforcement and Civil Liberties,” The Police Foundation: Washington, DC. 
 
Kaushal, Neeraj. 2006. “Amnesty Programs and the Labor Market Outcomes of 
Undocumented Workers,” Journal of Human Resources 16(3): 631–647. 
 
Kee, Lindsay. 2012. “Consequences and Costs: Lessons Learned from Davidson County, 
Tennessee’s Jail Model 287(g) Program,” American Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee.  
 
Kossoudji, Sherrie A. and Deborah A. and Cobb-Clark. 2002. “Coming Out of the 
Shadows: Learning About Legal Status and Wages from the Legalized Population,” 
 Journal of Labor Economics 20(3): 598–628.  
 
Kostandini, Genti, Elton Mykerezi, and Cesar Escalante. “The Impact of Immigration 
Enforcement on the U.S. Farming Sector,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
96(1): 172–192. 
 
Lacayo, A. Elena. 2010. “The Impact of Section 287(g) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act on the Latino Community,” Working Paper, Issue Brief No. 21, National 
Council of La Raza. 
 
110 
Lee, Michelle Ye Hee and Glenn Kessler. 2016. “Fact-Checking Donald Trump’s 
Immigration Speech,” The Washington Post, September 1, 2016. 
 
Lopez, Mark Hugo, and Susan Minushkin. 2008. “2008 National Survey of Latinos: 
Hispanics See Their Situation in U.S. Deteriorating; Oppose Key Immigration 
Enforcement Measures,” Working Paper, Pew Hispanic Center, Washington DC. 
 
Massey, Douglas S., Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone. 2002. Beyond Smoke and 
Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Age of Economic Integration. New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation.  
 
Massey, Douglas S., and Fernando Riosmena. 2010. “Undocumented Migration from 
Latin American in an Era of Rising U.S. Enforcement.” Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 630(1): 137–161.  
 
Orrenius, Pia, and Madeline Zavodny. 2014. “How Do E-Verify Mandates Affect 
Unauthorized Immigrant Workers?” IZA Discussion Paper No. 7992. 
 
Parrado, Emilio A. 2012. “Immigration Enforcement Policies, the Economic Recession, 
and the Size of Local Mexican Immigrant Populations.” Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 641(1): 16–37. 
 
Pena, Anita Alves. 2010a. “Legalization and Immigrants in U.S. Agriculture,” The B.E. 
Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 10(1): 1–22. 
 
Pena, Anita Alves. 2010b. “Poverty, Legal Status, and Pay Basis: The Case of U.S. 
Agriculture,” Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 49(3): 429–456.  
 
Pham, Huyen, and Pham Hong Van. 2010. “The Economic Impact of Local Immigration 
Regulation: An Empirical Analysis,” Immigration and Nationality Law Review 31(2): 
687–721. 
 
Phillips, Julie, and Douglas S. Massey. 1999. “The New Labor Market: Immigrants and 
Wages after IRCA,” Demography 36(2): 233–246. 
 
Pinkerton, James, and St. John Barned-Smith. 2017. “Sheriff Cuts Ties with ICE Program 
Over Immigrant Detention,” Houston Chronicle, February 21, 2017. 
 
Quereshi, Ajmel. 2010. “287(g) and Women: The Family Values of Local Enforcement 
of Federal Immigration Law,” Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender and Society 25(2): 
261–300. 
 
Quiroga, Seline Szkupinski, Dulce M. Medina, Jennifer Glick. 2014. “In the Belly of the 
Beast: Effects of Anti-Immigration Policy on Latino Community Members,” American 
Behavioral Scientist 58(13): 1723–1742.  
 
 
111 
Rhodan, Maya. 2017. “President Trump Wants Sheriffs to Help with Deportations. 
Here’s What Sheriffs Think,” Time (March 16, 2017), http://time.com/4704084/donald-
trump-immigration-sheriffs-287g/. 
 
Rivera-Batiz, Francisco L. 1999. “Undocumented Workers in the Labor Market: An 
Analysis of the Earnings of Legal and Illegal Mexican Immigrants in the United States,” 
Journal of Population Economics 12(1): 91–116. 
 
Schuck, Peter H. 2007. “Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously,” University of 
Chicago Legal Forum 2007(1): 57–92. 
 
Singer, Audrey, Jill H. Wilson, and Brooke DeRenzis. 2009. “Immigrants, Politics, and 
Local Response in Suburban Washington,” Brookings Institute: Metropolitan Policy 
Program.  
 
Vaughan, Jessica M., and James R. Edwards Jr. 2009. “The 287(g) Program: Protecting 
Home Towns and Homeland,” Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies.  
 
Warren, Robert, and Jeffrey S. Passel. 1987. “A Count of the Uncountable: Estimates of 
Undocumented Aliens Counted in the 1980 United States Census,” Demography 24(3): 
345–393.  
 
Weissman, Deborah M., Rebecca C. Headen, and Katherine Lewis Parker. 2009. “The 
Policies and Politics of Local Immigration Enforcement Laws: 287 (g) Program in North 
Carolina,” University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.  
 
Wong, Tom K.  2012. “287(g) and the Politics of Interior Immigration Control in the 
United States: Explaining Local Cooperation with Federal Immigration Authorities,” 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 38(5): 737–756. 
 
Zavodny, Madeline. 2000.  “The Effects of Official English Laws on Limited-English 
Proficient Workers,” Journal of Labor Economics 18(3): 427–452. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 
FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Table 1: List of All Active 287(g) Agreements, as of December 2011 
 
State / County / 
City 
Law Enforcement 
Agency 
Model Date Signed 
Alabama Alabama Department 
of Public Safety 
Task Force 09/10/2003 
Arizona Arizona Department of 
Corrections 
Jail &Task Force 09/16/2005 
Arizona Arizona Department of 
Public Safety 
Jail & Task Force 04/15/2007 
Mesa, Arizona City of Mesa Police 
Department 
Jail & Task Force 11/19/2009 
Phoenix, Arizona City of Phoenix Police 
Department 
Jail & Task Force 03/10/2008 
Florence, Arizona Florence Police 
Department 
Task Force 10/21/2009 
Maricopa County, 
Arizona 
Maricopa County 
Sherriff’s Office 
Jail & Task Force 02/07/2007 
Pima County, 
Arizona 
(Tuscon) 
Pima County Sheriff’s 
Office 
Jail & Task Force 03/10/2008 
Pinal County, 
Arizona 
Pinal County Sheriff’s 
Office 
Jail & Task Force 03/10/2008 
Yavapai County, 
Arizona 
Yavapai County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail & Task Force 03/10/2008 
Benton County, 
Arkansas 
(Bentonville) 
Benton County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail & Task Force 09/26/2007 
Springdale, 
Arkansas 
City of Springdale 
Police Department 
Task Force 09/26/2007 
Rogers, Arkansas Rogers Police 
Department 
Task Force 09/25/2007 
Washington 
County, Arkansas 
Washington County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail & Task Force 09/26/2007 
Los Angeles 
County, California 
(Los Angeles) 
Los Angeles County, 
Sheriff’s Office  
Jail Enforcement 02/01/2005 
Orange County, 
California 
(Anaheim) 
Orange County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail Enforcement 11/02/2006 
Riverside County, 
California 
Riverside County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail Enforcement 04/28/2006 
San Bernardino 
County, California 
San Bernardino 
County Sheriff’s 
Jail Enforcement 11/19/2005 
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Office 
Colorado Colorado Department 
of Public Safety 
Task Force 03/29/2007 
El Paso County, 
Colorado 
El Paso County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail Enforcement 05/17/2007 
Danbury, 
Connecticut 
City of Danbury Police 
Department 
Task Force 10/15/2009 
Delaware Delaware Department 
of Corrections 
Jail Enforcement 10/15/2009 
Bay County, 
Florida 
(Panama City) 
Bay County Sheriff’s 
Office 
Task Force 06/15/2008 
Collier County, 
Florida 
(Naples) 
Collier County, 
Sheriff’s Office  
Jail & Task Force 08/06/2007 
Florida  Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement 
Task Force 07/02/2002 
Jacksonville, 
Florida 
Jacksonville Sheriff’s 
Office 
Jail Enforcement 07/08/2008 
Georgia Cobb County Sheriff’s 
Office 
Jail Enforcement 02/13/2007 
Georgia Georgia Department of 
Public Safety 
Task Force 07/27/2007 
Gwinnet County, 
Georgia 
Gwinnet County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail Enforcement 10/15/2009 
Hall County, 
Georgia 
Hall County Sheriff’s 
Office 
Jail & Task Force 02/29/2008 
Whitfield County, 
Georgia 
Whitfield County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail Enforcement 02/04/2008 
Frederick County, 
Maryland 
Frederick County 
Sheriff’s  
Jail & Task Force 02/06/2008 
Minnesota Minnesota Department 
of Public Safety  
Task Force 09/22/2008 
Missouri Missouri State 
Highway Control 
Task Force 06/25/2008 
Las Vegas, Nevada Las Vegas 
Metropolitan Police 
Department 
Jail Enforcement 09/08/2008 
Hudson City, New 
Hampshire 
Hudson City Police 
Department 
Task Force 05/05/2007 
Hudson County, 
New Jersey 
Hudson County 
Department of 
Corrections 
Jail & Task Force 08/11/2008 
Monmouth County, 
New Jersey 
Monmouth County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail Enforcement 10/15/2009 
New Mexico New Mexico Jail Enforcement 09/17/2007 
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Department of 
Corrections 
Alamance County, 
North Carolina 
Alamance County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail Enforcement 01/10/2007 
Cabarrus County, 
North Carolina 
Cabarrus County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail Enforcement 08/02/2007 
Durham, North 
Carolina 
Durham Police 
Department 
Task Force 02/01/2008 
Gaston County, 
North Carolina 
Gaston County Police 
Department 
Jail Enforcement 02/22/2007 
Guilford County, 
North Carolina 
Guilford County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Task Force 10/15/2009 
Henderson County, 
North Carolina 
Henderson County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail Enforcement 06/25/2008 
Mecklenburg 
County, North 
Carolina 
(Charlotte) 
Mecklenburg County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail Enforcement 02/27/2006 
Butler County, 
Ohio 
Butler County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail & Task Force 06/25/2008 
Tulsa County, 
Oklahoma 
(Tulsa) 
Tulsa County Sheriff’s 
Office 
Jail & Task Force 08/06/2007 
Rhode Island Rhode Island State 
Police 
Task Force 10/15/2009 
Beaufort County, 
South Carolina 
Beaufort County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Task Force 06/25/2008 
Charleston County. 
South Carolina 
(Charleston) 
Charleston County 
Sheriff’s Department 
Jail Enforcement 11/09/2009 
York County, South 
Carolina 
York County Sheriff’s 
Office 
Jail Enforcement 10/16/2007 
Davidson County, 
Tennessee 
(Nashville) 
Davidson County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail Enforcement 02/21/2007 
Tennessee Tennessee Department 
of Safety 
Task Force 06/25/2008 
Carrollton, Texas Carrollton Police 
Department 
Jail Enforcement 08/12/2008 
Farmers Branch, 
Texas 
Farmers Branch Police 
Department 
Task Force 07/08/2008 
Harris County, 
Texas 
(Houston) 
Harris County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail Enforcement 07/20/2008 
Washington 
County, Utah 
Washington County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail Enforcement 09/22/2008 
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Weber County, 
Utah 
Weber County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail Enforcement  09/22/2008 
Herndon, Virginia Herndon Police 
Department 
Task Force 03/21/2007 
Loudoun County, 
Virginia 
Loudoun County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Task Force 06/25/2008 
Manassas Park, 
Virginia 
Manassas Park Police 
Department 
Task Force 03/10/2008 
Manassas, Virginia Manassas Police 
Department 
Task Force 03/05/2008 
Prince William 
County, Virginia 
Prince William County 
Police Department 
Task Force 02/26/2008 
Prince William 
County, Virginia 
Prince William County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Task Force 02/26/2008 
Prince William-
Manassas, Virginia 
Prince William-
Manassas Regional 
Jail 
Jail Enforcement 07/09/2007 
Rockingham 
County, Virginia 
Rockingham County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail & Task Force 04/25/2007 
Shenandoah, 
Virginia 
Shenandoah County 
Sheriff’s Office 
Jail & Task Force 05/10/2007 
Source: Capps et al. (2011) 
 
 
Figure 1: Number of Individuals, ICE Assumed Custody:  
Los Angeles County, 2000–2012 
 
 
 
Source: Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) Data, Tracking Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
Detainers. Last Accessed November 9, 2017.  
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by Presence of 287(g) Agreement in Jurisdiction of 
Residence 
 
 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics by Immigrant Status 
 
 
 
Variable 287(g) Agreement No 287(g) Agreement 
Male     0.57   0.59 
Age   41.99 41.50 
Married     0.55   0.59 
Years of Education   13.55 13.58 
Hispanic     0.20   0.11 
White     0.73   0.78 
Black     0.12   0.11 
Asian     0.06   0.04 
Other Race     0.09   0.07 
Foreign Born      0.23   0.15 
Wage (in 2010 dollars)   24.04 24.50 
N 397,021   1,839,335 
Note: Data shown is comprised of the 1% 2000 Census and a 1% sample of both the 3-year 2005–2007 and  
5-year 2008–2012 American Community Survey. Weighted using sample weights. Sample restricted to those 
working full-time and full-year. Sample is restricted to workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour 
who are not self-employed. Age was restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Those born in Guam, 
Puerto Rico, or the U.S. Virgin Islands were excluded from this analysis, as were citizens born abroad.  
Variable Immigrant Native to U.S. 
Male      0.63   0.57 
Age    40.57 41.75 
Married      0.60   0.59 
Years of Education    12.76 13.72 
Hispanic      0.45   0.07 
White      0.46   0.83 
Black      0.08   0.11 
Asian      0.24   0.01 
Other Race      0.22     0.04 
Wage (in 2010 dollars)    22.48 24.82 
N  316,605   1,919,751 
Note: Data shown is comprised of the 1% 2000 Census and a 1% sample of both the 3-year 2005–2007 and  
5-year 2008–2012 American Community Survey. Weighted using sample weights. Sample restricted to those 
working full-time and full-year. Sample is restricted to workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour 
who are not self-employed. Age was restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Those born in Guam, 
Puerto Rico, or the U.S. Virgin Islands were excluded from this analysis, as were citizens born abroad.  
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Table 4: Triple Difference Estimates, 287(g) Agreements 2000–2012 
 
 
Men 
ln(wage) 
Women 
ln(wage) 
     
Age  0.0579*** 0.0526*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0008) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0544*** -0.0512*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Years of Education 0.0863*** 0.1044*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0007) 
Hispanic -0.0950*** -0.0514*** 
 
(0.0051) (0.0055) 
Black -0.1703*** -0.0858*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0042) 
Asian -0.0811*** -0.0120 
 
(0.0076) (0.0082) 
Other Race -0.0408*** -0.0318*** 
 (0.0059) (0.0068) 
Immigrant -0.0338*** -0.0291*** 
 
(0.0041) (0.0041) 
Immigrant × 287(g) 
Agreement -0.0484*** -0.0479*** 
 
(0.0106) (0.0125) 
Constant 0.3824*** 0.1205*** 
 
(0.0082) (0.0090) 
   Observations      1,288,237   950,119 
R-squared 0.3342       0.3089 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is the log of wages in 2010 dollars. Data shown is 
comprised of the 1% 2000 Census and a 1% sample of both the 3-year 2005–2007 and 5-year 2008–2012 
American Community Survey. Sample weights are used. Sample restricted to those working full-time and 
full-year. Age was restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include industry, 
marital status, children present, and veteran status. Sample is restricted to workers earning between $1.50 
and $300 per hour who are not self-employed. “287(g) Agreement” indicates the presence of a 287(g) 
agreement in state k at time t.  
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Table 5: Summary Statistics by Immigrant Legal Status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Legal Immigrant Potentially Undocumented 
Immigrant 
Male      0.58     0.71 
Age    44.35   35.61 
Married      0.66     0.52 
Years of Education    13.47   11.81 
White      0.46     0.46 
Hispanic      0.34     0.59 
Black      0.07     0.07 
Asian      0.29     0.19 
Other Race      0.28     0.28 
Wage (in 2010 dollars)    25.88   18.02 
N  191,784 124,821 
Note: Data shown is comprised of the 1% 2000 Census and a 1% sample of both the 3-year 2005–2007 and 5-
year 2008–2012 American Community Survey. Weighted using sample weights. Sample restricted to those 
working full-time and full-year. Sample is restricted to workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who 
are not self-employed. Age was restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Those born in Guam, Puerto 
Rico, or the U.S. Virgin Islands were excluded from this analysis, as were citizens born abroad. “Potentially 
Undocumented” indicates whether the individual is classified as an undocumented worker according to Borjas 
(2017). For more information about this classification, see Section IV.  
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Table 6: Triple Difference Estimates of the Impact of 287(g) Agreements by 
Potential Legal Status 
 
 
 
 
Men 
ln(wage) 
Women 
ln(wage) 
Age  0.0575***     0.0524*** 
 
(0.0007)    (0.0008) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0542***    -0.0512*** 
 (0.0009)    (0.0009) 
Years of Education 0.0864***     0.1039*** 
 
(0.0006)    (0.0007) 
Hispanic -0.0821***    -0.0417*** 
 
(0.0051)    (0.0055) 
Black -0.1680***    -0.0858*** 
 (0.0046)    (0.0042) 
Asian -0.0882***    -0.0202** 
 
(0.0075)    (0.0081) 
Other Race -0.0435***    -0.0349*** 
 (0.0059)    (0.0068) 
Potentially Undocumented -0.0980***    -0.1421*** 
 (0.0067)    (0.0086) 
Potentially Legal -0.0167***    -0.0064 
 (0.0060)    (0.0066) 
Potentially Undocumented × 287(g) 
Agreement -0.0681***    -0.0894*** 
 
(0.0117)    (0.0173) 
Potentially Legal × 287(g) Agreement -0.0586***    -0.0543*** 
 (0.0116)    (0.0123) 
Constant 0.4461***     0.1856*** 
 
(0.0082)    (0.0090) 
   Observations      1,288,237 950,119 
R-squared 0.3373     0.3154 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. Data 
shown is comprised of the 1% 2000 Census and a 1% sample of both the 3-year 2005–2007 and 5-year  
2008–2012 American Community Survey. Sample weights are used. Sample restricted to those working full-
time and full-year, with usual hours greater than 35 hours per week and weeks worked per year greater than 
50. Age was restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include industry, marital 
status, children present, and veteran status. Sample is restricted to workers earning between $1.50 and $300 
per hour who are not self-employed. “287(g) Agreement” indicates the presence of a 287(g) agreement in 
state k at time t. “Potentially Undocumented” indicates whether the individual is classified as an 
undocumented worker according to Borjas (2017). For more information about this classification, see Section 
IV. 
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Table 7: Triple Difference Estimates of the Impact of 287(g) Agreements on 
Immigrant Worker Hours 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Men 
ln(hours) 
Women 
ln(hours) 
Age  0.0043*** 0.0040*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0051*** -0.0043*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Years of Education 0.0062*** 0.0075*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
Hispanic -0.0164*** -0.0080*** 
 
(0.0009) (0.0008) 
Black -0.0144*** 0.0026 
 (0.0022) (0.0021) 
Asian 0.0043*** 0.0040*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
Other Race -0.0487*** -0.0293*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0033) 
Immigrant -0.0314*** -0.0312*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0049) 
Immigrant × 287(g) 
Agreement -0.0130*** -0.0098*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Constant 3.6499*** 3.5727*** 
 
(0.0083) (0.0075) 
   Observations     1,342,983   1,109,614 
R-squared 0.0511   0.0466 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. 
Data shown is comprised of the 1% 2000 Census and a 1% sample of both the 3-year 2005–2007 and 
5-year 2008–2012 American Community Survey. Sample weights are used. Age was restricted to 
those between the ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include industry, marital status, children 
present, and veteran status. Sample is restricted to workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour 
who are not self-employed. “287(g) Agreement” indicates the presence of a 287(g) agreement in state 
k at time t.   
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Table 8: Probit Estimates of the Impact of 287(g) Agreements on Immigrant 
Worker Employment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Men 
Pr(emp) 
Women 
Pr(emp) 
Age  0.0391*** 0.0544*** 
 
(0.0013) (0.0015) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0472*** -0.0597*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0017) 
Years of Education 0.0422*** 0.0505*** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0013) 
Hispanic -0.1599*** -0.1332*** 
 
(0.0104) (0.0117) 
Black -0.2658*** -0.2460*** 
 (0.0089) (0.0086) 
Asian -0.2490*** -0.1856*** 
 
(0.0141) (0.0157) 
Other Race -0.0726*** -0.0815*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0137) 
Immigrant -0.0790*** -0.0828*** 
 (0.0094) (0.0110) 
Immigrant × 287 (g) 
Agreement 0.2372*** 0.1497*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0208) 
Constant 0.2373*** -0.2749*** 
 
(0.0295) (0.0347) 
   Observations     1,545,884   1,330,166 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual is 
employed. Data shown is comprised of the 1% 2000 Census and a 1% sample of both the 3-year 
2005–2007 and 5-year 2008–2012 American Community Survey. Sample weights are used. Age 
was restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include industry, marital 
status, children present, and veteran status. Sample is restricted to workers earning between $1.50 
and $300 per hour who are not self-employed. “287(g) Agreement” indicates the presence of a 
287(g) agreement in state k at time t.   
 
 
122 
Table 9: Triple Difference Estimates, Placebo Test 
 
 
Men 
ln(wage) 
Women 
ln(wage) 
Age  0.0577***     0.0526*** 
 
(0.0007)    (0.0008) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0543***    -0.0512*** 
 (0.0009)    (0.0009) 
Years of Education 0.0862***     0.1044*** 
 
(0.0006)    (0.0007) 
Hispanic -0.0988***    -0.0548*** 
 
(0.0051)    (0.0055) 
Black -0.1725***    -0.0884*** 
 (0.0046)    (0.0042) 
Asian -0.0807***    -0.0100 
 
(0.0076)    (0.0081) 
Other Race -0.0383***    -0.0301*** 
 (0.0059)    (0.0068) 
Immigrant 0.0261*     0.0078 
 (0.0150)    (0.0176) 
Immigrant × 287(g) 
Agreement  -0.0158     0.0151 
 
(0.0251)    (0.0286) 
Constant 0.3846***     0.1187*** 
 
(0.0315)    (0.0369) 
   Observations  910,398 682,979 
R-squared 0.3441     0.3192 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. Data 
shown is comprised of the 1% 2000 Census and a 1% sample of both the 3-year 2005–2007 and 5-year 
2008–2012 American Community Survey. Sample weights are used. Sample restricted to individuals who 
have not moved in the past five years and those working full-time and full-year, with usual hours greater 
than 35 hours per week and weeks worked per year greater than 50. Age was restricted to those between the 
ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include industry, marital status, children present, and veteran status. 
Sample is restricted to workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not self-employed. 
“287(g) Agreement” indicates the presence of a 287(g) agreement in state k at time t–3.  
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Table 10: Triple Difference Estimates Without Migrants  
 
 
Men 
ln(wage) 
Women 
ln(wage) 
Age  0.0583*** 0.0532*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0005) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0553*** -0.0516*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Years of Education 0.0898*** 0.1086*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) 
Hispanic -0.1176*** -0.0776*** 
 
(0.0031) (0.0033) 
Black -0.1783*** -0.0787*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0026) 
Asian -0.0964*** -0.0062 
 
(0.0046) (0.0049) 
Other Race -0.0530*** -0.0332*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0041) 
Immigrant -0.0221*** -0.0109*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0041) 
Immigrant × 287(g) 
Agreement  -0.0535*** -0.0590*** 
 
(0.0189) (0.0150) 
Constant 0.4855*** 0.2470*** 
 
(0.0315) (0.0369) 
   Observations      1,288,237  950,119 
R-squared 0.3441      0.3192 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. Data 
shown is comprised of the 1% 2000 Census and a 1% sample of both the 3-year 2005–2007 and 5-year 
2008–2012 American Community Survey. Sample weights are used. Sample restricted to individuals who 
have not moved in the past five years (2000 Census) or moved in the past year (ACS) and those working full
time and full-year, with usual hours greater than 35 hours per week and weeks worked per year greater than 
50. Sample restricted to those who have not moved in the past year inter- or intra-state. Age was restricted to 
those between the ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include industry, marital status, children present, 
and veteran status. Sample is restricted to workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not 
self-employed. “287(g) Agreement” indicates the presence of a 287(g) agreement in state k at time t.  
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Table 11: Triple Difference Estimates of Agreement Type 
 
 
Men 
ln(wage) 
Women 
ln(wage) 
Age  0.0580***     0.0511*** 
 
(0.0001)    (0.0001) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0548***    -0.0496*** 
 (0.0001)    (0.0001) 
Years of Education 0.0868***     0.1043*** 
 
(0.0009)   (0.0011) 
Hispanic -0.1117***   -0.0732*** 
 
(0.0008)   (0.0008) 
Black -0.1693***   -0.0668*** 
 (0.0007)    (0.0006) 
Asian -0.0748***    -0.0293** 
 
(0.0012)    (0.0013) 
Other Race -0.0525***    -0.0160 
 (0.0009)    (0.0010) 
Immigrant × Jail 287(g) 
Agreement  -0.0775***    -0.0408*** 
 
(0.0040)    (0.0046) 
Immigrant × Task Force 
287(g) Agreement -0.1006***    -0.1177*** 
 (0.0024)    (0.0028) 
Immigrant × Hybrid 287(g) 
Agreement  -0.0115*     0.0078 
 
(0.0052)    (0.0058) 
Constant 0.1920**     0.2609*** 
 
(0.0089)    (0.0094) 
   Observations      1,288,237 950,119 
R-squared 0.3401     0.3204 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. Data 
shown is comprised of the 1% 2000 Census and a 1% sample of both the 3-year 2005–2007 and 5-year 
2008–2012 American Community Survey. Sample weights are used. Sample restricted to those working full-
time and full-year, with usual hours greater than 35 hours per week and weeks worked per year greater than 
50. Age was restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include industry, marital 
status, children present, and veteran status. Sample is restricted to workers earning between $1.50 and $300 
per hour who are not self-employed. “287(g) Agreement” indicates the presence of a 287(g) agreement in 
state k at time t. Jail, task force, and hybrid agreements are described in detail in Section II. 
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Table 12: Triple Difference Estimates of the Impact of Agreement Strength  
 
 
Men 
ln(wage) 
Women 
ln(wage) 
Age  0.0577*** 0.0526*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0008) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0543*** -0.0512*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Years of Education 0.0869*** 0.1048*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0007) 
Hispanic -0.0887*** -0.0468*** 
 
(0.0051) (0.0055) 
Black -0.1670*** -0.0845*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0042) 
Asian -0.0837*** -0.0128 
 
(0.0075) (0.0081) 
Other Race -0.0443*** -0.0361*** 
 (0.0059) (0.0068) 
Immigrant -0.0533*** -0.0525*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0057) 
Immigrant × High Strength 
Agreement -0.0768*** -0.0621*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0139) 
Immigrant × Low Strength 
Agreement -0.0484*** -0.0716*** 
 
(0.0116) (0.0142) 
Constant 0.4106*** 0.1454*** 
 
(0.0082) (0.0090) 
   Observations      1,288,237    950,119 
R-squared 0.3378        0.3160 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. Data 
shown is comprised of the 1% 2000 Census and a 1% sample of both the 3-year 2005–2007 and 5-year 
2008–2012 American Community Survey. Sample weights are used. Sample restricted to those working full-
time and full-year, with usual hours greater than 35 hours per week and weeks worked per year greater than 
50. Age was restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include industry, marital 
status, children present, and veteran status. Sample is restricted to workers earning between $1.50 and $300 
per hour who are not self-employed. “High Strength Agreement” and “Low Strength Agreement” indicate 
the presence of a 287(g) agreement that resulted in a percentage of individuals taken into custody by ICE 
that is above or below the median in state k at time t. 
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Table 13: Triple Difference Estimates of the Impact of Agreement Strength on the 
Potentially Undocumented Population  
 
 
Men 
ln(wage) 
Women 
ln(wage) 
Age  0.0571*** 0.0522*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0008) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0540*** -0.0511*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Years of Education 0.0866*** 0.1042*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0007) 
Hispanic -0.0824*** -0.0422*** 
 
(0.0051) (0.0055) 
Black -0.1670*** -0.0842*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0042) 
Asian -0.0803*** -0.0088 
 
(0.0075) (0.0081) 
Other Race -0.0418*** -0.0325*** 
 (0.0059) (0.0067) 
Potentially Undocumented -0.0145 -0.0573*** 
 (0.0089) (0.0108) 
Potentially 
Undocumented× High 
Strength Agreement -0.0770*** -0.0511*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0142) 
Potentially Undocumented × Low Strength Agreement -0.0468*** -0.0910*** 
 
(0.0154) (0.0229) 
Constant 0.0577*** 0.0527*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) 
   Observations 1,288,237 950,119 
R-squared 0.3377 0.3161 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. Data shown is 
comprised of the 1% 2000 Census and a 1% sample of both the 3-year 2005–2007 and 5-year 2008–2012 American 
Community Survey. Sample weights are used. Sample restricted to those working full-time and full-year, with usual 
hours greater than 35 hours per week and weeks worked per year greater than 50. Additional controls include 
industry, marital status, children present, and veteran status. Sample is restricted to workers earning between $1.50 
and $300 per hour who are not self-employed. “High Strength Agreement” and “Low Strength Agreement” indicate 
the presence of a 287(g) agreement that resulted in a percentage of individuals taken into custody by ICE that is above 
or below the mean in state k at time t. “Potentially Undocumented” indicates whether the individual is classified as an 
undocumented worker according to Borjas (2017). For more information about this classification, see Section IV.  
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Table 14: Triple Difference Estimates of the Effects of Scope  
 
 
Men 
ln(wage) 
Women 
ln(wage) 
      
Age  0.0577*** 0.0525*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0008) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0543*** -0.0510*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Years of Education 0.0867*** 0.1047*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0007) 
Hispanic -0.0916*** -0.0513*** 
 
(0.0051) (0.0055) 
Black -0.1685*** -0.0850*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0042) 
Asian -0.0847*** -0.0144* 
 
(0.0075) (0.0082) 
Other Race -0.0443*** -0.0349*** 
 (0.0059) (0.0068) 
Immigrant -0.0630*** -0.0637*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0055) 
Targeted Scope × 
Immigrant -0.0217 -0.01973 
 (0.0565) (0.0647) 
Broad Scope × Immigrant -0.0295*** -0.0282** 
 
(0.0112) (0.0133) 
Constant 0.4133*** 0.1472*** 
 
(0.0082) (0.0090) 
Observations      1,288,237   950,119 
R-squared 0.3376       0.3157 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. Data shown is 
comprised of the 1% 2000 Census and a 1% sample of both the 3-year 2005–2007 and 5-year 2008–2012 American 
Community Survey. Sample weights are used. Sample restricted to those working full-time and full-year, with usual 
hours greater than 35 hours per week and weeks worked per year greater than 50. Age was restricted to those between 
the ages of 18 and 65. Additional controls include industry, marital status, children present, and veteran status. Sample 
is restricted to workers earning between $1.50 and $300 per hour who are not self-employed. “Broad Scope” and 
“Targeted Scope” indicate the targeted nature of each 287(g) agreement that. If the proportion of individuals who 
committed no crime or committed a low-level crime under ICE detainer request in state k at time t is greater than the 
mean, observations are classified as “Broad Scope,” while “Targeted Scope” captures observations under the mean, as 
these agreements mostly target individuals who commit crimes that are considered to be a priority. For more 
discussion of these labels, see Section V.  
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Table 15: Triple Difference Estimates of the Effects of Scope on Potentially 
Undocumented Immigrants 
 
 
Men 
ln(wage) 
Women 
ln(wage) 
Age  0.0577***     0.0525*** 
 
(0.0007)    (0.0008) 
Age Squared / 100 -0.0543***    -0.0510*** 
 (0.0009)    (0.0009) 
Years of Education 0.0867***     0.1046*** 
 
(0.0006)    (0.0007) 
Hispanic -0.0915***    -0.0511*** 
 
(0.0051)    (0.0055) 
Black -0.1687***    -0.0852*** 
 (0.0046)    (0.0042) 
Asian -0.0847***    -0.0148* 
 
(0.0075)    (0.0082) 
Other Race -0.0441***    -0.0350*** 
 (0.0059)    (0.0068) 
Potentially Undocumented -0.0631***    -0.0633*** 
 (0.0047)    (0.0053) 
Targeted Scope × 
Potentially Undocumented -0.0445    -0.0322 
 (0.0702)    (0.0972) 
Broad Scope × Potentially 
Undocumented -0.0637***   -0.0949*** 
 
(0.0143)   (0.0221) 
Constant 0.4136***    0.1490*** 
 
(0.0082)   (0.0090) 
Observations      1,288,237      950,119 
R-squared 0.3334          0.3084 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. The dependent variable is the natural log of wages in 2010 dollars. Data shown is comprised 
of the 1% 2000 Census and a 1% sample of both the 3-year 2005–2007 and 5-year 2008–2012 American Community Survey. 
Sample weights are used. Sample restricted to those working full-time and full-year, with usual hours greater than 35 hours 
per week and weeks worked per year greater than 50. Age was restricted to those between the ages of 18 and 65. Additional 
controls include industry, marital status, children present, and veteran status. Sample is restricted to workers earning between 
$1.50 and $300 per hour who are not self-employed. “Broad Scope” and “Targeted Scope” indicate the targeted nature of each 
287(g) agreement that. If the proportion of individuals who committed no crime or committed a low-level crime under ICE 
detainer request in state k at time t is greater than the mean, observations are classified as “Broad Scope,” while “Targeted 
Scope” captures observations under the mean, as these agreements mostly target individuals who commit crimes that are 
considered to be a priority. For more discussion of these labels, see Section V.  “ Potentially Undocumented” indicates 
whether the individual is classified as an undocumented worker according to Borjas (2017). For more information about this 
classification, see Section IV. 
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CHAPTER THREE: BACKLOGS AND BORROWED TIME: THE IMPACT OF 
CASE BACKLOG ON THE IMMIGRATION COURT SYSTEM 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Case backlog has plagued the U.S. immigration court system for almost a decade. 
This backlog coincides with a time of immense delay in the immigration court system, 
with some courts scheduling hearings more than seven years in the future. Other than the 
inconvenience of delay, commentators have hypothesized that backlog can also 
disadvantage the likelihood of success of the underlying cases, as immigration court 
proceedings often turn on evidence that could become stale over time. As immigration 
enforcement has increased over the past decade, the inflows to immigration courts have 
also steadily increased, leaving immigration court backlog at an all-time high. At the end 
of the 2017 fiscal year, there were over 629,000 cases pending in immigration courts 
nationwide. This backlog has continued to increase in the early months of 2018. In this 
chapter, I use the variation in case backlog in each immigration court to determine how 
backlogs affects the duration of each case and the outcome of each case decided by 
immigration judges. 
Immigration judges presiding over immigration cases work under fast-paced, 
high-pressure, and culturally-charged conditions. Due to this pressure, immigration 
judges have higher burnout rates than hospital workers and prison wardens.27 
Immigration judges must juggle hundreds, if not thousands of cases, at once. The 
infrastructure to support these judges has been lacking—with small staffs and limited 
                                                 
27 Lustig et al. (2008) conducted a survey of 96 immigration judges that indicated that immigration judges 
were suffering significant symptoms of secondary traumatic stress and reported more burnout than any 
other professional group that the Copenhagen Burnout Inventory (CBI) has investigated, including busy 
physicians and prison wardens. 
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resources, immigration judges are acutely aware of the pressures that backlog creates in 
their courtrooms.   
However, judicial backlog is not unique to immigration courts. Supreme Court 
Justice Samuel Alito stated that one of the greatest problems facing the judiciary was the 
“crushing” workload faced by courts of appeals.28 Though there has been extensive 
discussion in legal literature on backlog in the federal courts, this discussion, until 
recently, has been qualitative and has focused on the judicial decision-making process in 
times of high caseloads (Richman and Reynolds 1996; Gulati and McCauliff 1998). It has 
since evolved to focus on two outputs: the number of case completions and the outcomes 
of the underlying cases.  
A growing law and economics literature examines caseload effects on judicial 
output. Studies have found conflicting evidence of caseload on case completions. 
Beenstock and Haitovsky (2004) study the workload of judges in Israel and find that 
there is a positive correlation between cases completed and caseload pressure, in line with 
literature finding that higher caseloads leads to higher case completion rates due to 
pressure that incentivizes judges to speed up case resolutions (Luskin and Luskin 1986; 
Rosales-Lopez 2008; Dimitrova-Grajzl et al. 2012). However, other studies suggest that 
an increase in caseload leads to a congestion effect in courts, which slows down the 
court’s productivity and thwarts case resolution (Buscaglia and Ulen 1997; Murrell 
2001). This chapter will determine whether the incentivization effect or congestion effect 
is stronger in U.S. immigration courts. 
                                                 
28 Interview by David F. Levi with Samuel A. Alito, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, in 
Durham, North Carolina (Sept. 15, 2010); Huang (2011).  
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Studies also examine the effects of judicial decision making on the ultimate 
outcome of individual cases. In addition to studies that focus on immigration court cases 
(Ramji-Nogales et al. 2007; Keith and Holmes 2009; Chen et al. 2016; Ryo 2016), 
studies on the broader judiciary suggest that individual judge or court characteristics have 
some influence on the outcomes of cases (Anderson et al. 1999; Revesz 1999; Sunstein et 
al. 2004).29 This literature pushes back on the ideal that individual cases are decided 
based on merit rather than extraneous factors, such as the biases of adjudicators. Backlog 
can be one of these extraneous factors (Huang 2011), but only a few papers have 
examined this factor in the immigration court context. Chen et al. (2016) find that U.S. 
immigration judges are less likely to approve an individual claiming asylum when they 
approved the previous claimant—thus, exhibiting gambler’s fallacy—when case backlog 
is high. Norris (2018) studies refugee appeals courts in Canada and finds that a 10 percent 
higher workload reduces the consistency of judicial decision making, an effect that 
remains persistent even with controls for case outcomes. This chapter adds to the existing 
literature examining case backlog in courts by providing an analysis of the effects of 
backlog on case duration and case outcome in U.S. immigration courts.   
I use a restricted-access dataset derived from Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) records that captures all four million juvenile cases decided in immigration courts 
between 2003 and 2013. Juvenile cases provide a unique opportunity to analyze the 
effects of case backlog in immigration courts because, until 2014, they were not subject 
to changes in priority in the immigration court system, which continuously shifted the 
order of priority of adult cases, particularly when those individuals had been convicted of 
                                                 
29 There is also a substantial literature that focuses on the effects of extraneous factors on judicial decision 
making, such as the proximity of the hearing to the judge’s lunch time (Danzinger, Levav, and Avnaim-
Pesso 2011) and the outcome of the home team’s football game (Eren and Mocan 2016).  
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a crime. Studying only juvenile cases also allows me to disentagle the effects of case 
duration in immigration courts by focusing on the exogenous change in the backlog of 
adult cases.  
I find, consistent with evidence on congestion effects in other courts, that 
immigration court backlog is correlated with longer case durations, even when 
controlling for specific court- and case-level factors. I find that when adult case backlog 
increases, juvenile case duration also increases in immigration courts by roughly three 
percent. This congestion effect persists regardless of the success of an individual’s claim 
or the individual’s representation status. However, I do find this effect is heterogeneous 
by year, suggesting a non-linear relationship between case backlog and case duration. I 
find that the relationship between case duration and backlog shifts when overall caseload 
becomes sufficiently large, suggesting that courts operate efficiently until they reach their 
breaking point. I find this phenomenon also holds when examining the probability of 
success in an immigration court case. 
As backlog intensifies, courts are noting the realities of this delay, including the 
substantial costs to the immigration system as a whole. The Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) spent approximately $2 billion on immigration detention in 2014, at an 
average of $5.46 million per day, or $161 per detainee per day (Ryo 2016). Mounting 
costs of case delay—including the cost to continue to hold individuals in detention—are 
straining the immigration system. My analysis shows that case backlog in immigration 
courts is associated with an increase in case duration, providing a congestion effect that 
can be costly to the immigration system as a whole.  
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II. Background  
 
The immigration court system is an important component of immigration 
enforcement in the United States. Individuals charged with violating immigration law are 
able to present their cases in these administrative courts, which operate under the 
Department of Justice’s Executive Offices of Immigration Review (EOIR). There are 
approximately 250 immigration judges currently serving in immigration courts. 
Immigration judges (IJs) oversee the fifty-eight immigration courts in the United States, 
where they hear evidence and determine the credibility of each application for relief. IJs 
are separate from the federal judiciary and are employees of EOIR.  
Immigration courts are administrative bodies that are trial-like in nature. For 
many immigrants, immigration courts are the first and last opportunity that they have to 
present evidence in support of their case. Additionally, the highly deferential standard 
provided to immigration courts on appeal heightens the need for an effective and 
complete development of the factual record in immigration courts in support of any 
claims for relief. Immigration judges work with small staffs, and their staff and court 
hours are set exogenously. The size of each immigration court varies as well: in 2015, for 
example, Fishkill, New York had one full-time employee while the largest court, Los 
Angeles, California, had approximately 85 full-time employees. 
Immigrants enter the immigration court system when they receive a Notice to 
Appear (NTA), a charging document issued by DHS alleging a violation of U.S. 
immigration law. DHS files this NTA with the closest immigration court to the 
respondent’s location, unless it believes another location is more appropriate. When an 
immigrant receives an NTA, he is summoned to an immigration court to appear before an 
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immigration judge in removal proceedings. While these removal proceedings are 
pending, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) may detain respondents, or 
respondents may be released on bond on conditional parole.30  
Court administrators randomly assign cases in immigration proceedings to judges, 
without regard to the underlying merit of each case (Ramji-Nogales et al. 2007).  Usually 
an immigration hearing has many parts, and immigration judges have broad discretion to 
determine how long a particular case will last and how many hearings are necessary to 
rule on the individual’s claim. The first, called a master calendar hearing, allows the IJ to 
ensure that the respondent understands the charges brought against him and gives him the 
opportunity to concede removability. If the respondent’s removability is still in question, 
the IJ sets the schedule for future merit hearings until a decision is made on the 
individual’s removability. At this merits hearing, the IJ hears testimony and reviews 
evidence regarding the individual’s removability and any claims for relief on behalf of 
the respondent. Based on the record, the IJ then must determine whether the respondent is 
removable, or whether any of the respondent’s claims for relief are meritorious. Judges 
issue oral or written decisions at the conclusion of these immigration court proceedings. 
If the individual is deemed removable by the judge, the individual is subject to removal 
from the United States per the judge’s order. The respondent then may appeal this 
judgment to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which is also under the purview of 
EOIR.   
Immigration judges hear a mixture of adult and juvenile proceedings, as there is 
no special juvenile immigration court. Juvenile proceedings continue just as adult 
                                                 
30 The Immigration and Nationality Act requires DHS to detain certain aliens such as those deemed 
inadmissible for certain criminal convictions or terrorist activity. See 8 U.S.C. 1226(c).  
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proceedings do in immigration courts, except judges are instructed to pay special 
attention to unrepresented juveniles in immigration proceedings. In juvenile cases, 
immigration judges are encouraged to provide a list of pro bono services to the juvenile 
and are allowed to make reasonable accommodations for juvenile immigrants.31 Further, 
for juveniles without representation, judges are asked to consider making a brief opening 
statement at the beginning of each proceeding to explain the purpose and the nature of 
proceedings and to introduce the parties and discuss each person’s role in the proceeding 
(EOIR 2007). Other than these slight procedural modifications, there is no marked 
difference between adult and juvenile proceedings in immigration courts. 
Immigration judges workloads are massive, and they are acutely aware of the 
consequences of their work. Judge Dana Leigh Marks, President of the National 
Association of Immigration Judges, said that immigration judges are “doing death penalty 
cases in a traffic court setting,” as the judges are “working at light speed, and yet the 
stakes for the people who are before the courts can be a risk to their very life” (Yang 
2017). Studies on immigration court judge decision making have found disparities in 
judge asylum grant rates both across and within individual immigration courts (Ramji-
Nogales et al. 2007; Eagly and Shafer 2015) but most have attributed these disparities to 
individual judge characteristics, rather than the underlying backlog pressures facing these 
courts.  
Immigration judges are aware of backlog pressure and make necessary tradeoffs 
to adequately manage this backlog. Yet, immigration judges, by the very nature of their 
posts, are required to act on each case regardless of the pile of cases that they see before 
                                                 
31 Reasonable modifications including allowing juveniles to bring pillows or toys, sit with an adult 
companion, or permitting juveniles to testify next to a trusted adult or friend (EOIR 2007).  
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them. And—unlike in civil courts— backlog in immigration courts does little to 
encourage settlements outside of court as immigrant cases are, for the most part, handled 
in the immigration court system itself.32 
Figure 1 shows the immigration court backlog through the end of the 2017 fiscal 
year. The number of pending cases steadily increased year over year from 2008 until 
2017. The backlog in immigration courts reached historic heights in 2017, when 
immigration courts had more than 629,000 cases pending. Yet, this backlog is not 
homogeneous among immigration courts, as cases within each immigration court 
originate in the place of immigration charge and are rarely transferred. In Arlington, 
Virginia—highly regarded as one of the nation’s most expedient immigration court—
eight judges share responsibility for 30,000 cases, with some scheduling hearings more 
than seven years into the future. Smaller immigration courts shoulder a limited portion of 
the backlog: Oakdale, Louisiana had just 151 cases pending in 2017. 
As President Obama increased immigration enforcement during his presidency, 
Congress tightened spending that resulted in a hiring freeze from 2011 to 2014 of 
immigration judges. Figure 2 shows the number of immigration judges hearing cases in 
immigration courts from 2003 until 2013. The number of immigration judges fluctuated 
slightly over this decade, but did not grow by a signification amount: the immigration 
judiciary has only expanded from a low of 207 immigration judges in 2007 to a high of 
239 judges in 2011.  The immigration judiciary continues to face staffing issues: 40 
                                                 
32 Juvenile immigrants do have several types of available immigration relief that they can claim through the 
immigration system, including asylum, special immigrant juvenile status, U-visas, and T-visas. However, 
other than asylum, these types of relief must be resolved outside of the immigration court system. The 
numbers of individuals receiving this type of relief is also minute in comparison to the number of 
individuals presenting their case in immigration courts as Congress sets caps for these special visas. For 
example, no more than 6,000 SIJS visas were approved each year by Congress in 2011–2015.  
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percent of immigration judges nationwide in 2016 were eligible for retirement. This 
shortage in staffing persists even though Congress has allocated funds for the 
immigration court system to hire new judges.  Recently, the Washington Post reported 
that the Department of Justice is “aiming to slash the massive immigration court backlog 
in half by 2020” through the addition of judges, technology, and refusing to tolerate 
repeated delays in deportation cases (Sacchetti 2017). However, it is unlikely that relief 
in the form of new judges will arrive quickly, as the GAO found that it took an average of 
742 days to hire new immigration judges from 2011 through August 2016 (GAO 2017). 
Figure 3 shows the mounting backlog for each immigration judge on average. Over my 
sample period, the average backlog of each immigration judge nearly doubled, from 777 
cases per judge each year in 2003 to 1516 cases per judge in 2013. To compare to Article 
III courts during this time period, United States District Court judges heard a high of only 
546 cases per judge in 2013. The structure of immigration courts and the volume of cases 
that they incur distinguish these courts from U.S. federal courts. This chapter examines 
whether immigration courts’ response to case backlog is also unique.  
III. Conceptual Framework 
 
The impact of case backlog on immigration court output in immigration courts 
remains both theoretically and empirically ambiguous. Studies on civil court activity find 
that increased backlog can either increase court output (Luskin and Luskin 1986; 
Rosales-Lopez 2008; Dimitrova-Grajzl 2012) by incentivizing judges to avoid backlog in 
light of reputational concerns or a distaste for backlog, or decrease output (Buscaglia and 
Ulen 1997; Murrell 2001; Mitsopoulos and Pelagadis 2007) by congesting courtrooms 
and court resources. In the immigration court context, it is unclear whether the 
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incentivization or congestion effect will be dominant. Immigration judges may be 
motivated by reputational concerns and a distaste for backlog, or increased backlog could 
congest the limited resources that are currently allocated to immigration courts. 
The model of judicial decision making of Cooter (1983) and Posner (1993) 
assumes that judges are subject to the basics of utility theory: judges are rational and, just 
like everyone else, maximize their utility. Judges derive utility from leisure, minimizing 
effort required to arrive at a decision in each case. Beenstock and Haitovsky (2004) add 
that judges derive utility from disposing of their caseload. Large backloads bring judges 
disutility, as large backlogs can provide a signal to other judges and superiors of low 
effort or underperformance. Reputational concerns, such as possibilities for promotion or 
recognition, encourage judges to minimize backlog. Notably, in U.S. Federal District 
courts, a Civil Justice Reform Act Report is released semiannually, which tallies all 
motions pending more than six months and civil cases pending for more than three years 
before each judge. These reports signal the manner in which each individual judge 
handles her court. There is no equivalent reporting mechanism in immigration courts, as 
cases pending are reported on the court-level only.  
Beenstock and Haitovsky (2004) find support for an incentivization effect in 
courts. They hypothesize that when an individual judge’s backlog increases, case 
completions will also increase. In the trial-level immigration court context, a quicker 
disposal of cases could result from judges ruling on the merits of the case earlier in the 
trial period or finding that the prosecution did not meet its burden in proving that the 
alien was removable and closing the case. This case completion increase, ceteris paribus, 
will lead to shorter case durations, especially in the immigration court context, where 
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there is a large inflow of cases to each judge and immigration court. In the immigration 
court context, if judges respond to an incentivization effect, they will speed their 
decisions by ruling quickly on cases rather than waiting to schedule additional hearings. 
Immigration judges may also be less motivated to diminish their backlog for reputational 
or prestige reasons because, unlike in the Article III court system, there are fewer direct 
routes to promotion in the immigration court system, and there exists little recordkeeping 
on individual judge statistics. 
In immigration courts, there is also a possibility that a congestion effect will also 
be present. This congestion effect is caused by an overwhelming number of cases into a 
court system, causing the functions of the court to diminish and judicial efficiency to 
decrease (Buscaglia and Ulen 1997; Murrell 2001; Mitsopoulos and Pelagadis 2007). A 
congestion effect may also be due to an expenditure of resources in the court system that 
causes more individuals to file cases: if backlog pressure causes judges to speed up their 
time to case resolution, more litigants may file their claims in the system, creating a 
supply-side congestion effect (Priest 1989; Buscaglia and Ulen 1997). Finally, a 
congestion effect may be present in immigration courts if, as Jonski and Mankowski 
(2014) find, judges feel less pressure as backlog decreases and expand the time that they 
take to complete cases. 
 There also exists unobserved immigration court-level heterogeneity that may be 
correlated with the caseload of a court. As individuals are sent to the immigration court 
nearest to the area in which they were given a notice to appear, the caseload of a given 
court will depend on factors including the size of the undocumented immigrant 
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population in a given area.33 Additionally, there may be reverse causality from case 
duration and judicial staffing: the Department of Justice could hire judges to help reduce 
the strain on the immigration court system. I address these potential problems in Section 
V. 
 The effect of backlog on grant rates for relief from removal in immigration 
proceedings is also ambiguous. First, it is possible that judicial decision making is not 
affected by case backlog at all. Yet, recent empirical literature on judicial decision 
making suggests that time pressures can affect the eventual outcome of a case before a 
judge (Huang 2011; Dimitrova-Grajzl et al. 2014, 2015; Chen et al. 2016; Norris 2018). 
If immigration judges are rational actors and make trade-offs taking time and caseload 
pressure into account, backlog should affect at least the marginal cases in their court. 
Successful immigration relief applications often include detailed evidence and 
testimony, and speeding up the process could impinge necessary evidence from becoming 
a part of the record. Given this need for more detailed evidence and testimony, successful 
applications often take longer to hear. Therefore, in the context of significant time 
pressure, it may be less costly for a judge to reject an individual’s case as it requires less 
time in the courtroom, and often, less time for the judge and their staff to craft an opinion. 
Further, psychology literature found that individuals gave negative evidence significantly 
more weight in decision making when making decisions that were subject to time 
pressure (Wright 1974). To the extent that immigration judges are subject to these 
                                                 
33 Immigration courts are an ideal court to study in this context as little forum shopping, or selection of the 
court by the litigant, takes place in the immigration court system. As individuals are sent to the closest 
immigration court to where their NTA was issued, individuals cannot select the court that resolves cases 
more expeditiously. In court systems where forum shopping can occur, the demand for court services will 
be endogenous to case duration (Murrell 2001).  
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cognitive biases, these judges may be more likely to rule against a case if they are under 
time pressure.  
However, if backlog increases, this increase could also lead to an increase in 
successful applications. Rather than being rejected relief outright, individuals with long 
case durations have the ability to amass more evidence and witnesses to testify on their 
behalf over the delay. Often immigration cases turn on evidence regarding country 
conditions, and these delays could lead to favorable changes in country conditions. 
Further, as individuals are awaiting their time in immigration court, they could also 
increase their human and social capital, another factor that immigration court judges 
often take into account when determining whether individuals may remain in the United 
States. These positive effects would lead to more successful applications for relief given 
an increase in case backlog. Successful immigration relief applications also rely on other 
factors, such as attorney skill, strength of claim, and individual immigration judge 
leniency (Ramji-Nogales et. al 2007, 2010; Eagly and Shafer 2015). While many of these 
factors are unobservable, I use individual case characteristics along with court- and year-
fixed effects to control for the underlying heterogeneity in case outcomes.  
IV. Data  
 
To examine the impact of backlog on judicial decision making in immigration 
courts, I use a proprietary dataset that contains over five million juvenile immigration 
removal cases decided between 1950 and October 2016. The Transaction Records Access 
Clearinghouse (TRAC) obtained this dataset pursuant to a FOIA request from the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), the division of the Department of 
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Justice that retains jurisdiction over immigration court proceedings.34 I am able to access 
this data through my appointment as a TRAC Fellow. The names of the respondents, as 
well as any other personal identifiers, are removed from DHS records before the 
information is released to TRAC.  
The TRAC dataset is ideal for my analysis not only because it captures all 
juvenile cases decided in the immigration court system, but also because it is rich in 
information that is otherwise unavailable elsewhere, including court outcomes and 
demographic characteristics of respondents. EOIR employees extracted this data from 
EOIR’s CASE database system, which tracks the workloads of immigration courts.  One 
limitation of this dataset is that it was recorded purely for EOIR internal recordkeeping 
and was not intended for individuals to engage with it for data analysis. Therefore, EOIR 
does not impute values for certain variables and there are missing values for many 
variables in the data.  Throughout my analysis, I create indicator variables for missing 
values for each variable that I use. There also may be a rate of error in the reporting by 
EOIR, as these data were used for in-house reporting only. As long as the measurement 
error is random for a given variable, my estimates will only suffer from attenuation bias 
and will be biased towards zero. If this bias occurs, my coefficients will be conservative 
estimates of the true effect. I address specific issues with measurement error for key 
variables in my analysis, such as with case duration, below.35 
                                                 
34 TRAC is a data gathering and research nonprofit organization that operates out of Syracuse University. 
35 The TRAC data is compiled into many different large files with different information regarding charge 
data, individual judges, attorneys, and hearing schedules. I merge these datasets across individual case 
numbers (labeled idncase in the files). Each individual has one case number, even if they are associated 
with the same family. In each case, each different proceeding also has its own proceeding identification. 
However, I merge on case numbers as a whole, and assign any judge information and attorney information 
to the entire case.  
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The TRAC data contain case-level data regarding demographic characteristics of 
the individual and identifies the judge, attorney status, and the court in which the decision 
took place. The data contain demographic characteristics such as whether the individual 
is detained, crimes charged against the individual, and the individual’s country of 
origin.36 The data also contain case-level detail such as the type of case, number of 
grounds for removal charged, number of applications for relief filed, and whether the 
individual was present during the hearing when the decision was rendered.  
There are a variety of different types of cases that arrive before an immigration 
judge, including removal cases, asylum cases, and withholding of removal cases. Over 98 
percent of cases in the TRAC data from 2003 until 2013 are removal cases. As the merits 
and procedures of different case types may result in heterogeneous effects on case 
duration and the likelihood of relief, I drop cases other than removal cases from my 
sample. In removal cases, I code a decision as a denial of relief if the individual was 
denied any relief sought or the judge otherwise rules that an individual is subject to 
removal by authorities. In my sample, denial includes voluntary departure orders, where 
an immigration court judge sustains the charges against the individual and issues an order 
for voluntary departure. 
 I code all grants of relief and termination of proceedings as relief granted. These 
outcomes include actual grants of relief, in which the immigration judge finds that the 
individual is entitled to relief from removal and may remain in the United States. There 
are exist a variety of circumstances in which a case may be closed. These include cases in 
which the government attorney prosecuting the individual’s case exercises prosecutorial 
                                                 
36 The data also has fields to record information regarding the language spoken during the trial, gender, and 
birthdate. However these fields are rarely recorded in the data. 
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discretion and drops the request for a removal order, or when the immigration judge 
terminates proceedings after finding that DHS has not established that the individual is 
removable. Under these closures, the individual is permitted to stay in the United States. 
There are a few types of resolutions to specific cases that do not fall squarely in the relief 
granted or denied dichotomy. An example of this is when the case is transferred to a 
different court. I drop these cases from my sample. I remove from my sample cases in 
which the final decision is missing. 
I create an indicator variable, in absentia, indicating whether the individual was 
present at the hearing in which the decision was rendered. The data also contain 
indicators for whether the individual is detained at the time of hearing, was detained but 
released from custody, or was never detained since court proceedings began. I create an 
indicator variable equal to one if an individual was ever detained. The TRAC data also 
contain a variable that tracks whether an attorney was present in the case at any time. I 
use this to create an indicator variable for attorney presence in a case. The TRAC data 
also include whether the individual was charged with a crime other than being illegally 
present in the United States. I create an indicator variable indicated that the individual 
committed a crime.  
Finally, the data contain the date when the case was opened and the date of the 
final decision. I use these dates to calculate the duration of each individual’s case in 
immigration court by counting the days elapsed from the date of the case opening to the 
date of the final decision.37 This information at the individual case level provides a more 
accurate measure of individual case duration across courts than previous studies of case 
                                                 
37 I find that for 56 individuals (less than one-hundredth of one percent of my sample), the TRAC data 
reports a negative case duration. This could be due to an incorrect recording of the date. I remove these 
individuals from my sample.  
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duration, which relied on the ratio of cases that are postponed or remain unresolved at the 
end of the year to the total number of cases introduced during the year  (Mitsopoulos and 
Pelagadis 2007).  
To obtain data on the number of cases pending, I use data from the TRAC 
Immigration supplements available online.38 These supplements include the number of 
cases pending at the conclusion of each fiscal year (September 30) at each immigration 
court. I restrict the case-level data from 2003 until the end of 2013. Restricting my 
sample to these dates avoids the confounding effects from one of the largest immigration 
reform acts in history, the Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 and potential short-term effects of 9/11. Further, limiting cases to only those before 
2014 avoids potential confounding effects of both a large hiring of immigration judges 
and a surge of immigrant children to the borders of the United States in the summer of 
2014.  
 To obtain an exogenous measure of backlog pressure, I construct a measure of the 
percentage change in adult immigration cases pending. I use the total amount of cases 
pending and subtract the total number of juvenile cases resolved in that year to arrive at 
the total number of adult cases pending. To obtain the percentage change in adult 
immigration cases pending, I subtract the number of cases pending last year in a given 
court from the cases pending this year and divide this number by the number of cases 
pending last year. Using the percentage change in adult cases allows for an exogenous 
measure of backlog pressure that is not tied to the individual juvenile case at issue. Using 
the percentage change in total cases or juvenile cases only would be endogenous, as 
                                                 
38 These are available at TRAC’s Immigration Backlog tool, available at 
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/.  
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longer juvenile case duration could cause an increase in juvenile case backlog. Using the 
percentage change in adult cases pending only avoids this endogeneity.  
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the entire case sample. I find, nationwide, 
and over the entire sample period, that there are an average of 8,533 cases pending in the 
court that the individual case is located. The average case duration from opening to 
completion is just under on year, or 364.5 days. Less than half (35 percent) of individuals 
have an attorney at any point during their immigration court case. One-fifth of individuals 
are in absentia, or fail to show to a court date when a decision is rendered. 21.8 percent of 
individuals in my sample have successful applications for relief to remain in the United 
States, and the remainder (78.2 percent) of individuals are denied relief and are 
subsequently deemed removable from the United States. 16 percent of sampled 
individuals have committed a crime other than being present illegally in the United 
States, yet almost 60 percent of individuals have been detained at one point during their 
case.  
Table 2 shows the summary statistics over time.  Consistent with other evidence 
regarding immigration court backlog, the average number of cases pending across cases 
in my sample increased sharply from 2003–2010 levels, from under 8,000 cases to over 
11,000 cases in 2011–2013. As this increase occurred, the average case duration 
increased slightly over time, from 375 days in 2003–2010 to 441 days in 2011–2013. The 
number of individuals with attorneys also increased over time, with a low of 32 percent 
of individuals represented in 2003–2006 to a high of 47 percent of individuals 
represented in 2011–2013. My sample also depicts evidence of increased immigration 
enforcement: the number of individuals detained has steadily increased from 43 percent 
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in 2003–2006 to 72 percent in 2011–2013. Overall, the changes that I observe in my data 
over time comport with anecdotal evidence of increased backlogs and increased 
immigration enforcement. I next determine how these changes over time have affected 
case duration in immigration courts.  
Table 3 depicts summary statistics by attorney presence. Attorneys in immigration 
court cases are likely better equipped to present specific evidence in an individual’s case, 
or could strategically delay the individual’s case. Attorneys may also be hired in cases 
that are substantially more complicated than others. Therefore, it is unsurprising that 
individuals with attorneys have a substantially longer case duration, with a case duration 
of over 721 days as compared to 164 days for those without an attorney. In the 
immigration court context, individuals may decide to hire an attorney only if they 
anticipate that they cannot adequately represent their own claims to an immigration court 
judge. Individuals with attorneys are also more likely to obtain relief from removal: over 
half of all individuals with attorneys are granted relief in immigration courts, while only 
5 percent of pro se individuals are granted relief. I examine the effects of the presence of 
an attorney in my analysis of both case duration and the probability of a successful case. 
V. Examining the Effects of Case Backlog on Case Duration 
 
 I first examine whether each court’s backlog is associated with an effect on case 
duration. To examine this, I use a fixed effects model, adapted from Dimitrova-Grajzl et 
al. (2012) to include court and time fixed effects: ln(𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = ∝ + β1𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + X𝑖𝑖 𝜆𝜆 + Z𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾+ ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                 (1) 
where k= 1, 2 . . . ., N identifies the court, t= 1, 2, . . . ., T identifies the time period, and 
i= 1, 2 . . . ., N identifies the individual. The dependent variable, d, indicates case 
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duration, measured in days, and C indicates the percentage change in the number of adult 
cases pending in each court from the prior year to the current year. X𝑖𝑖 represents a vector 
of individual demographic characteristics including detained status (if the individual was 
ever detained or has never been detained), if the individual was convicted of a crime 
other than residing in the United States illegally, and country of origin. Z𝑖𝑖 represents a 
vector of case-level characteristics including attorney presence, in absentia status, and 
case outcome. The model above includes a set of court fixed effects 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 and year fixed 
effects 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖. Including these effects controls for unobserved heterogeneity in courts over 
each year, including the number of judges appointed. Murrell (2001) shows that 
estimators derived from models studying court performance without court and year fixed 
effects can be biased and recommends including, at the minimum, court fixed effects. I 
include robust standard errors clustered at the court level.  
Table 4 shows the result of Equation 2. I find that backlog is positively associated 
with case duration, as an increase of 1 percent in case backlog from the prior year results 
in roughly a 4 percent increase in case duration without controlling for whether the 
individual has an attorney or the ultimate outcome of the individual’s case. This result 
signals that a congestion effect is occurring in U.S. immigration courts, as case duration 
is positively related to the increase in the number of cases pending. 
 I find that controlling for whether an individual has an attorney reduces the point 
estimate on case duration to 3.7 percent. Attorneys have a large and positive effect on 
case duration, as attorneys in immigration courts will likely be more knowledgeable with 
regards to immigration law than a pro se client. Attorneys have an ability to achieve 
advantageous delays in an immigration case, and can present more evidence that 
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naturally makes a case duration longer. Literature on judicial decision making in 
immigration courts (Eagly and Shafer 2015; Ryo 2016) has noted the correlation between 
attorney representation and increased case duration. Eagly and Shafer (2015) attribute 
this correlation to the fact that attorneys often enter into cases in immigration courts later, 
as individuals often seek continuances to obtain counsel. Additionally, attorneys are far 
more represented in cases with claims for relief (Eagly and Shafer 2015). These claims 
require time to file the application with the immigration court and time to schedule a 
separate hearing on the merits of the application for relief.  My results are congruent with 
these explanations regarding length of time and representation status.  
I find my results are also robust to the inclusion of case outcome, as the inclusion 
of case resolution does not shift the magnitude of my main coefficient of interest. I find 
that relative to successful cases, denials of relief are negatively correlated with case 
duration. It is intuitive that this point estimate on denial of relief should be negative and 
large, as individuals in immigration court with denials of relief may not plead any form of 
relief. Therefore, it is likely that an immigration court judge will order them removed 
with a need for less evidence and less time. Across all three specifications, I find that the 
coefficient for individuals who have committed a crime have a positive correlation with 
case duration, while the coefficient on an individual who has been detained is correlated 
negatively with case duration.  
Table 5 shows the results of Equation 1 by attorney status. I find that case 
durations are, for the most part, impacted in a similar way that is not tied to whether the 
individual has an attorney.  However, the magnitude of the effect of case backlog on case 
duration is nearly doubled when considering an individual who does not have an attorney 
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compared with one who does: case backlog is associated with a 2.3 percent increase in 
case duration with an attorney and just less than a 5 percent increase without an attorney.  
To determine whether my results are driven by heterogeneous differences in my 
sample, I separate my sample into three different time periods. Table 6 shows the results 
of Equation 1 by time period. The coefficient of interest on the percentage change in 
cases pending switches signs over time, indicating a potential for a heterogeneous effect 
of case backlog on case duration. From 2003 until 2006, a one percent increase in the 
number of cases pending is associated with a 7 percent decrease in case duration. 
However, between 2007 and 2010, this effect becomes positive, with a one percent 
increase in the number of cases pending associated with a 1.6 percent increase in case 
duration. In 2011 through 2013, a one percent increase in the number of cases pending is 
associated with an 11.06 percent increase in case duration. These results could signify 
that the congestion effect increases in immigration courts as only as backlog becomes 
sufficiently large that it cripples the court’s resources, and suggests that the relationship 
between case duration and backlog is non-linear. These results comport with the findings 
of Jonski and Mankowsi (2017) that a ‘hockey-stick’ production model captures the 
response of judges to increasing caseload: namely, that the judicial response to growing 
caseload differs between courts operating below and over their capacity (Gillespie 1976).  
There is potential that my results are driven not by congestion, but by other 
factors that I cannot observe in the TRAC data including factors that are often left 
unrecorded by DHS, such as language at trial and the underlying merit of a case. The 
omission of these factors in my estimating equation would result in omitted variable bias, 
which would bias my results towards zero. By using court-level fixed effects along with 
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court-by-year and year fixed effects, I capture underlying heterogeneity in each court-
year so that my results are not biased due to differences among courts. It is also unlikely 
that my specification is subject to concerns of reverse causality. It is unlikely that 
immigration courts caused the increase in inflows of cases, as these increases were likely 
due to increased immigration enforcement without a similar increase in staff that could 
handle such increased enforcement.  
My results do not examine the underlying quality of decision in immigration 
courts, but past literature has indicated a positive relationship between efficiency and 
quality of decisions in courts (Djankov et al. 2001, Buscaglia 2001). To examine the 
potential relationship between the judicial decision making process and case backlog, I 
next examine case outcomes in immigration courts.  
VI. Examining Case Outcomes  
 
When examining case outcomes, it is difficult to isolate the influence of docket 
pressure from other factors, namely the changes in the quality of cases brought before 
immigration courts. Huang (2011) notes that reversal rates in the appellate cases will 
naturally fall as caseloads rise if certain classes of weaker appeals are growing at faster 
rates than the rest of the docket. Similarly, if an increase in backlog ushers in less 
meritorious claims, it will be difficult to disentangle whether an increase in denials of 
relief is due to the increased backlog or due to the degradation of the average case’s 
underlying merit.  
While it is impossible to know the underlying merit of each case in my sample, 
Table 7 shows the demographics of cases during my sample period remain similar, 
though the share of countries has changed over time. Notably, the region of birth for 
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individuals in my sample has shifted over time to include more individuals from Mexico 
and fewer individuals from the Caribbean, South America, and the Middle East. There 
exists roughly the same share of individuals from Europe, Asia, Central America, Africa, 
Oceania, and Canada. As immigration claims often turn on specific country conditions, 
the similarities between the demographics of individuals in distinct time periods in my 
sample may signal a homogenous distribution of case merit over time. However, to the 
extent that the distribution of underlying merit of each case in immigration courts has 
changed, I use court, year, and court-by-year fixed effects to control for the underlying 
heterogeneity over time.     To determine the effects of backlog on case outcomes, I use the following probit 
equation: Pr(𝑆𝑆) = ∝ + β1𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + X𝑖𝑖  𝜆𝜆 + Z𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾+ ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2) 
where k= 1, 2 . . . ., N identifies the court, t= 1, 2, . . . ., T identifies the time period, and 
i= 1, 2 . . . ., N identifies the individual. The dependent variable, S, indicates success in 
an immigration court case and equals 1 if there is a grant of relief or termination of 
proceedings. C indicates the percentage change in the number of adult cases pending in 
each court from the prior year until the current year. X𝑖𝑖  represents a vector of individual 
demographic characteristics such as detained status (if the individual was ever detained or 
has never been detained) and country of origin. Z𝑖𝑖 represents a vector of case-level 
characteristics including attorney status and in absentia status. I also include court fixed 
effects 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 and year fixed effects 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖. 
Table 8 shows an increase in the percent change in cases pending also increases 
the probability of success for individuals in immigration courts when controlling for 
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demographic and attorney effects. This effect could be attributed to the ability to develop 
the factual record in immigration cases that a longer case duration provides, which would 
lead to a greater chance of success for individuals. I also find that detained and in 
absentia individuals are less likely to obtain relief in immigration court cases, as are 
individuals  who have committed a crime other than residing in the United States 
illegally. Table 9 shows that the effects of backlog on the probability of success hold 
when bifurcating my sample by attorney status. An increase in the percentage change in 
adult cases pending in an immigration court leads to an increase in the probability of 
success for juvenile individuals both with and without an attorney.  
Table 10 shows the results of Equation 2 over time. I find, like case duration, 
there is significant heterogeneity over time when I separate my sample into three distinct 
time periods. I find that from 2003–2006, a one percent increase in the percentage change 
of adult cases pending is associated with a decrease in the probability of success for a 
given individual’s case. This effect changes signs in 2006–2009, when a one percent 
increase in the in the percentage change of adult cases pending is associated with a slight 
percent increase in the probability of success for a given individual. This magnitude 
increases significantly in 2011–2013, when the same change is associated with a large 
increase in the probability of success for a given individual.  
These results are consistent with my findings on the effects of case backlog on 
case duration. As I find that backlog increases case duration, individuals may have more 
time in immigration courts to present their cases and provide evidence that merits them a 
grant of relief from removal. Yet, I find that the relationship between backlog and the 
likelihood of success may also be non-linear, as the probability of success only 
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dramatically increases when the overall backlog in the time period becomes sufficiently 
large. Ultimately, these results present a consistent story of the effects of backlog in the 
immigration court system. 
VII. Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides an empirical analysis of the effects of case backlog on the 
immigration court system and finds that a congestion effect is prevalent in immigration 
courts, as an increase in case backlog leads to roughly 3 percent increase in case duration 
days overall. However, when segmenting my sample by years, I find that this congestion 
effect is most prevalent in the later years in my sample when overall case backlog is the 
highest. My results suggest that immigration courts are ill prepared to handle the increase 
in cases that are flooding their courtrooms. However, I find that for respondents in 
immigration courts this congestion could be good news—an increase in backlog is 
associated with an increase in the likelihood of success in immigration courts. This 
chapter contributes to existing literature by providing an analysis of the effects of backlog 
on case duration and case outcome in U.S. immigration courts. This chapter ultimately 
suggests that while a congestion effect is dominant, there is evidence that a non-linear 
relationship between backlog and case-level outcomes exists. 
My findings implicate economic concerns, as the delay in immigration courts is 
costly. The United States spends nearly $2 billion on immigrant detention each year, and 
this number has been steadily rising over the past decade. The ever-increasing wait times 
in immigration courts have forced circuit courts to debate the constitutionality of these 
extended detention periods. The results of my study implicate a recent circuit split 
regarding when detained aliens are allowed a bond hearing while their cases are pending 
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in immigration courts. Section 1226(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
allows for the mandatory detention of criminal aliens for a “reasonable amount of time” 
to complete the removal proceedings. Circuits are split as to what constitutes a 
“reasonable amount of time” amidst case backlogs that are taking years longer than 
anticipated. Many circuits have held that this delay is a violation of individual due 
process rights. My results show that this delay—and the concern of underlying justice 
that circuits are grappling with—is unlikely to be ameliorated by increased caseload 
pressure. 
The impact of caseload pressure on successful grants of relief also has 
implications for the immigration court system’s deliverance of justice. If backlog 
pressure has an effect on the length of an individual’s case or—more critically—how the 
judge rules in the case, it is plausible that the same case would result in a different 
manner in a different court. As some immigration courts are now scheduling hearings that 
will not take place for many years, this examination comes at a critical time to determine 
how immigration judges are adjusting to this mounting strain and the effects that it has on 
delay and justice in the immigration court system.  
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Figure 1: Backlog in U.S. Immigration Courts, 2000–2016 
 
 
 Source: Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) Immigration Backlog Tool. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of Immigration Judges Hearing Cases in U.S. Immigration 
Courts 
 
 
 Source: Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC).  
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Figure 3: Number of Cases Per Judge, 2003–2013 
 
 
       Source: Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC).  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, All Cases 2003–2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Cases Pending   8533.21 11402.63 
Case Duration     364.51     539.58 
Attorney       35.92         0.48 
No Attorney       64.08         0.48 
In Absentia       20.56         0.35 
Relief Granted       21.82         0.41 
Relief Denied       78.12         0.41 
Committed Crime       16.36         0.37 
Ever Detained       58.78         0.49 
Never Detained       41.22         0.49 
N  2,284,432  
 
Note: Data shown is comprised of the DHS records of all juvenile cases in immigration courts during the 
years 2003–2013. The unit of observation is at the case-level. Data was compiled by the Transactional 
Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and was made 
available to me through my appointment as a TRAC Fellow. Data on cases pending in each immigration 
court was provided by TRAC’s immigration tool. “Cases Pending” reflects the number of cases pending in 
each immigration court.  “Case Duration” is measured by days elapsed between the individual’s Notice to 
Appear and the conclusion of their case before an immigration judge. Individuals are recognized as “In 
Absentia” if they are not present at the hearing in which an immigration judge announces the conclusion of 
their case. “Committed Crime” reflects whether the individual was accused of committing a crime other 
than entering the United States illegally. All variables except “Cases Pending” and “Case Duration” are 
expressed as a percentage of the total sample. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics, by Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2003–2006 2007–2010 2011–2013 
Cases Pending 7914.12 7586.85 11090.13  
Case Duration 375.58 364.48 441.36 
Attorney 32.54 37.12 37.12 
No Attorney 67.46 63.88 61.68 
In Absentia 13.71 13.97 16.03 
Relief Granted 18.88 23.03 23.50 
Relief Denied 81.12 76.97 76.50 
Committed Crime 15.52 16.59 17.15 
Ever Detained 43.35 63.25 72.43 
Never Detained 56.64 36.75 27.57 
N        717,376    1,125,804              657,732 
Note: Data shown is comprised of the DHS records of all juvenile cases in immigration courts 
during the years 2003–2013. Data was compiled by the Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse (TRAC) through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and was made 
available to me through my appointment as a TRAC Fellow. Data on cases pending in each 
immigration court was provided by TRAC’s immigration tool. “Case Duration” is measured 
by days elapsed between the individual’s Notice to Appear and the conclusion of their case 
before an immigration judge. Individuals are recognized as “In Absentia” if they are not 
present at the hearing in which an immigration judge announces the conclusion of their case. 
“Committed Crime” reflects whether the individual was accused of committing a crime other 
than entering the United States illegally. All variables except “Cases Pending” and “Case 
Duration” are expressed as a percentage of the total sample. 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics by Attorney Presence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Attorney No Attorney 
Cases Pending 12806.34   6138.20 
Case Duration     721.73     164.30 
In Absentia         5.48       29.02 
Relief Granted       51.76         5.03 
Relief Denied       48.24       94.97 
Committed Crime       15.34       16.93 
Ever Detained       40.88        68.80 
Never Detained       59.12        31.20 
N     820,489   1,463,943 
Note: Data shown is comprised of the DHS records of all juvenile cases in immigration courts during the 
years 2003–2013. Data was compiled by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) through 
a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and was made available to me through my appointment as a TRAC 
Fellow. Data on cases pending in each immigration court was provided by TRAC’s immigration tool. 
“Case Duration” is measured by days elapsed between the individual’s Notice to Appear and the conclusion 
of their case before an immigration judge. Individuals are recognized as “In Absentia” if they are not 
present at the hearing in which an immigration judge announces the conclusion of their case. “Committed 
Crime” reflects whether the individual was accused of committing a crime other than entering the United 
States illegally. All variables except “Cases Pending” and “Case Duration” are expressed as a percentage of 
the total sample. 
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Table 4: Fixed Effects Estimates, Case Duration 
 
 ln(caseduration) ln(caseduration) ln(caseduration) 
Percentage Change in 
Cases Pending × 100 0.0430*** 0.0379*** 0.0377*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Attorney  1.4947*** 1.3396*** 
  (0.0020) (0.0021) 
In Absentia  -0.2962*** 0.5051*** 0.7010*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
Relief Denied   -0.6251*** 
   (0.0024) 
Crime Committed  0.1457*** 0.1654*** 0.1796*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
Ever Detained -1.1441*** -0.8209*** -0.6846*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
Constant 5.8884*** 4.8259*** 5.2283*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0054) (0.0056) 
   
 Observations     2,284,432     2,284,432      2,284,432 
R-squared  
     0.4479     0.5565 0.5694 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. Dependent variable is the natural log of case duration. Data shown is 
comprised of the DHS records of all juvenile cases in immigration court. Data was compiled by the 
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and 
was made available to me through my appointment as a TRAC Fellow. Data on cases pending in each 
immigration court was provided by TRAC’s immigration tool. “Case Duration” is measured by days 
elapsed between the individual’s Notice to Appear and the conclusion of the case before an immigration 
judge. “Relief Denied” represents a denial of relief in an immigration court that results in the individual’s 
removal. This variable is described in detail in Part IV. Other control variables include country of origin, in 
absentia status, if the individual was ever detained, and whether a crime other than residing illegally within 
the United States was charged.  
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Table 5: Case Duration, By Attorney Status 
 
 Attorney No Attorney 
Percentage Change in 
Cases Pending × 100 0.0231*** 0.0554*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) 
In Absentia  0.2418*** 0.7759*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0035) 
Relief Denied -0.4734*** -0.9510*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0049) 
Crime Committed  -0.0044 0.2803*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0027) 
Ever Detained -0.4542*** -0.7453*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0034) 
Constant 6.4832*** 5.6823*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0093) 
   
Observations  820,489 1,463,943 
 
R-Squared      0.3311        0.4346 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. Dependent variable is the natural log of case 
duration. Data shown is comprised of the DHS records of all juvenile cases in 
immigration court. Data was compiled by the Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse (TRAC) through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and was 
made available to me through my appointment as a TRAC Fellow. Data on cases 
pending in each immigration court was provided by TRAC’s immigration tool. 
“Case Duration” is measured by days elapsed between the individual’s Notice to 
Appear and the conclusion of the case before an immigration judge. “Relief 
Denied” represents a denial of relief in an immigration court that results in the 
individual’s removal. This variable is described in detail in Part IV. Other control 
variables include country of origin, in absentia status, if the individual was ever 
detained, and whether a crime other than residing illegally within the United 
States was charged.  
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Table 6: Case Duration, By Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2003–2006 2007–2010 2011–2013 
Percentage Change in 
Cases Pending × 100 -0.0721*** 0.0016*** 0.1106*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0002) (0.0046) 
Attorney 1.2526*** 1.4253*** 1.1779*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0034) (0.0043) 
In Absentia  0.4020*** 0.7570*** 1.1850*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0057) 
Relief Denied -0.6086*** -0.6027*** -0.6920*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0053) 
Crime Committed  0.1294*** 0.2617*** 0.0723*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0047) 
Ever Detained -0.8217*** -0.6933*** -0.4984*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0047) 
Constant 5.4480*** 5.1187*** 5.0608*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0084) (0.0120) 
   
 Observations  717,376      1,125,804  657,732 
R-squared  
      0.5981      0.5902      0.5647 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10.  Dependent variable is the natural log of case duration. Data shown is 
comprised of the DHS records of all juvenile cases in immigration co013. Data was compiled by the 
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and was 
made available to me through my appointment as a TRAC Fellow. Data on cases pending in each 
immigration court was provided by TRAC’s immigration tool. “Case Duration” is measured by days elapsed 
between the individual’s Notice to Appear and the conclusion of the case before an immigration judge. 
“Relief Denied” represents a denial of relief in an immigration court that results in the individual’s removal. 
This variable is described in detail in Part IV. Other control variables include country of origin, in absentia 
status, if the individual was ever detained, and whether a crime other than residing illegally within the United 
States was charged.  
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Table 7: Demographic Makeup of Respondent Demographics, By Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2003–2006 2007–2010 2011–2013 
Region of Birth    
Mexico   28.54       46.24   47.98 
Caribbean   19.08       11.76   13.31 
Asia   10.40         9.91     9.45 
West Europe     0.89         1.06     0.88 
Eastern Europe     1.89         1.65     1.57 
Middle East     3.16         2.00     1.54 
South America   11.17         5.25     4.02 
Central America   20.91       17.53   18.12 
Africa     3.21         3.16     2.45 
Oceania     0.32         0.39     0.34 
Canada     0.43         0.38     0.38 
Demographics    
Attorney   32.54       37.12    37.12 
No Attorney   67.46       63.88    61.68 
In Absentia   33.71       13.97    16.03 
Relief Granted   18.88       23.03    23.50 
Relief Denied   81.12       76.97    76.50 
Committed Crime   15.52       16.59    17.15 
Ever Detained   43.35       63.25    72.43 
Never Detained   56.64       36.75    27.57 
N 717,376  1,125,804  657,732 
Note: Data shown is comprised of the DHS records of all juvenile cases in immigration courts 
during the years 2003–2013. Means reported. Data was compiled by the Transactional Records 
Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and was made 
available to me through my appointment as a TRAC Fellow. Data on cases pending in each 
immigration court was provided by TRAC’s immigration tool.  
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Table 8: Probit Model, Success 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Pr(Success) 
Percentage Change in Cases Pending  0.0221*** 
 (0.0002) 
Attorney 1.1025*** 
 (0.0027) 
In Absentia  -1.6505*** 
 (0.0056) 
Crime Committed  -0.0955*** 
 (0.0033) 
Ever Detained -0.9496*** 
 (0.0027) 
Constant -0.5626*** 
 (0.0071) 
  
Observations          2,284,432 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. Data shown is comprised of the DHS records of all 
juvenile cases during the years 2003–2013. Data was compiled by the Transactional 
Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
and was made available to me through my appointment as a TRAC Fellow. The 
dependent variable, probability of success, is defined by a grant of relief or termination 
of a case in immigration court. This variable is described in detail in Part IV. Data on 
cases pending in each immigration court was provided by TRAC’s immigration tool. 
“Case Duration” is measured by days elapsed between the individual’s Notice to Appear 
and the conclusion of the case before an immigration judge. Individuals are recognized 
as “In Absentia” if they are not present at the hearing in which an immigration judge 
announces the conclusion of their case. Other control variables include country of origin, 
if the individual was ever detained, and whether a crime other than residing illegally 
within the United States was charged.  
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Table 9: Probit Model, Success, By Attorney Status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Attorney   No Attorney 
Percentage Change in Cases 
Pending × 100 0.0163*** 0.0132*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) 
In Absentia  -2.5789*** -1.8342*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0067) 
Crime Committed  -0.1083*** -0.0434*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0057) 
Ever Detained -0.7276*** -1.4354*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0053) 
Constant 0.3586*** 0.0386*** 
 (0.0078) (0.0131) 
   
Observations      820,489   1,463,943 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. Data shown is comprised of the DHS records of all juvenile cases during the years 
2003–2013. Data was compiled by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) through a Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) and was made available to me through my appointment as a TRAC Fellow. The dependent 
variable, probability of success, is defined by a grant of relief or termination of a case in immigration court. This 
variable is described in detail in Part IV. Data on cases pending in each immigration court was provided by TRAC’s 
immigration tool. “Case Duration” is measured by days elapsed between the individual’s Notice to Appear and the 
conclusion of the case before an immigration judge. Individuals are recognized as “In Absentia” if they are not 
present at the hearing in which an immigration judge announces the conclusion of their case. Other control variables 
include country of origin and whether a crime other than residing illegally within the United States was charged. 
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Table 10: Probit Model, Success, By Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2003–2006 2007–2010 2011–2013 
Percentage Change in 
Cases Pending × 100 -0.2240*** 0.0162*** 0.3621*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0006) (0.0083) 
Attorney 0.8225*** 1.1137*** 1.1913*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0064) 
In Absentia  -0.0408*** -0.0344*** -0.2327*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0080) 
Crime Committed  -1.6760*** -1.7435*** -2.0890*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0102) (0.0162) 
Ever Detained -0.7361*** -0.8386*** -0.7469*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0071) 
Constant -0.9555*** -0.5844*** -0.5074*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0201) (0.0277) 
   
 Observations  717,376      1,125,804  657,732 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. Data shown is comprised of the DHS records of all juvenile cases during the 
years 2003–2013. Data was compiled by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) through a 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and was made available to me through my appointment as a TRAC 
Fellow. The dependent variable, probability of success, is defined by a grant of relief or termination of a case 
in immigration court. This variable is described in detail in Part IV. Data on cases pending in each 
immigration court was provided by TRAC’s immigration tool. “Case Duration” is measured by days elapsed 
between the individual’s Notice to Appear and the conclusion of the case before an immigration judge. 
Individuals are recognized as “In Absentia” if they are not present at the hearing in which an immigration 
judge announces the conclusion of their case. Other control variables include country of origin and whether a 
crime other than residing illegally within the United States was charged. 
 
 
